Putin and the Philosophy of Complexity

On the rise of the quantum world and multipolarity

Alexander Dugin unpacks Vladimir Putin’s Valdai speech as a philosophical blueprint for a multipolar world, showing how quantum complexity, civilizational sovereignty, and strategic realism form a new global order that defies Western simplifications.

Host: There are world leaders whom everyone watches and listens to. And then there are those whose words people not only watch and listen to, but also rewatch and relisten to. Vladimir Putin is one of the few in the latter category. Last week, he delivered one of his programmatic speeches, which was actively watched, listened to, commented on — and, quite frankly, feared in the West. Nevertheless, what do you consider the main takeaway from the Russian President’s speech at Valdai?

Alexander Dugin: You know, on the one hand, what he said did not fundamentally differ from his previous speeches at Valdai or other venues. Yet if one traces the sequence of his programmatic addresses, one can see how, step by step, our president unfolds a complete philosophy — an alternative to the Western globalist model. These are no longer mere remarks or tactical statements. That is why Trump’s speeches do not need to be revisited, but Putin’s do — because each one is a new episode in an ongoing series, especially meaningful if you remember the previous ones.

Trump’s speeches are clips, memes: you can watch them detached from American history, detached even from Trump himself. He says something amusing, dances, jumps, winks, threatens, frightens, and then retracts. It is a short-term format — small, inconsistent, flashy, sometimes menacing, yet contradicting what he showed a moment earlier. Putin is the opposite type: a world leader who gradually reveals his philosophy.

In this Valdai speech, Putin continued to elaborate on multipolarity — an idea he has been discussing for a long time, but now more often, more concretely, and more deeply. This is the unfolding of the understanding of multipolarity that is awakening not only in our society but also in the president’s own consciousness. Why multipolarity? Because it represents something new. It is neither a bipolar nor a unipolar world, nor the Westphalian system of nation-states, where each is supposedly sovereign but, in reality, is not. Only great civilization-states can be truly sovereign in our world, and this is becoming clearer over time.

Originally, “multipolarity” was a slogan — a meme that bound no one to anything. But now, just as one draws a line through two points, geopolitical consciousness and the president’s worldview narrative move along that line. He is outlining ever more clearly the model of a multipolar world, where the poles are civilization-states. It becomes increasingly evident why the multipolar world resembles nothing that came before. The only historical parallel would be the structure of humanity before the Age of Discovery: entire civilization-states — the Islamic Caliphate, the Indian civilization, the Chinese Empire, African kingdoms, the Western European and Russo-Byzantine empires. Before colonialism, there existed true multipolarity, embodied by empires, civilization-states, or macro-states, as we say today. Putin is charting this transition — not only theoretically, but also in practice.

At each Valdai meeting, he takes stock: what has been achieved, what has not, where there are obstacles, and where breakthroughs occur. A breakthrough happened with Trump, though the supporters of unipolarity immediately began to adjust and contain it. MAGA, in its original conception, recognized multipolarity, but the neoconservatives continue to pressure Trump, trying to push him away from that position. This is a constant, grand process of transition towards multipolarity, affecting all regions — within Russia, on its borders, in the Pacific, in the Middle East, in Africa, and in Latin America.

In the United States and Europe, there is a genuine civil war between conservatives and liberal globalists, who remain loyal to unipolarity — politicians devoid of substance, driven only by the frantic, dying will to preserve the unipolar regime and its ideology. Putin analyzes all of this.

People are beginning to understand that this is not a meme but a demand — one that must guide education, culture, politics, and the economy. We must engage actively and proactively, not reactively, in building the multipolar world. To do so, everyone must grasp what it truly is: an ideological trend, long-term and fundamental, explaining everything else.

This is no longer a novelty but a deepening of the theme. What is new, in my view, is the emphasis on the philosophy of complexity developed by the French thinker Edgar Morin. Putin mentioned several times the nonlinear processes of the new world, comparing them to quantum mechanics. Nonlinear processes, quantum mechanics — these imply interconnectedness, where even the slightest change on the micro level — from a blogger with an iPhone to an individual person — affects global macro processes. It is no longer a world of linear mechanics.

