I just started reading, I have yet to complete it, this is a beautiful piece! But just a quick point, the Emiratis are totally out of this one, but yes the Giants brigade and Tariq’s forces were to some degree supported by the Emiratis extensively at one point, now both groups are fully behind Saudi and stepping away from the Emiratis — not by choice of course.
Thank you. It is difficult for the average person to understand what is going on in Yemen as we swim in a propaganda shaped world of terrorism labels, Sunni vs Shia, good guys vs terrorists etc. I wonder what will happen to the adherence to my home,my family, my tribe world view when they take over Aden and the rest of Yemen. Will Schmidt’s theory of bureaucratization prevail with the consequent weakening of adherence.
On another note: we westerners have very little understanding of the Arabian peninsula peoples. We just see the monolith of the states. Further information would be appreciated. Thanks again
Thank you for this thoughtful comment. You are asking exactly the right question, and it is a question that Carl Schmitt himself raised at the end of Theorie des Partisanen: what happens to the partisan when the war ends, or when the partisan becomes the state? Schmitt was pessimistic. He believed that the regular army and the bureaucrat would inevitably absorb the irregular fighter, and that the teluric energy of the partisan would be neutralized by the apparatus of the state.
But Yemen may be a case that complicates Schmitt's pessimism. Let me explain why.
On bureaucratization:
Ansar Allah has indeed begun to institutionalize. Since taking Sanaa in 2014, they have established a Supreme Revolutionary Committee and a Supreme Political Council, appointed governors, and created parallel governance structures. A recent study by Abdulmalik Eissa at Sana'a University describes this as a transformation "from a religious-cultural protest movement into a dominant political authority". The Berghof Foundation has documented how Ansar Allah shifted its "supervisors" from informal posts into formal government jobs—what they call a "re-formalisation of de facto operations".
So yes, bureaucratization is happening. But here is the crucial nuance: in Yemen, the state has always been weak, and the tribe has always been strong. Tribal elders in Al-Jawf and Marib still mediate disputes, negotiate ceasefires, and coordinate security functions. As one tribal elder told researchers: "We don't run a state. We keep people from killing each other". This means that even if Ansar Allah builds a bureaucracy, it cannot simply replace the tribal system. It must coexist with it, embed itself within it, or risk losing the very social base that gives it legitimacy.
The question is not whether bureaucratization happens—it always does—but whether the movement retains its ideological core. And here, Ansar Allah has an advantage that Schmitt did not fully anticipate: the qa'id al-sayf (the principle of rising with the sword) is not a bureaucratic principle. It is a religious obligation. It cannot be delegated to a bureaucrat. It requires the leader to act, to be present, to embody the resistance. This is why, as your comment implies, the adherence to "my home, my family, my tribe" worldview is not simply a pre-modern residue. It is a form of political legitimacy that the modern state has never fully replaced in Yemen.
I would add this: the very fact that Ansar Allah has been able to withstand years of war, blockade, and terror-listing—while simultaneously governing 70 percent of Yemen's population—suggests that its legitimacy is not derived from bureaucratic procedure, but from the act of resistance itself. The moment it stops resisting, the moment it becomes merely an administration, it risks the same fate Schmitt predicted. But that moment has not yet arrived.
To understand Yemen, one must understand that the tribe is not a relic. It is a living institution with a thousand-year history, a system of customary law ('urf), and a moral economy of honor and protection. Paul Dresch's work on Yemeni tribes shows how deeply this system is embedded in the relationship between the major tribes, the Zaydi Imamate, and ideas of statehood. When Western analysts reduce this to "Sunni vs. Shia" or "Iran vs. Saudi Arabia," they are not describing Yemen. They are describing their own categories.
In short: Schmitt's theory of bureaucratization is a real risk, but Yemen's tribal structure and Ansar Allah's ideological commitment to resistance may slow it down. The movement is not a state. It is something else—a partisan order that governs without fully becoming a state, and resists without fully becoming an army. Whether it can sustain this dual identity is the real question. And that question is not answered by Schmitt. It is answered by Yemen itself.
Thank you again for engaging so seriously. It is rare and appreciated.
Thank you for adding more nuance. I think about these things as I fully believe that most peoples, even those not tied together by blood/ tribe, hang together by shared values and a common understanding of their ecosystem, political and social. This adherence grows greater when the commonality is attacked. I am Canadian and see this now with the way the citizenry has responded to the attack by the gangster regime ( I will not in principle use its name) south of us. Even those with very disparate backgrounds have come together, taken individual action and demanded similar action by governments, organizations and businesses. The purpose to defend our values and systems. Our country. This from a nation of immigrants! So I disagree that the underlying values and world view of Ansar Allah is pre modern. My worry for both the people of Yemen and my people is that the consequence of the modern information technology is to undermine the comity of shared values and understanding. Thank you again. It is hard to get accessible information for understanding of the peoples of the Middle East.
Seeing how Hussaini principles are the very foundation of the Resistance Axis, from Iran to Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, the risks mentioned are less likely to occur Insha’Allah.
One might say that, insofar as his motivation is ideological and his power is only as strong as his connection to the soil he stands on, the partisan is the opposite of the mercenary.
The analogy is striking: the Houthis operate as modern Schmittian partisans. Through their Zaydi doctrine of resistance and control over critical territory, they are fueling an Iran-centered geopolitical Großraum designed to dismantle Western maritime hegemony.
