Western Fragmentation vs Asian Cohesion
Decline meets discipline
Brecht Jonkers contrasts Asia’s cohesive, duty-bound vision of the state with the West’s atomized, individualist drift into bureaucratic irrelevance.
There is a fundamental difference between the “European”, i.e. basically liberal, and the “Asian” attitude towards the existence and the role of the state. It is a civilisational divide that transcends the typical ideological debate, and it showcases the clear difference between “Western” individualist versus “Eastern” collectivist attitudes towards human society.
Using a major oversimplification of a complex matter, I believe it is correct to state that Asia sees the state as an ultimately necessary tool to (ideally) ensure justice, social cohesion, order and harmony. The West, on the other hand, has a fundamentally antagonistic and negative attitude towards the existence of the state as such, seeing it at best as a necessary evil to prevent people from robbing and killing each other in the streets. Which incidentally ties in to the underlying negative and misanthropic view of human nature that underpins modern Western philosophy. But I digress.
The Western state is still, at its core, a “night-watchman state” of the British/US model that originated in the 18th century: a state concerned mainly (or only) with the prevention of violence in the public sphere, the preservation of property and the calm continuation of the status quo, no matter what that status quo is. Minimal intervention, minimal legislation and minimal support to anyone in need.
Obviously, things have changed significantly after World War II with the adoption of the welfare state model, mainly done in order to prevent the working classes from revolting. This change was caused by two main factors: the organised representation of labour forces who demanded their fair share after the sacrifices made during the two world wars, and the looming “threat of communism” from the East that showcased an alternative system that could lure the working classes away from continuing to support the liberal, capitalist model.
The “big government” changes made since 1945 have slowly been eroded since the 1990s, as the “neoliberal” (in reality: old-school capitalist) model has taken root deep inside the Western society and mindset. Margaret Thatcher phrased this mentality succinctly when she said, “… who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families.” This notably did not stop her from mobilising the British state’s military against Argentina or letting Irish Republicans starve to death in very much state-owned and tax-funded prison cells.
Nowadays, one of the favourite talking points of European political discourse is “that is not the responsibility of the government”: it is not the government’s task to help people find employment, to ensure affordable healthcare, to create and maintain the necessary quantity of available housing, or to ensure that the national economy is remotely sustainable. It actually makes one wonder what the point of the government even is anymore, and why we even pay taxes and are meant to obey laws anymore for a state that gives precious little in return.
That, in a nutshell, is contemporary Western political mentality: people are meant to obey and comply with the law, pay taxes and subject themselves to a stifling bureaucracy; but whatever you do, do not demand too much in return. You are on your own for everything else. And this goes across the Atlantic world, from the most ardently free-market fundamentalist in the United States to the Scandinavian liberal and even the red-flag-waving Labour Party offshoot on either the British Isles or the European continent.
The “Asian view” is notably different in its very core. Tied back to ancient traditions, such as China’s Mandate of Heaven and the idea of a harmonious society as found in Confucian texts, the state is a central pillar in society and human history.
The traditional Asian mindset, again simplifying matters here for the sake of clarity, is in reality a more quid pro quo situation than the Western liberal idea. Yes, the state demands and expects obedience and compliance to a far-reaching degree. The collective responsibility borne by every individual is far more pervasive in the East than in the West. Civil society and individual citizens are expected to comply with the traditions and rules dictated by the state, religion and ancient custom. The Western emphasis on “living your own truth” and “be whoever you want to be” is foreign to traditional Asian society. And these traditions live on across and beyond typical left/right divides, bridging the gap between very different political systems.
The social contract in the “Asian state” system is pretty clear: the population is meant to showcase filial piety and compliance with the laws and traditions, and in return the state has a very clear, almost religiously mandated duty to ensure public well-being to the furthest extent possible. Achieve the most benefit for the largest possible number of people, basically. The collective always supersedes the individual in matters of politics and society.
