Why Are the Turkic States Drawing Closer to Israel?

Ancient ties, modern strategy

Oğul Tuna explores the historical, strategic, and technological foundations of Israel’s growing ties with the Turkic states, revealing a pragmatic relationship that reaches far beyond today’s headlines.

From Bukharan Jews to Energy and Technology Cooperation: The Anatomy of Israel’s Relations with Azerbaijan and the Turkic States of Central Asia

From Bukharan Jewish communities to energy and technological cooperation, from concerns over Iran to multidirectional diplomacy—the relationships Israel has built with Azerbaijan and the Turkic states of Central Asia are usually discussed in Turkey through two primary lenses: the containment of Iran and the Palestinian question.

Yet these relationships are far older and far more layered than can be explained by contemporary wars or security policies alone. Historic Jewish communities across the region, cooperation in energy, agriculture, and irrigation technology, shared concerns about political Islam, diaspora networks, and the Central Asian republics’ pursuit of diversified foreign policies all form part of the same equation.

What we see, therefore, is neither a purely ideological rapprochement nor a secret alliance directed from a single center. Rather, it is a pragmatic web of relationships in which different interests converge in specific areas. It is also worth noting that Israel’s ties with the region strengthened during the same period in which other “Western” actors, especially Turkey, began expanding their engagement with Central Asia.

The Relationship Did Not Begin in 1991

The historical ties between Israel and Central Asia long predate the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Bukharan Jews, who lived in Bukhara, Samarkand, Merv, and the surrounding regions, were among the most important communities in Central Asia’s historical, cultural, and commercial life. Traditions concerning their origins stretch back to antiquity. Trade centers along the Silk Road, the forced migrations described in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, and enduring connections with the Iranian-speaking world all helped shape the community’s presence in the region.

Likewise, the Mountain Jews of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus constitute one of the region’s long-established indigenous communities. Their language, Juhuri—also known as Judeo-Tat—belongs to the Iranian branch of languages. Consequently, it would be inaccurate to identify these communities directly either with the Khazar Khaganate’s adoption of Judaism or with Turkic-speaking Jewish populations.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a large proportion of both the Bukharan and Mountain Jewish communities emigrated to Israel, the United States, and Russia. Yet their cemeteries, synagogues, family connections, and cultural heritage remained in Central Asia. Today, this historical memory serves as one of the principal foundations of Israel’s cultural and tourism diplomacy in the region.

Where Security Concerns Converge

One of the principal factors bringing Israel and the Central Asian governments closer together has been the convergence of their security outlooks, particularly from the 1990s through the early 2020s.

The post-Soviet Turkic republics of Central Asia did not seek to remove religion entirely from public life, but they did strive to keep it under firm state supervision. Iran’s efforts to export its revolution during the 1990s, militant organizations operating in Afghanistan and Syria, Central Asian fighters who joined ISIS, and various radical movements active throughout the region since the 1990s all profoundly shaped these countries’ security policies.

Israel, for its part—with the exception of ISIS—regards virtually every form of political Islam, along with Iran’s regional influence, as among its principal security threats.

Even so, this does not mean the two sides agree on every issue. It does, however, create common ground in areas such as preventing radicalization, securing borders, intelligence cooperation, cybersecurity, and protecting state institutions.

What Does Israel Gain?

For Israel, the first major consideration is energy.

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan play important roles in Israel’s oil supply. The transportation of Azerbaijani crude to the Mediterranean through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline has enabled energy cooperation to continue even during periods of political tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv.

In this context, it is worth recalling the late İlber Ortaylı’s observation: “Turkey has two foreign ministries: one in Ankara and the other in Baku.”

The second consideration is Iran. Azerbaijan, located directly north of Iran, is the Turkic state with which Israel has developed its closest relationship. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, shares a long land border with Iran. From Israel’s perspective, this geography naturally forms part of its intelligence and security calculations.

From the perspective of the Turkic states, however, it would be misleading to reduce every aspect of these relationships to a supposed strategy of “encircling Iran.” Iran is certainly an important factor, but it is far from the only one.

