Constantin von Hoffmeister and Tsar Putin are both correct. How and why? Darwinian competition is the enduring, one may say eternal, leitmotif of international politics. That is unquestionable. Yet, some hermeneutical/analytical finesse is required. The Tsar's comments should be interpreted as diplomatic good manners and not as a factual description of a state of affairs. Yet, the Tsar's words are not devoid of substance. Quite the opposite. First, Russia is a nation-empire. China is not, nor is India. Each will, quite naturally, seek aggrandisement. Of what sort? India can not expand territorially. China can, but it will not since the costs of attempting to do so are simply prohibitive. Moreover, Chinese strategic culture is averse to such lunacies, as the B&R initiative demonstrates. For example, were Peking to pursue a war of expansion in Central Asi, Siberia or elsewhere such an adventure would imperil the very basis of its power (unconstrained flows of goods and resources to and from China). Seppuku, in other words. China's export based economy constrains its imperial ambitions. The question is: can one (of the three) seek politico-military aggrandisement at the expense of the other/s (a zero-sum imperialist scenario)? No. It is this impossibility that permits the Tsar of speaking about the equality of states (not economies). China's economic-industrial preponderance is colossal. That is unquestionable. Yet, China requires energy and, just as importantly, geo-strategic stability in Central Asia and elsewhere. In securing these two aims (and there are others where Russia is equally crucial) Russia is absolutely central. Indispensable, in fact. One may say that Russia's need to sell energy to China makes it dependent on Peking, turning it into "a junior partner", as some western analysts have stated with a condescending smile that expresses nothing but despair. The present dire economic situation of Germany, largely resulting from the embargo on Russian hydro-carbons, demonstrates that energy dependence binds both provider and purchaser in equal measure. The artic route is crucial to China, and not only because of maritime transportation. The artic is a secure Russian lake. India's energy dependence on Russia is structural. I could continue. What is important to understand is that, given the geographical proximity of these three colossuses, any significant conflict between them would lead all to significant Mutual Assured Degradation. India and China have what Russia lacks and vice versa. Conflicts between them were always skirmishes that never truly escalated. For good reason. Now, with greater substantive interdependencies on the horizon, the probability of escalation will further decrease, as will the likelihood of territorial disputes. Also, with the end of the Ukraine War and with the ascension top power of new and truly European political leaders in the old continent, rapprochement with Russia is, more than a probability, a certainty. I need not expand on the implications of this geo-strategic reconfiguration. For the first time in its long history, Russia will be the geostrategic centre of the most economically dynamic continent the world has ever know.
Darwinian struggle, writes Lonergan, is a "relic" of times past: "The idea of a return to multiple, geographically bounded hegemons is a fiction, because the West already won the hegemonic struggle on terms far more advanced than mere territorial dominion." The West already won the hegemonic struggle. Well, game over, then. A glimpse at American think tanks seems to reveal otherwise. Concern is omnipresent. Why is it so, if the war has already been won? Have all these "experts" become hysterical housewives? What arrogance, Mr Lonergan! Yes, true, hegemony was always much more than mere territory but, and this is the crucial point, it was never less than territory. The Industrial Revolution required goods from abroad. AI requires energy. Cosmopolitan centres require water. Chips require rare earths. India needs fertilisers, but it can offer services. Europe needs energy, but it can offer innovation etc. Territory remains crucial to hegemony. Why did you write a short time ago that China will be tempted to invade Siberia? Non sequitur, Mr Lonergan. Territory is the condition of the possibility of hegemony. Why does the US have hundreds of military bases around the world? This is too evident to warrant further discussion. Development and control of knowledge, technological innovation etc are, to be sure, vital to any hegemon. The US, as you well know, is loosing the technological race. Darwinian competition is not static. You can not say that the war has been won for the simple fact that the war is ongoing. The Industrial Revolution did not transcend regional empires and the need for resource-rich territories. It made control over resources absolutely crucial. Nonsense, Mr Lonergan.
