Krzysztof Karczewski argues that Russia embodies a distinct Eurasian civilization rooted in Orthodoxy and Byzantinism, opposed to the liberal West yet aligned with a “second Europe” of traditionalist, communal, and anti-globalist heritage.
Once, on Russian (and also Polish!) social media, I noticed a debate: Does Russia belong to Europe? In other words, does Russia belong to the circle of European civilization or rather to Eurasian civilization? Is the Russian people closer, civilizationally, to other European peoples, or perhaps equally close to Mongolic, Turkic, Paleosiberian peoples, etc.; closer to the Indo-Europeans, or also to the “Turanian” peoples? Are “Europe” and “Eurasia,” as civilizational categories, completely distinct, or is the matter more complex?
In my view, the dispute “Is Russia part of Europe or part of Eurasia?” rests on a great misunderstanding. First, I ask you, dear Readers: what is the civilization of Europe? Does it mean only the current postmodern (and earlier, modernist), liberal, globalist, non-Christian civilization of the West? Or does it mean precisely the Christian (more specifically, Catholic) civilization of Europe? Or perhaps it simply refers to the Greco-Roman heritage, reaching back to the ancient flourishing of Greek philosophy and Roman political thought? For European civilization is not monolithic. Indeed, the history of European civilization moved directly from its Catholic stage (the medieval Catholic civilization of Europe), through the stages of the Enlightenment (18th century), Positivism (19th century), and finally to the last stage of postmodern liberalism, the era of LGBTQ, modern technologies, artificial intelligence, and globalization. The trajectory of European civilization has moved in a single direction: towards desacralization, the loss of community, the apotheosis of the “free” individual, and the “liberation” of the individual from his own biological nature. Moreover, liberalism — the official ideology of today’s European civilization — was born within Catholic Europe. Yet the particular stages of European civilization — founded on nominalism, globalism, and the like — are quite distinct. Compared with the current postmodern phase of liberalism, the Catholic legacy is more traditional.
What is more, let us remember that apart from the Catholic heritage and the modern liberal, godless Europe, there is also the Greco-Roman heritage (and, by the way, that of other Indo-European peoples: Celts, Germans, Slavs, etc.), which reaches back to pre-Christian times. That is why, for example, representatives of the European, anti-liberal New Right distinguished between two concepts:
“Europe” — as a civilization based on the ethno-cultural heritage of the Indo-Europeans, a communal, conservative, and social heritage, glorifying brotherhood, social community, tradition;
“the West” — as a liberal, modern, mercantile, materialistic, technocratic civilization, with institutions such as NATO, the European Union, and a monocentric international order (with the USA as the “world’s policeman”).
Thus, in broad generalization, we can distinguish three paradigms within the civilization of Europe/the West:
the pre-Christian heritage of the Indo-European peoples (Greeks, Romans, Celts, Germans, Slavs, etc.),
the Catholic heritage,
the modern, liberal, Enlightenment (and postmodern), materialist, secular heritage (the present civilization of the West) — this paradigm has ruled from the end of the Middle Ages until today.
These three paradigms are quite distinct but at times overlap. For example, Christian theology absorbed from ancient Greece, reaching back to pre-Christian times, elements of the legacy of the great Greek philosophers (such as Plato, Aristotle, etc.) and also took interest in Roman political thought. Christian theology combined three sources into one: faith in God (the most important element!), Greek philosophy, and Roman political thought. A cursory glance at the history of the Roman Empire suffices. As Professor Jacek Bartyzel said, the decisive event in the history of the Roman Empire was its “Christianization, initiated by the Edict of Toleration of Constantine the Great, issued in Milan in 313 (or perhaps an earlier circular of his rival Licinius), and crowned by the establishment of Christianity as the state religion by the Edict De fide catholica under Theodosius the Great in 380. Then European civilization was identical with the heritage of the Christian Empire.”1
Furthermore, as this well-known political philosopher wrote, “The Christianization of the Roman Empire also made possible the elaboration of the principles of an imperial political theology, essentially the work of Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263–340). He developed the view, already expressed by Tertullian (c. 160–c. 220) and Origen (185–254), that Providence had included the Roman Empire in the divine salvific plan, since the Word of God chose as the time of His Incarnation the very moment when Octavian Augustus established the Pax Romana. Now, when the Empire had accepted the true religion, it would establish earthly rule according to the divine archetype, finding its strength in its resemblance to God’s monarchy, and the orbis Romanus and the orbis Christianus would coincide. Articulated by Eusebius and realized by Constantine, Christian ecumenism meant replacing a purely political universalism with a spiritual (religious) universalism, which made the empire an instrument of evangelization.”2
Yet in 395, Theodosius I the Great divided the empire into two parts: western (Romance-Latin) and eastern (Greek). The political unity of the empire, which had always possessed a sacred and universal mission (to spread the Divine Truth), was broken. Soon after, the Western Roman Empire fell. The last emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was overthrown by the Germanic leader Odoacer, while the Eastern Roman Empire (called “Byzantium” by Western historians) survived until 1453 (the fall of Constantinople).