To understand this world, to build diplomacy, to interact with different poles, to grasp the contradictions of the divided West — split between Europe and the U.S. — we need new thinking. Diplomacy today requires immersion in the society, religion, and culture of every country and civilization. This demands, from MGIMO¹ diplomats — where I teach the theory of the multipolar world and civilizations — a complete restructuring of consciousness. It touches business, the economy, industry, the military sphere, and war itself — now nonlinear, as drones abolish the classical parameters of industrial warfare.

The philosophy of complexity, as Putin presents it, is the foundation of new diplomacy. It is a call to abandon simplistic views of reality. The modern world, with its multipolarity, is a complex system. Let us discard old clichés and cease projecting past templates onto the new; let us instead turn to quantum mechanics, and study civilizations, religions, and theologies, which once again determine the course of events. This is an invitation to a transformation of consciousness — of the entire state, and especially of its thinking class.

Our mindset — a confused mixture of Soviet remnants and forgotten liberalism — stands on the brink of catastrophe. If we fail to comprehend the complexity of the reality in which we live, act, and make decisions — upon which we depend — the outcome will be dire. In essence, Putin has called for philosophy. A great power requires a great philosophy. Without it, it becomes a golem: a mechanical construct operated by alien hands. The world is ruled by those who think. There are no rulers who are fools; if there appear to be, then someone else rules behind them. The world is governed by ideas: false or true, just or cruel, humane or inhumane. That, I believe, is one of the key conclusions from Vladimir Putin’s speech at Valdai.

Host: In just fifteen minutes, you have presented a detailed, substantive, and comprehensive analysis of the speech — its meaning and significance. Yet, if one looks at Western headlines, all they say is: “Russia threatens escalation,” the headlines declare. In smaller print, the more cautious outlets add, “in the event that Europe, the West, or the United States becomes militarized and flooded with weapons.” But the headlines everywhere read: “Russia shakes its fist at us.” You made a good comparison earlier: first comes philosophy, then the short clips for social media. For such short Western attention spans, is there anything serious or essential that can still be conveyed — or is Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev’s more direct approach, hitting hard and baiting the American president with trolling, more effective?

Alexander Dugin: I think Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev is doing exactly what he should. Each has his role. Vladimir Putin unfolds a serious, thoughtful philosophy. The West’s interpretation of it, however, is pure phenomenology: a person, society, or civilization sees in the world only reflections of its own preconceptions. In English, one says “reading”; in French, grille de lecture — a framework of interpretation. If a terrorist says “mama” or “meow,” we will still hear a terrorist message. People see their own reflection, and no argument can convince them otherwise — that is the power of consciousness. Europe sees an enemy in Russia through this prism and interprets every word of Putin accordingly, ignoring all else.

To be honest, I didn’t even notice any “escalation theme” in the speech. Putin spoke about defending national interests calmly and gently, noting that we share more in common with Trump than with European globalists. Yet they highlight what suits them: “Putin threatens.” The convergence with America is left unmentioned. Their reading is selective — they wish to see a threat, to prepare for war with Russia, and to justify its initiation by accusing us of provocation, using any pretext. If Putin had remained silent, they would have interpreted his silence as preparation for escalation. This cannot be corrected.

As for Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, he has mastered the style of short, sharp, precise remarks. This suits the Western mind. They say, “We will destroy you,” and he replies, “Try — and we’ll strike first.” It works because on their level of perception it is a meme exchange: meme versus meme. Trump says, “Russia is a paper tiger.” Medvedev responds, “This tiger wags its tail, and a nuclear bomb might fall on your head.” Ten beats nine — Medvedev wins the hand. It looks like a fool’s game, but by their rules, it’s poker. They ignore Putin’s preferans.²

I think Medvedev is preparing for the future. He shows that the future will be no less patriotic, only tougher. If our course continues, it will harden further. Medvedev is shaping the image of this country vividly, sharply, concisely, and memetically. The essence of his posts is to prepare the ground for an unambiguous line. Putin, consciously, is gentle and fluid in his formulations. Yet both the good cop and the bad cop are needed. Putin is clearly the good one, Medvedev the tough one. Together, they split the criminals, investigate the cases, draw the lines, and maintain order. They complement each other perfectly — both are necessary.