What you write about China reveals how little you know about that country's economic development. Yes, it is politically centralised, the omnipotent party plays a role in orienting economic activity, but, in essence, China's economy is decentralised. Have they made poor choices in highlighting AI and technological supremacy as vital national interests? Have they failed in solar panels, battery production, networks etc??
"It is a fiction because the table is already set, and the rules of the feast have long been established by the West."
Well, the last thing to fall is pride.
Rules are formulated by Power.
Your words express denial. The idea that a state-driven (in the sense above) can outcompete a market driven (oligarchical driven) economy is anathema to you. It must be hard to have to accept this fact. Cognitively, I mean.
Constantin von Hoffmeister's argument for a new Darwinian multipolarity, where regional hegemons rise and clash, rests on a fundamental misreading of modern history. This vision, while rhetorically powerful, is a relic of a world that began to disappear with the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. The true nature of global power did not fracture into rival spheres; rather, it consolidated into a new, unique form of dominance that the West, and particularly the United States, came to embody. The idea of a return to multiple, geographically bounded hegemons is a fiction, because the West already won the hegemonic struggle on terms far more advanced than mere territorial dominion.
The Industrial Revolution unleashed a force that fundamentally transcended the logic of regional empires. Power was no longer measured solely by the size of an army or the breadth of a kingdom's borders. Instead, it was defined by control over capital, technology, and global supply chains. The British Empire, and later the United States, did not seek to rule every territory directly but to integrate the world into a single, interconnected system from which they profited immensely. This system, built on free trade, financial institutions, and technological innovation, became the new battlefield. It is a system in which the West's cultural, economic, and institutional norms serve as the default setting for global interaction. To suggest that a new "regional hegemon" can simply emerge and compete on this field is to ignore the existing, deeply entrenched infrastructure of Western power.
Von Hoffmeister’s claim that multipolarity is driven by Darwinian struggle fails to account for the true nature of modern power. The "claws" he describes are not just military; they are the financial networks, the intellectual property laws, the global reserve currency, and the control over data and digital communication. Russia's "claws" in Central Asia are not a sign of a new, equal hegemon rising; they are the desperate grasp of a declining power attempting to maintain relevance through outdated, 19th-century methods. China, while a formidable economic force, is a case in point. Its so-called "rise" is less a modern ascent and more a reversion to a historical model of top-down, state-driven control. This pre-industrial form of governance, based on an absence of internal pluralism and a rigid, hierarchical system, is fundamentally ill-suited to navigate the fluid, decentralized world of global finance and innovation. Its power is brittle and will likely prove unsustainable in the long run against the adaptive, flexible, and decentralized nature of Western influence.
International law, far from being a "ghostly word," is the language of this Western-dominated order. It may not prevent all conflict, but it largely dictates the terms of engagement, the rules of trade, and the norms of diplomacy. This legal framework is not an illusion of parity but a reflection of the hegemonic reality. The world is not fracturing into rival, equal spheres but rather showing signs of a single, deeply integrated global system that, for now, remains fundamentally organized around Western principles. Putin's vision of an equal table is indeed a fiction, but not for the reasons Von Hoffmeister suggests. It is a fiction because the table is already set, and the rules of the feast have long been established by the West.
The idea that the West has permanently transcended multipolarity is the Actual fiction. Industrial capitalism & financial hegemony did build a global operating system, but entropy is eating it alive: negative-sum economics, hollowed industry, fractured supply chains, stag-deflation, etc., is here to stay. Sir Constantin is right... History has always been Darwinian, civilizations tearing at One another’s throats when the center weakens. Russia’s “claws” & China’s brittle authoritarianism don’t need to mimic Western pluralism; they only need to exploit a collapsing empire already devouring itself. International law is not proof of Western permanence; it is the ghost of an order rotting from within. The feast isn’t fixed; the table is cracking, & new civilizational claimants are dragging their own into the hall.
