The Shadow War on Russia’s Command

Hunting Russia’s generals

Alexander Dugin examines the covert war against Russia’s generals and the polar order safeguarding Russia’s sovereignty.

Recently, terrorist attacks targeting high-ranking Russian military officials have become more frequent.

Earlier, in December 2024, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, was killed by Ukrainian saboteurs and mercenaries. He had, in particular, exposed cases of Ukrainian Nazis using weapons prohibited by UN conventions and had been deeply involved in investigating the activities of biolaboratories in Ukraine that allegedly conducted experiments on innocent people.

In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff and responsible for military strategy in Ukraine, was killed.

In December 2025, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Operational Training Directorate of the General Staff and likewise a key figure in Russia’s defense structure, was killed.

At the same time, the enemy began targeting the top leadership of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (formerly the GRU). Initial reports claimed the elimination of GRU Major General Andrei Averyanov, who allegedly oversaw sabotage, military, and hybrid operations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and who was said to have died aboard the tanker Qendil together with his deputies. Later, this information from Western media was not confirmed, yet there is no smoke without fire.

Finally, on February 6, 2026, Ukrainian terrorists in Moscow fired several shots into the back of Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the official First Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff under Igor Kostyukov.

These troubling facts show that after the first wave of terrorist attacks in 2022—whose targets (and, sadly, at times victims) were figures of an ideological nature, ranging from my daughter Daria Dugina (although the investigation believes I myself was the intended target), Vladlen Tatarsky (Maxim Fomin), Zakhar Prilepin, and Konstantin Malofeyev to major media personalities such as Vladimir Solovyov, Margarita Simonyan, Dmitry Kiselyov, Olga Skabeeva, Yevgeny Popov, and others—the Kiev regime has focused specifically on the military, and recently on the leadership of military intelligence, the GRU.

The Kiev regime has shifted its focus to the military, and more recently to the leadership of military intelligence—the GRU. Collage by Tsargrad.

Several important factors should be noted here.

1. In this situation, Kiev acts as the executor, supplying hitmen—the direct killers—and carrying out their recruitment, training, and infiltration. Yet it is obvious that actions against emblematic figures of a nuclear power cannot occur without coordination with the leadership of the United States and other significant NATO countries. Without approval—and indeed without direct instruction—from the CIA and MI6, Kiev would not have dared undertake such actions alone and at its own risk, regardless of its alleged irrationality. Western intelligence services stand behind this targeted terror, and it is likely that a certain initiative belongs precisely to British intelligence, though not without CIA participation (their independence relative to the CIA should not be exaggerated—the United States undoubtedly remains the leader of the collective West). This means that the strategy of eliminating key figures in Russia has been approved at the highest level.

2. One cannot fail to see in this tactic a direct parallel with Israel’s actions against its regional adversaries—the leadership of Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Israel acts in exactly the same way: striking intellectuals, political leaders, journalists capable of influencing the masses, and above all the military-political leadership, each time choosing the most significant and pivotal figures. This indicates that we are dealing not merely with Ukrainian terrorism and its Western patrons and masters, but also with Israeli methods.

3. The shift from attacks on ideological figures to the targeted killing of military personnel signals a change in the enemy’s tactics. The focus now lies on circles that constitute the core of patriotic forces within the army leadership. It is no secret that both in Soviet times and afterward, the GRU formed a stable stronghold of people most devoted to Russia and its sovereignty, regardless of specific ideology. I wrote about this “Order of the Polar Ones” within the GRU, drawing on the works of Vilmare and Parvulesco, as early as the beginning of the 1990s. At that time, however, nearly all patriotic networks were crushed, and a fifth column of convinced Atlanticists (such as Anatoly Chubais or Andrei Kozyrev) entrenched itself in power in Russia. Yet as Putin carried out patriotic reforms, the “Order of the Polar Ones” within the GRU revived and gradually advanced to leading positions, especially during the Special Military Operation, when the civilizational confrontation with the West entered a critical stage—a struggle over who would prevail. Hence the desire, already belonging not to Ukraine but to the West acting through Ukraine, to eliminate the most important figures in this structure. The attempts on Averyanov and Alekseyev are the clearest markers of this turn.

It is alarming that the opponent (a major opponent, not merely hired Nazi hitmen from Ukraine) targets precisely those figures and circles whom the West—rightly or wrongly—regards as committed supporters of carrying the Special Military Operation through to complete Victory and as effective in the most crucial spheres, from ideology and information warfare to the execution of the most effective operations in military and intelligence domains. Thus, the enemy considers General Averyanov responsible for a developed network of pro-Russian structures in the Middle East and Africa and accuses him of conducting bold operations against Western influence networks in those regions. In their eyes, General Alekseyev is one of the principal architects of the “Crimean Spring” and the uprising in Donbas. Other generals likewise played key roles in developing and implementing important strategies in the “great war of continents,” which extends far beyond the Special Military Operation and Ukraine.

Yet there is another dimension. Western strategists are convinced that Russia’s ruling elite essentially consists of opportunists, conformists, and hidden liberals (since it was formed in the 1990s, when Atlanticist tendencies prevailed). These are seen as natural allies of the West—a “sixth column.” They are personally loyal to Putin, yet should anything happen to him, God forbid, it is unlikely they would continue the same course towards strengthening civilizational sovereignty and confronting the West. Therefore, the targets of selective elimination are either ideologues or the most influential figures of the military-security bloc—and recently, the GRU directly. The patriotic core of Orthodox intellectuals, on the one hand, and the security services—especially representatives of the GRU such as Averyanov and Alekseyev—on the other, appear in the eyes of our enemies as the principal problem. Of course, after President Putin himself, who is the symbol of Russia’s revival, the chief theorist and practitioner of a multipolar world, and the figure restoring the country to the ranks of the great powers.

However, the enemy cannot reach Putin (although even in this matter it has long crossed “red lines,” as evidenced by the recent drone attack on the presidential residence in Valdai). Ideologues and key GRU figures, unfortunately, are sometimes within reach. No illusions should be entertained: this is a Western-coordinated strategy that has proven fairly effective in Libya, Venezuela, Syria, and the Middle East as a whole. If a sitting head of state lacks support from convinced patriots and a core of truly loyal military personnel (such as the “Order of the Polar Ones” in the GRU), then the elimination of the top leader in a critical situation leads to an easy transfer of power to the “sixth column,” which then voluntarily hands the “keys to the city” to the adversary.

Therefore, the security of this sector of our society—patriotic ideologues and genuinely effective military figures (and if one believes the enemy, the effectiveness of Averyanov and Alekseyev is rated at the highest level)—is not merely a technical matter; much of the strategic security of the top leadership depends upon it. We are dealing with a very intelligent adversary. It understands the structure of our society with clear realism and knows full well the value of the “sixth column,” which dreams of a return to the era before the Special Military Operation, before Crimea, and ultimately before Putin. Everything rests on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and a fairly narrow circle of influential patriots occupying key positions in society and in the security agencies. It is precisely at them that the enemy directs its blow, and, unfortunately, with increasing precision.

(Translated from the Russian)