I am convinced that Dmitry Anatolyevich [Medvedev] knows exactly what he is doing, how sharp and sometimes undiplomatic it may appear. But when living among wolves, one must howl like a wolf. It is necessary externally, so that others remember whom they are dealing with. He is one of our most popular bloggers — people read him and immediately understand everything.

Will everyone delve into Edgar Morin’s philosophy of complexity or the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, or study multipolarity? Some will listen, but for the rest — those too lazy to think — Medvedev’s blog reveals the truth. To the ordinary person, everything becomes clear: in Russia, we stand above all else, to the end — “Surrender, enemy, freeze, and lie down!”

Host: The results of recent elections will inevitably affect those countries’ lives and our relations with them. Let us start with Georgia, where the ruling Georgian Dream party performed confidently in municipal elections, officially receiving more than eighty percent support. Perhaps this is a naive or simplistic question. In recent times — especially after elections — the situation has been accompanied by unrest. Some speak of protests, others of rallies. In short, people take to the streets with flags of familiar blue-yellow and blue-white colors. These are old schemes — devised twenty, thirty, forty years ago to destabilize undesirable governments. Western schemes used in different countries, though lately less effective. Or am I being naive?

Alexander Dugin: First of all, you are right: the mobilization of “civil society” to seize power or overthrow unwanted regimes has been a tactic that worked for decades, with varying success. It is a powerful weapon of new social and political technologies. It is not so much about creating opposition structures as about mobilizing free elements of the population: the lunatics, street preachers, and people who have changed their sexual orientation. These are mercurial fragments, scattered atoms of society — useless for constructive politics and incapable of representing any coherent position. Their numbers keep growing because Western culture deliberately destabilizes consciousness.

These uprooted, mentally weak masses — chaotic crowds — become a serious instrument of big politics. They shake societies, destabilize states, and then genuine forces arrive on their shoulders — forces that seize power and do not relinquish it.

Once the regime changes, these crowds disperse — they demand nothing, they are nobody. They are the refuse of big cities — liberals not in the ideological sense, but simply people living by the rule of “each for himself.” These chaotic atoms are easily mobilized for destruction. Yet they demand nothing in return. Upon their shoulders, liberal puppets rise and establish dictatorships. That was the case on the Maidan in Ukraine, and, to a large extent, in France as well. As soon as the liberals take power, they hold it tightly. The people they mobilized as a battering ram against legitimate, more or less sovereign governments — they later dismiss.

In Georgia, this has happened several times — it was one of the first color revolutions.

Host: But that was more than twenty years ago.

Alexander Dugin: Yes, twenty years ago it succeeded, bringing to power a genuine dictator and Nazi, Saakashvili. But Georgia seems to have developed immunity to these color revolutions — it no longer succumbs. The sovereign government of Georgian Dream, initially pro-Western and artificially European in its orientation — weak and contrived though it may have been — has nevertheless grown stronger compared to the hysterical provocateurs, terrorists, and Nazis, mostly a large mass of Georgian schizophrenics. It has accumulated experience and therefore resists.

This is a dangerous thing — the philosophy of complexity. Worthless refuse can overturn the fate of a country or the course of geopolitics. Microprocesses are actively exploited. Incidentally, in America, Antifa consists of exactly such people. Recently banned in the United States, it disguises itself as “anti-fascist,” yet it is an ultra-terrorist organization that brands inconvenient liberals as fascists, attacks them physically, stalks them, reports them, edits Wikipedia, and kills — as happened with Charlie Kirk. This is dangerous, because these people are mentally unstable and easily slip into physical violence.

But Georgia has immunity. Antibodies have formed. Georgian Dream has matured. It has learned to govern the country calmly — making no rash moves, resisting provocations, and guided by the idea of preserving Georgian sovereignty. It has found the keys: where to stop, where to act firmly, where to yield, and where to shift course. It plays this dangerous game from a position of strength and efficiency. It has grasped the algorithm and mastered it.

After Zurabishvili and the previous elections, everything seemed clear. But the liberals, inspired by the rigged elections in Moldova — where the Sandu dictatorship banned everything that challenges its power and meeting no serious resistance, decided to shake Georgia again. This time, I think, nothing will come of it, but one should not underestimate the strategy. It works astonishingly well: the more weak elements a society has, the more effective it becomes.