Constantin von Hoffmeister and Tsar Putin are both correct. How and why? Darwinian competition is the enduring, one may say eternal, leitmotif of international politics. That is unquestionable. Yet, some hermeneutical/analytical finesse is required. The Tsar's comments should be interpreted as diplomatic good manners and not as a factual description of a state of affairs. Yet, the Tsar's words are not devoid of substance. Quite the opposite. First, Russia is a nation-empire. China is not, nor is India. Each will, quite naturally, seek aggrandisement. Of what sort? India can not expand territorially. China can, but it will not since the costs of attempting to do so are simply prohibitive. Moreover, Chinese strategic culture is averse to such lunacies, as the B&R initiative demonstrates. For example, were Peking to pursue a war of expansion in Central Asi, Siberia or elsewhere such an adventure would imperil the very basis of its power (unconstrained flows of goods and resources to and from China). Seppuku, in other words. China's export based economy constrains its imperial ambitions. The question is: can one (of the three) seek politico-military aggrandisement at the expense of the other/s (a zero-sum imperialist scenario)? No. It is this impossibility that permits the Tsar of speaking about the equality of states (not economies). China's economic-industrial preponderance is colossal. That is unquestionable. Yet, China requires energy and, just as importantly, geo-strategic stability in Central Asia and elsewhere. In securing these two aims (and there are others where Russia is equally crucial) Russia is absolutely central. Indispensable, in fact. One may say that Russia's need to sell energy to China makes it dependent on Peking, turning it into "a junior partner", as some western analysts have stated with a condescending smile that expresses nothing but despair. The present dire economic situation of Germany, largely resulting from the embargo on Russian hydro-carbons, demonstrates that energy dependence binds both provider and purchaser in equal measure. The artic route is crucial to China, and not only because of maritime transportation. The artic is a secure Russian lake. India's energy dependence on Russia is structural. I could continue. What is important to understand is that, given the geographical proximity of these three colossuses, any significant conflict between them would lead all to significant Mutual Assured Degradation. India and China have what Russia lacks and vice versa. Conflicts between them were always skirmishes that never truly escalated. For good reason. Now, with greater substantive interdependencies on the horizon, the probability of escalation will further decrease, as will the likelihood of territorial disputes. Also, with the end of the Ukraine War and with the ascension top power of new and truly European political leaders in the old continent, rapprochement with Russia is, more than a probability, a certainty. I need not expand on the implications of this geo-strategic reconfiguration. For the first time in its long history, Russia will be the geostrategic centre of the most economically dynamic continent the world has ever know.
Darwinian struggle, writes Lonergan, is a "relic" of times past: "The idea of a return to multiple, geographically bounded hegemons is a fiction, because the West already won the hegemonic struggle on terms far more advanced than mere territorial dominion." The West already won the hegemonic struggle. Well, game over, then. A glimpse at American think tanks seems to reveal otherwise. Concern is omnipresent. Why is it so, if the war has already been won? Have all these "experts" become hysterical housewives? What arrogance, Mr Lonergan! Yes, true, hegemony was always much more than mere territory but, and this is the crucial point, it was never less than territory. The Industrial Revolution required goods from abroad. AI requires energy. Cosmopolitan centres require water. Chips require rare earths. India needs fertilisers, but it can offer services. Europe needs energy, but it can offer innovation etc. Territory remains crucial to hegemony. Why did you write a short time ago that China will be tempted to invade Siberia? Non sequitur, Mr Lonergan. Territory is the condition of the possibility of hegemony. Why does the US have hundreds of military bases around the world? This is too evident to warrant further discussion. Development and control of knowledge, technological innovation etc are, to be sure, vital to any hegemon. The US, as you well know, is loosing the technological race. Darwinian competition is not static. You can not say that the war has been won for the simple fact that the war is ongoing. The Industrial Revolution did not transcend regional empires and the need for resource-rich territories. It made control over resources absolutely crucial. Nonsense, Mr Lonergan.