Later, from about the 9th century AD, Christian ecclesiastical structures began to tear from within, bogged down in dogmatic differences, and eventually split into two branches: Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Naturally, the bastion of Catholicism was then Western Europe, while the bastion of true Christianity — that is, Orthodoxy — was Eastern Europe. Consequently, Orthodoxy triumphed in the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire was already a truly Christian (Orthodox) empire, the legitimate heir of the Christian Roman Empire (of the time of Constantine the Great and Theodosius the Great).
Thus, European civilization was divided into:
a Western, Catholic, Romance-Germanic-Latin part,
an Eastern, Orthodox, Byzantine, Greek (later Russian) part.
Therefore, if you say: “Russia is not Europe,” or “Russian civilization contradicts European civilization” (or “Western civilization”), and by this you mean only the liberal, Western, Romano-Latin-Germanic Europe, the present Europe, the broader West, the “transatlantic” community, the modern heritage of Europe/the West, and even, after further reflection, the Catholic heritage of Europe — then you are right! Russian identity rests on traditional Orthodox principles, on Byzantinism, mysticism, the superiority of spirit over matter, on Orthodox concepts such as sobornost, Bogochelovechestvo (God-manhood), as well as Dostoevsky’s notion of the “pan-human.” This heritage reaches back to the Christian Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and Russian Tsardom. It stands in part opposed to the Catholic, and even more so to the liberal, Western, rationalist, modernist (and postmodernist), technocratic, materialist civilization of Europe that identifies “Europe” with “the West.” Incidentally, the antagonism — rationalist-Catholic-liberal Europe versus Orthodox-Byzantine Russia — was precisely how it was defined by the Slavophiles (e.g., Aleksey Khomyakov, Konstantin Aksakov, Ivan Kireevsky), by Nikolai Danilevsky, by the pochvenniki3 (e.g., Fyodor Dostoevsky), and by the Eurasianists (e.g., Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Pyotr Savitsky, Pyotr Suvchinsky, Sergei Efron, Lev Karsavin, George Vernadsky).
Yet if you maintain that “Russia is part of Europe” (without going into detail!) but also that “Russia is not Europe” (again, without detail!), treating “European civilization” as a single entity without qualification, even as “Christian European civilization,” as if it were monolithic — then, I warn you, you will encounter many fierce misunderstandings, passionate disputes, and ambiguities.
Indeed, the heritage of Europe in its dominant current evolved from Catholicism through the Enlightenment, through the ideologies of liberalism, socialism, nationalism, to postmodernism and LGBT affirmation. Yet there is also a “second Europe”: essentially peripheral, mystical, fervently anti-liberal, anti-Western, anti-globalist, identity-focused and social, based on brotherhood, community, and tradition, and quite close to the heritage of Eastern Europe — Slavic, Byzantine, Orthodox heritage. This “Europe-2” finds expression in the declarations and programs, in part, of nationalist and socialist parties skeptical towards the European Union, U.S. domination, globalism, the monocentric international order, and the entrenched technocratic power of bankers and politicians acting as compradors of the USA.
What is more, anti-liberal, anti-Western, social and conservative “Europe-2” is ideologically and culturally much closer to Russia-Eurasia than to mainstream, liberal, Western, globalist, and materialist Europe (the West)! Consider the antagonism: the present civilization of the West affirms individualism, “freedom,” progress, globalism, rationalism, political correctness, “cancel culture” (in reality, totalitarian methods of surveillance and ostracism), LGBTQ affirmation, whereas the Russian and Eurasian civilization affirms community, tradition, “blossoming complexity,” mysticism, the true freedom of man, the freedom of the soul and the choice of the individual (within the boundaries set by natural law), and the traditional family model as the basic cell of organic society. Indeed, “Europe-2” contains many identitarian, national, conservative, communal, religious elements (e.g., Catholic ones — here naturally in their traditionalist and anti-liberal form), yet no signs of affirming liberal values.