Western culture encourages their proliferation. Illegal immigrants — people unrooted in society, free atoms — can easily make the quantum leap from marginal existence to destructive force. This manipulation of chaos has become a strategy adopted by serious global powers. I believe the protests in Georgia will come to nothing, yet this constant threat will flare up again and again in any society striving for sovereignty.

Host: Next on the horizon is the Czech Republic, where Babiš has returned — a former leader some call a herald of change. Once again, the Czech Republic may join Hungary and Slovakia as a small but confident bloc of nations prioritizing their own interests, while European and Eurocentric ones come second. What do you make of this? The Czech elections have brought to power a man who is far from pro-Russian, yet his policy differs from the openly hostile course the Czech Republic has pursued towards Russia in previous years.

Alexander Dugin: The question is not whether one is for or against Russia — that is secondary. It is noteworthy that even Poland is leaning more towards sovereignty. Hungary and Slovakia prioritize sovereignty, freeing themselves from the pressure of globalist forces that seek to abolish it. Their logic is pragmatic, grounded in national interest: they shape their foreign policy — including relations with Russia — based on the principle “Hungary first, Slovakia first,” not “the European Union first.”

Orbán and Fico are not pro-Russian politicians — they are sovereigntists consistently pursuing national interests. A similar sovereigntist has now come to power in the Czech Republic. Even Poland, despite its hostility to us, is moving in that direction.

I recommend reading the monograph by the outstanding contemporary thinker Alexander Bovdunov, dedicated to the project The Great Eastern Europe — his dissertation transformed into a scholarly work. Several years ago, before these processes became visible, he demonstrated that Eastern Europe constitutes an independent geopolitical formation, distinct from Western Europe. This applies to all the countries of the region: Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and even Austria.

Bovdunov’s Great Eastern Europe project anticipated the wave of populist revolutions that would bring sovereigntists to power — by democratic or less democratic means — and that this would happen faster in Eastern Europe than in the West. This region will emerge as an independent pole: on one hand, European — close to France, Germany, England, Spain, and Italy — and on the other, close to us. It is an intermediate region, a kind of bridge. The zone of Great Eastern Europe could become a key lever in the grand European and Eurasian geopolitical balance.

Small countries adopting this strategic line — which Bovdunov formulated as a theory — are now seeing these scenarios unfold, including through Babiš’s rise. The sovereigntists of Eastern Europe will gradually transform it into an autonomous civilizational entity.

In my own work Noomakhia, two volumes are devoted to Eastern Europe — both Slavic and non-Slavic. Although I did not deal directly with geopolitics, I explored the cultural identities of these peoples. It is a unique world. Serbia is another vivid example of sovereigntism.

Gradually, if we accept that sovereigntists may retain a critical stance towards us, this picture will become dominant. The issue is not their attitude towards Russia, but the attitude of Polish leaders towards the Polish people, Czech leaders towards the Czech people, and Serbian leaders towards the Serbian people. The subject is sovereignty.

The sovereigntist wave in Eastern Europe will lead to the formation of an independent community. We are interested in this. Yet this does not mean they work for us or must be Russophiles. Their logic is different: they seek independence and aim to act solely in the interests of their own states. And they have good reasons for that.

I believe the populist, national forces will triumph sooner in Eastern Europe than in the West. In Germany, the AfD is winning everywhere in the former GDR and Western Prussia — regions less dominated by liberal totalitarianism, where patriotic forces are stronger. This part of unified Germany also borders Eastern Europe (Prussia can be considered part of Eastern or Central Europe).

It is a highly interesting project. What is unfolding in Eastern Europe is a stable trend, not a series of random outbursts or the handiwork of political technologists. It is the logic of the Great Eastern Europe project, taking on real geopolitical form.

(Translated from the Russian)

1. Translator’s note (TN): MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) is Russia’s elite university for diplomacy and international affairs, overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. TN: Preferans is a traditional Russian card game known for its strategic complexity, often used metaphorically to suggest deep, methodical planning as opposed to simple or impulsive moves.