I just started reading, I have yet to complete it, this is a beautiful piece! But just a quick point, the Emiratis are totally out of this one, but yes the Giants brigade and Tariq’s forces were to some degree supported by the Emiratis extensively at one point, now both groups are fully behind Saudi and stepping away from the Emiratis — not by choice of course.
Thank you! Your lens makes this very complex context quite intelligible. Very informative.
It is a great pleasure that you feel this way about my writing.
Thank you. It is difficult for the average person to understand what is going on in Yemen as we swim in a propaganda shaped world of terrorism labels, Sunni vs Shia, good guys vs terrorists etc. I wonder what will happen to the adherence to my home,my family, my tribe world view when they take over Aden and the rest of Yemen. Will Schmidt’s theory of bureaucratization prevail with the consequent weakening of adherence.
On another note: we westerners have very little understanding of the Arabian peninsula peoples. We just see the monolith of the states. Further information would be appreciated. Thanks again
Thank you for this thoughtful comment. You are asking exactly the right question, and it is a question that Carl Schmitt himself raised at the end of Theorie des Partisanen: what happens to the partisan when the war ends, or when the partisan becomes the state? Schmitt was pessimistic. He believed that the regular army and the bureaucrat would inevitably absorb the irregular fighter, and that the teluric energy of the partisan would be neutralized by the apparatus of the state.
But Yemen may be a case that complicates Schmitt's pessimism. Let me explain why.
On bureaucratization:
Ansar Allah has indeed begun to institutionalize. Since taking Sanaa in 2014, they have established a Supreme Revolutionary Committee and a Supreme Political Council, appointed governors, and created parallel governance structures. A recent study by Abdulmalik Eissa at Sana'a University describes this as a transformation "from a religious-cultural protest movement into a dominant political authority". The Berghof Foundation has documented how Ansar Allah shifted its "supervisors" from informal posts into formal government jobs—what they call a "re-formalisation of de facto operations".
So yes, bureaucratization is happening. But here is the crucial nuance: in Yemen, the state has always been weak, and the tribe has always been strong. Tribal elders in Al-Jawf and Marib still mediate disputes, negotiate ceasefires, and coordinate security functions. As one tribal elder told researchers: "We don't run a state. We keep people from killing each other". This means that even if Ansar Allah builds a bureaucracy, it cannot simply replace the tribal system. It must coexist with it, embed itself within it, or risk losing the very social base that gives it legitimacy.
The question is not whether bureaucratization happens—it always does—but whether the movement retains its ideological core. And here, Ansar Allah has an advantage that Schmitt did not fully anticipate: the qa'id al-sayf (the principle of rising with the sword) is not a bureaucratic principle. It is a religious obligation. It cannot be delegated to a bureaucrat. It requires the leader to act, to be present, to embody the resistance. This is why, as your comment implies, the adherence to "my home, my family, my tribe" worldview is not simply a pre-modern residue. It is a form of political legitimacy that the modern state has never fully replaced in Yemen.
I would add this: the very fact that Ansar Allah has been able to withstand years of war, blockade, and terror-listing—while simultaneously governing 70 percent of Yemen's population—suggests that its legitimacy is not derived from bureaucratic procedure, but from the act of resistance itself. The moment it stops resisting, the moment it becomes merely an administration, it risks the same fate Schmitt predicted. But that moment has not yet arrived.
To understand Yemen, one must understand that the tribe is not a relic. It is a living institution with a thousand-year history, a system of customary law ('urf), and a moral economy of honor and protection. Paul Dresch's work on Yemeni tribes shows how deeply this system is embedded in the relationship between the major tribes, the Zaydi Imamate, and ideas of statehood. When Western analysts reduce this to "Sunni vs. Shia" or "Iran vs. Saudi Arabia," they are not describing Yemen. They are describing their own categories.
In short: Schmitt's theory of bureaucratization is a real risk, but Yemen's tribal structure and Ansar Allah's ideological commitment to resistance may slow it down. The movement is not a state. It is something else—a partisan order that governs without fully becoming a state, and resists without fully becoming an army. Whether it can sustain this dual identity is the real question. And that question is not answered by Schmitt. It is answered by Yemen itself.
Thank you again for engaging so seriously. It is rare and appreciated.
Thank you for adding more nuance. I think about these things as I fully believe that most peoples, even those not tied together by blood/ tribe, hang together by shared values and a common understanding of their ecosystem, political and social. This adherence grows greater when the commonality is attacked. I am Canadian and see this now with the way the citizenry has responded to the attack by the gangster regime ( I will not in principle use its name) south of us. Even those with very disparate backgrounds have come together, taken individual action and demanded similar action by governments, organizations and businesses. The purpose to defend our values and systems. Our country. This from a nation of immigrants! So I disagree that the underlying values and world view of Ansar Allah is pre modern. My worry for both the people of Yemen and my people is that the consequence of the modern information technology is to undermine the comity of shared values and understanding. Thank you again. It is hard to get accessible information for understanding of the peoples of the Middle East.
A very enjoyable and interesting read..
Seeing how Hussaini principles are the very foundation of the Resistance Axis, from Iran to Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, the risks mentioned are less likely to occur Insha’Allah.
One might say that, insofar as his motivation is ideological and his power is only as strong as his connection to the soil he stands on, the partisan is the opposite of the mercenary.
The organic connection of the partisan runs deeper than what you described, yet what you said can serve as a basis for understanding it.
The analogy is striking: the Houthis operate as modern Schmittian partisans. Through their Zaydi doctrine of resistance and control over critical territory, they are fueling an Iran-centered geopolitical Großraum designed to dismantle Western maritime hegemony.