Moreover, Russian (Eurasian) civilization, Russia-Eurasia, unites not only the political and administrative heritage of the empire of Genghis Khan from the East but also — and perhaps most importantly — the identitarian heritage of Eastern Europe: Orthodox, Byzantine, and Russian in the narrow sense (ethnic Russian) — see: “Moscow, the Third Rome.”
In other words, the thesis of the clash “Russia versus Europe” sometimes appears vague, general, unspecific, and accompanied by many misunderstandings. Today, Russia opposes the dominant Western, liberal, Enlightenment, postmodern, mercantile, LGBTQ-affirming (and, to a lesser degree, Catholic) line of Europe’s heritage, but not the entire cultural heritage of that Old Continent!
The thesis of the clash “Russia versus the West” — this, I think, is the most appropriate. It is worth remembering the validity of such a civilizational conflict:
Liberal, Western, individualist, globalist, mercantile, materialist Europe (the West) versus communal and social “Europe-2,” Byzantine and Orthodox Eastern Europe (and indirectly, the civilization of Russia-Eurasia).
I consider it certain that Russia is Eurasia, which means that it is an original civilization and empire, guarding the wealth of the Russian people as a multi-ethnic community, whose core is the Russians in the narrow sense and their Russian-Orthodox culture. Indeed, it is a certainty that Russia embodies, in essence, the Byzantine, Orthodox, and Slavic heritage of identity, and thus the heritage of Eastern Europe, combined with the political and administrative heritage of the empire of Genghis Khan from the East. By virtue of the important spiritual (religious, Byzantine) component of its culture, Russia may assume the mission of rejoicing in and saving Europe. Indeed, Russia, with the mission of Christianizing Europe, may even forge an alliance with European Catholic-traditionalist, pro-Russian circles: “Christian (Orthodox-Catholic) Eastern Europe against the atheist West (especially Western Europe),” “God, Church, religion against the world of economics, the technocratic elite, mercantilism, finance, big corporations, global domination of the USA, NATO, globalization, and postmodernism.” In short: “The West versus the alliance of traditional empires: the Catholic Imperium Europeanum and the Orthodox Eurasian Empire (in its classic form, i.e., from the Bug to Vladivostok).” By the way, the alliance of these two empires would mean a strategic axis, a foundation for a broader Eurasian empire, i.e., from Reykjavik to Vladivostok.
Thus, in summary: “Europe against Russia” — no. “Liberal, Western Europe against the alternative, nonconformist Europe, ‘Europe-2,’ and Byzantine, Orthodox Eastern Europe (and indirectly Russia-Eurasia)” — yes. “The West against Russia” — yes, yes, yes! The transatlantic civilization of the West and the civilization of Russia-Eurasia can be defined as follows:
The liberal, globalist, transatlantic civilization of the West versus the alliance of:
the civilization of Russia-Eurasia (uniting above all Orthodox, Byzantine, and Slavic Eastern Europe, as well as many Mongolic, Turkic, Ugric, Manchu, and Paleosiberian peoples and ethnic groups),
the peripheral, anti-liberal, diverse, conservative, socialist, popular and nationalist, Catholic (in its traditionalist and pro-Russian form, of course) “Europe-2,”
the Asian, African, and Latin American civilizations.
(Translated from the original Polish essay here)
Bartyzel, Cesarstwo, http://www.legitymizm.org/ebp-cesarstwo, accessed 11 June 2023.
Ibid.
Translator’s note: The pochvenniki (Russian: почвенники, from pochva — “soil” or “native ground”) were a group of 19th-century Russian intellectuals and writers who argued for a cultural and spiritual revival rooted in the Russian people’s “native soil.”
Russia's complete embracing of Europe was tried before, in 1991. What followed was a long decade of horror something like Victor Hugo's Les Miserables melting into Dostoevsky's The Devils.
One thing became totally clear, Russian ethos, Russian values and culture are not compatible with European analogues.
The idea of another 'iron curtain' dropping across Europe is a big heads-up that history likes to repeat itself, just in different ways. Sure, these actions show real worries about security, but they also point out the increasing splits and political tensions that are changing borders and friendships. Europe's plan to deal with Russia really drives home how worry, planning, and strength are still calling the shots, even in today's connected world.