Again, this vision tends to supersede typical political ideologies. It is, of course, obvious that communists like Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung have collectivist tendencies, but it goes far beyond that. The founder of the very much capitalist and generally pro-Western state of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was famously quoted as stating that “[w]hat Asians value may not necessarily be what Americans or Europeans value. Westerners value the freedoms and liberties of the individual. As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective and efficient.” Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed also notably emphasised “Asian values” and a “Look East” policy during and after his tenure in power.
The state in the “Asian system”, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, is there to regulate, to control and to ensure to the largest possible extent the harmony and welfare of the populace. It is perhaps not a “democratic” system in the Western meaning of the word, true. But liberal democracy is not the make-or-break factor in international politics, let us face it.
And we cannot argue with the fact that it works. From the “Asian tiger” states that even Western media regularly praise, to the single most rapid and most extensive improvement of living conditions in human history that happened in the People’s Republic of China: the “Asian system” clearly works for Asia. This has led to a situation that Indian analyst and author Parag Khanna described in the title of his book with The Future is Asian.
If the West wants to play any role of importance in the present and future multipolar world, perhaps it could take a few pages out of the books of the ancient societies of Asia. Both long-term history and recent events have proven the long-term tenacity, liveliness and sophistication of these societies that are built around collective well-being, clearly defined authority, tradition and filial piety. After all, Asia has been the focal point of human civilisation for centuries prior; and after a hiatus of only two centuries of European-American dominance, it has become so again.
 | A guest post by
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Brecht Jonkers has offered a sharp and timely reflection on the growing divergence between Western and Asian models of statehood. His contrast between Western fragmentation and Asian cohesion cuts to the heart of today’s geopolitical realignment. By framing the issue not merely in terms of ideology but of civilizational structure, Jonkers contributes to a much-needed shift in how we evaluate political legitimacy and institutional resilience.
His observation that “liberal democracy is not the make-or-break factor in international politics” is particularly striking. It signals a departure from the normative absolutism that has long underpinned Western political discourse—and it resonates deeply with what is now becoming evident across multiple levels of analysis: that state legitimacy can emerge from coherence, efficiency, and functionality, rather than from electoral ritual, staged debate, procedural consensus, or the rhetoric of rights.
This is precisely what Lee Kuan Yew captured in his famous declaration: “My values are for a government which is honest, effective and efficient.” His words do not merely reflect an "Asian preference"; they articulate an alternative model of legitimacy, grounded in tectonic functionality rather than deliberative validation. In this view, the state is not a platform for the aggregation of opinions, but a structure of coordination whose legitimacy derives from its capacity to generate stability, order, and material welfare.
Jonkers’ argument, though journalistic in form, parallels a deeper theoretical evolution. Even Francis Fukuyama, one of liberalism’s foremost intellectuals, has gradually acknowledged that states need not be liberal to be legitimate, nor democratic to be stable. What matters is not the form of consent, but the functional integrity of the political structure.
Order does not need to be agreed. It suffices that it works. In an age of fragmentation and affective inflation, this is the principle that increasingly separates viability from collapse. As Western societies grow entangled in expressive individualism and procedural paralysis, the Asian model asserts itself not through moral persuasion, but through operational sovereignty. It does not demand admiration—it demonstrates capacity.
This is the tectonic lesson: in a multipolar world marked by entropy and escalation, the future belongs to structures that hold. And Asia, quietly but decisively, has begun to hold more than anyone expected.
This diagnosis resonates directly with the theses developed in The Fragmentation Trilogy by The Postliberal Cyborg, which explores the structural disintegration of Western liberalism and its replacement by a techno-emotional regime incapable of coordination. Against this backdrop, the trilogy proposes a counterpoint: the emergence of techno-cybernetic governance, not as ideology or utopia, but as a post-moral architecture of resonant coordination—a system that, like the Asian model, abandons consensus as foundation and embraces structural coherence as the only remaining ground of legitimacy. https://albertocarrillocanan.substack.com/p/after-fragmentation-toward-a-postliberal
Western women have hated on their men and attacked them using every available option of government for decades now. Most especially the divorce courts. I support the mass immigration program. I support the introduction of Islam and Sharia law to secure the rights of men and boys in the west.