Geopolitics of the Third World War

American hegemony or multipolarity

© RIA Novosti

Alexander Dugin maps the global conflict between American hegemony and rising civilization-states.

Many analysts are now advancing the hypothesis that the Third World War has already begun and that we are in its first stage. Whether this is so or not will become clear in the near future, but for now let us assume the validity of this hypothesis and attempt to survey its geopolitical contours.

The essence of the Third World War lies in a radical transformation of the entire architecture of world politics. The international institutions that exist today have long ceased to correspond to the real state of affairs. They are still organized according to the logic of the Westphalian system and the bipolar world. The Westphalian model is based on the recognition of the sovereignty of all states acknowledged at the international level. The United Nations is built on the same foundation.

However, in practice, over the past hundred years, the principle of sovereignty has turned into pure hypocrisy. In the 1930s, a system took shape in Europe in which only three forces were sovereign, and these were strictly ideological:

1. the bourgeois-capitalist West (Britain, the United States, France, and so on);

2. the communist USSR;

3. the Axis countries with a fascist ideology.

This situation persisted even after the end of the Second World War, except that one of the ideological poles—the fascist one—disappeared. The other two—the capitalist and the socialist ones—grew stronger and expanded. Yet once again, no national state was sovereign in itself. Some were governed from Moscow, others from Washington. The Non-Aligned Movement wavered between the two poles.

The self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR put an end to bipolarity, and from that moment only the United States remained as the bearer of sovereignty. The United Nations and the Westphalian model became a fig leaf for global hegemony. Thus emerged the unipolar world.

Already in the 1990s, it became clear that international law would have to be revised—either in favor of a world government (the liberal “end of history” scenario of Francis Fukuyama) or in favor of direct Western hegemony (as envisioned by American neoconservatives). European countries followed the world-government scenario and, as a preparatory stage towards it, ceded their sovereignty to the European Union. Everyone else was subtly encouraged to prepare for the same.

However, in the early 2000s, a new tendency emerged: the will to restore sovereignty in Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing moved to make sovereignty not a fiction but a reality. Thus, multipolarity made itself known. From that point onward, it was proposed that sovereignty be vested in “civilization-states”—both those already formed (Russia, China, India) and potential ones (the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America). These, in turn, coalesced into BRICS.

As a result, the unipolar project came into direct confrontation with the multipolar one. Both globalists and neoconservatives opposed multipolarity. The potential for conflict was evident, while the old norms and rules inherited from previous geopolitical eras no longer functioned.

Whether the Third World War has already begun or not is ultimately secondary; its geopolitical content is clear: it is a war between unipolarity and multipolarity over a new architecture of the world, over the distribution of sovereign centers of decision-making: either confined to the West alone or shared among rising civilization-states.

Donald Trump returned to the White House for a second term in 2024 with an agenda that suggested he might accept multipolarity: rejection of interventions, criticism of globalists, direct conflict with liberals, sharp attacks on neoconservatives, a focus on domestic U.S. issues, and calls to return to traditional values—all of this gave reason to believe that Trump and his administration would align with multipolarity, while seeking to secure the most advantageous position for the United States within this new framework.

However, very soon the Trump administration began to move closer to the neoconservatives and to move away from its initial position. This was followed by support for the genocide in Gaza, continued provision of intelligence to Kiev, the seizure of Maduro, preparations for an invasion of Cuba, and finally a war against Iran, including the killing of the political leadership of the Islamic Republic. Washington has now fully adopted the neoconservative position and behaves as if it alone possesses genuine sovereignty in the world: without any reference to rules or international law, it asserts unilateral authority over the entire globe. It seeks to prove this in practice: through wars, invasions, abductions of heads of state, and the orchestration of regime-change operations.

The Third World War has been initiated by the United States in the context of preserving, strengthening, and ultimately consolidating the unipolar model of world order. All others are offered a choice: to become obedient vassals or to be treated as enemies. It is against these opponents of the unipolar world that Washington is waging the Third World War. At stake is sovereignty. Since there is as yet no single power capable of symmetrically opposing the United States, it is conducting military operations across several fronts simultaneously.