What you write about China reveals how little you know about that country's economic development. Yes, it is politically centralised, the omnipotent party plays a role in orienting economic activity, but, in essence, China's economy is decentralised. Have they made poor choices in highlighting AI and technological supremacy as vital national interests? Have they failed in solar panels, battery production, networks etc??
"It is a fiction because the table is already set, and the rules of the feast have long been established by the West."
Well, the last thing to fall is pride.
Rules are formulated by Power.
Your words express denial. The idea that a state-driven (in the sense above) can outcompete a market driven (oligarchical driven) economy is anathema to you. It must be hard to have to accept this fact. Cognitively, I mean.
We are now in the time of Hegemons made up of a mix of metal and sand. Fragility. Short cycle.
Constantin von Hoffmeister's argument for a new Darwinian multipolarity, where regional hegemons rise and clash, rests on a fundamental misreading of modern history. This vision, while rhetorically powerful, is a relic of a world that began to disappear with the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. The true nature of global power did not fracture into rival spheres; rather, it consolidated into a new, unique form of dominance that the West, and particularly the United States, came to embody. The idea of a return to multiple, geographically bounded hegemons is a fiction, because the West already won the hegemonic struggle on terms far more advanced than mere territorial dominion.
The Industrial Revolution unleashed a force that fundamentally transcended the logic of regional empires. Power was no longer measured solely by the size of an army or the breadth of a kingdom's borders. Instead, it was defined by control over capital, technology, and global supply chains. The British Empire, and later the United States, did not seek to rule every territory directly but to integrate the world into a single, interconnected system from which they profited immensely. This system, built on free trade, financial institutions, and technological innovation, became the new battlefield. It is a system in which the West's cultural, economic, and institutional norms serve as the default setting for global interaction. To suggest that a new "regional hegemon" can simply emerge and compete on this field is to ignore the existing, deeply entrenched infrastructure of Western power.
Von Hoffmeister’s claim that multipolarity is driven by Darwinian struggle fails to account for the true nature of modern power. The "claws" he describes are not just military; they are the financial networks, the intellectual property laws, the global reserve currency, and the control over data and digital communication. Russia's "claws" in Central Asia are not a sign of a new, equal hegemon rising; they are the desperate grasp of a declining power attempting to maintain relevance through outdated, 19th-century methods. China, while a formidable economic force, is a case in point. Its so-called "rise" is less a modern ascent and more a reversion to a historical model of top-down, state-driven control. This pre-industrial form of governance, based on an absence of internal pluralism and a rigid, hierarchical system, is fundamentally ill-suited to navigate the fluid, decentralized world of global finance and innovation. Its power is brittle and will likely prove unsustainable in the long run against the adaptive, flexible, and decentralized nature of Western influence.
International law, far from being a "ghostly word," is the language of this Western-dominated order. It may not prevent all conflict, but it largely dictates the terms of engagement, the rules of trade, and the norms of diplomacy. This legal framework is not an illusion of parity but a reflection of the hegemonic reality. The world is not fracturing into rival, equal spheres but rather showing signs of a single, deeply integrated global system that, for now, remains fundamentally organized around Western principles. Putin's vision of an equal table is indeed a fiction, but not for the reasons Von Hoffmeister suggests. It is a fiction because the table is already set, and the rules of the feast have long been established by the West.
The idea that the West has permanently transcended multipolarity is the Actual fiction. Industrial capitalism & financial hegemony did build a global operating system, but entropy is eating it alive: negative-sum economics, hollowed industry, fractured supply chains, stag-deflation, etc., is here to stay. Sir Constantin is right... History has always been Darwinian, civilizations tearing at One another’s throats when the center weakens. Russia’s “claws” & China’s brittle authoritarianism don’t need to mimic Western pluralism; they only need to exploit a collapsing empire already devouring itself. International law is not proof of Western permanence; it is the ghost of an order rotting from within. The feast isn’t fixed; the table is cracking, & new civilizational claimants are dragging their own into the hall.