The first front of the war of the unipolar world against the multipolar one is Ukraine. This war was provoked by the neoconservatives during the Obama era, and it was the globalists who became most deeply involved in it, seeing in Russia not only a geopolitical obstacle to the establishment of a world government, but also an ideological threat. Trump inherited this war and is not particularly enthusiastic about it (Russia is a nuclear power with a conservative ideology, against which the American president harbors no particular hostility). However, Moscow is clearly not prepared to accept a status of vassalage to Washington, insisting instead on sovereignty and multipolarity—positions incompatible with unipolar hegemony. In any case, Washington continues to support the Kiev regime, although it is increasingly shifting the initiative to the European NATO countries, for whom this conflict carries a principled and ideological significance. This front remains important, and the more resolutely Moscow defends its sovereignty, the harsher Washington’s stance towards Russia will become.

The second front for the United States is the Western Hemisphere: the seizure of Maduro and the establishment of control over Venezuela, preparations for an invasion of Cuba, and actions against cartels in Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and so on. In essence, this amounts to a war against all of Latin America, insofar as any of its countries attempts to resist the direct dictates of the United States.

The third front, now in its most intense phase, is the Israeli-American attack on Iran, which has ignited the entire Middle East. This also includes the continuation of Tel Aviv’s military operations in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and the redrawing of the entire map of the Middle East.

In effect, the West is currently waging simultaneous war against three poles of the multipolar world (Russia, the Islamic world, and Latin America). The opening of a fourth front—in the Pacific—is on the agenda. A conflict with China appears inevitable, given the global logic of the ongoing transformations in world politics.

India—another civilization-state—has so far adopted a wavering position and, due to its contradictions with China and Pakistan, leans towards the United States and Israel. Yet given its potential, India is hardly suited to the role of a compliant vassal, especially since multipolarity is the official course of its government.

Thus, in a first approximation, the map of the geopolitics of the Third World War is outlined. The party of the unipolar world is represented by the United States and the West as a whole, as well as their vassals, including Japan and South Korea in the Far East. They are fighting for two not entirely identical scenarios: globalism (the European Union and the Democratic Party of the United States) and direct American hegemony (the neoconservatives). At the same time, Netanyahu has his own autonomous plans within this configuration for building a Greater Israel, which fits only awkwardly with liberal globalism but is fully supported by the White House, the neoconservatives, and Christian Zionists. However, on the whole, this coalition is relatively united in the face of the multipolar world, and as escalation increases it will be compelled to act ever more cohesively, setting aside its internal contradictions for later.

The party of the multipolar world is far more fragmented. Its principal centers are Russia and China. Russia is already fighting its war in Ukraine, while China continues to avoid direct confrontation for the time being. The Islamic world is divided, with part of the Muslim countries under full U.S. control. Iran and the Shiite world as a whole are the most radical and stand at the forefront of resistance to the West, yet even the Iranians do not fully grasp that other fronts of this war, particularly Ukraine, affect them directly. The leadership of North Korea clearly understands the overall geopolitical picture and most openly supports Russia in its confrontation with the West on the Ukrainian front. Latin America is likewise fragmented. Lula’s government in Brazil leans towards multipolarity, whereas Milei’s regime in Argentina, on the contrary, supports the American-Israeli axis. In Africa, multipolarity is most acutely recognized by the countries of the Sahel Alliance (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger). South Africa, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and several other countries are close to this position. Yet even among them there is no consolidated stance. India occupies a neutral position: on the one hand as part of the multipolar bloc of countries, on the other maintaining close allied relations with the United States and Israel.

Overall, the unipolar forces, despite their internal contradictions, are more consolidated and have a clearer understanding of whom they are fighting, and for which interests and values. Differences in priorities and even in their visions of the final model of the desired world order between Europe and the United States do not prevent them from pursuing a unified strategy, close cooperation among intelligence communities, the exchange of military technologies, and so forth.

By contrast, the multipolar camp is far more disunited. Even those countries that are under direct attack from the unipolar West are in no hurry to integrate their capabilities or to engage directly in supporting one another.

(Translated from the original Russian version on RIA Novosti).