The third consideration is diplomatic legitimacy. By cultivating relations with Muslim-majority states, Israel gains greater room for maneuver beyond both the Arab world and the Western sphere. Kazakhstan’s accession to the framework of the Abraham Accords at the end of 2025 and Israeli President Herzog’s visit to Astana in 2026 demonstrate that these ties have now acquired a more visible political dimension. At the same time, the Kazakh government, mindful of domestic public opinion, continues to emphasize its support for a two-state solution and for the rights of the Palestinian people.

What Do the Turkic States Gain?

For the Central Asian republics, Israel’s principal attraction lies in technology.

In a region confronting chronic drought and water scarcity, Israeli expertise in drip irrigation, agricultural productivity, water management, and production technologies adapted to arid environments is of considerable value. This is complemented by cooperation in cybersecurity, digital customs systems, healthcare technologies, and the defense industry.

Second, Israel fits well within the Central Asian states’ strategy of maintaining a multidirectional foreign policy.

These countries have no desire to become dependent exclusively on Russia, China, Turkey, or the West. Instead, they seek to balance competing powers by cooperating with each in different fields. Turkey occupies a leading position in culture, education, and language; China in finance and infrastructure; Russia in energy, security, and historical ties; and Israel in technology and selected areas of security cooperation.

The Third Dimension: Diaspora and Public Diplomacy Networks

The third dimension involves diaspora and public diplomacy networks. Bukharan Jews living in Israel and the United States, in particular, have not completely severed their cultural and economic ties with their ancestral homeland. These connections can support tourism, investment, and the international visibility of Central Asian cities.

It may also be useful to view, in this context, the limited impact in the West of campaigns organized by the Armenian diaspora following the Second Karabakh War, as well as the recent increase in tourism promotion for Central Asia across social media.

Each Country’s Relationship Is Different

It is impossible to speak of “Azerbaijan and Central Asia’s Israel policy” as though it were a single, uniform, and unchanging whole. Nevertheless, Israel’s growing engagement with Central Asia has clearly become one of the region’s most significant geopolitical developments in recent years.

For Azerbaijan, energy, defense, Iran, and the Karabakh conflict are the defining factors. Relations between Baku and Tel Aviv also predate the Aliyev era. Their foundations were laid during the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence under President Abulfaz Elchibey. According to Aryeh Levin, then Israel’s ambassador to Moscow, Elchibey once remarked, “I am a Zionist,” drawing attention to what he saw as parallels between two different nationalist projects.

Kazakhstan stands out for its energy resources, technology transfer, and international diplomacy. While deepening its relationship with Israel, Astana has continued to support a two-state solution to the Palestinian question. Although their numbers are now small, Ashkenazi Jews in particular maintain historical ties to Kazakhstan. The father of Menachem Mendel Schneerson, whom many followers of Chabad—the world’s largest Hasidic movement—regard as the Messiah, was exiled to Almaty by Stalin, where he later died.

For Uzbekistan, the Jewish heritage of Bukhara and Samarkand is especially prominent. Although economic relations are not as extensive as those with Kazakhstan, agriculture, tourism, culture, and technology remain important areas of cooperation.

Turkmenistan presents a more closed example. There, the relationship revolves less around economic and cultural ties than around the Iranian border, diplomatic representation, and security considerations.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan maintain more limited relations with Israel, but they nevertheless cooperate in selected areas such as agriculture, healthcare, education, and security.

Governments and Societies Do Not Think Alike

The close relations cultivated by Central Asian governments with Israel do not mean that the peoples of the region are indifferent to the Palestinian cause.

State elites tend to evaluate the relationship primarily through the lenses of energy, technology, and security. Within society, however, growing religious sentiment in recent years, together with expanding cultural influence from Turkey, has produced a more visible sympathy for the Palestinians.

For this reason, Central Asian leaders often feel obliged to accompany the expansion of ties with Israel by publicly affirming their support for Palestinian statehood and a two-state solution. Here, too, the limits of the relationship become apparent.

A New Arena of Competition Between Turkey and Israel?

For the time being, it seems unlikely that Central Asia will become a direct arena of competition between Turkey and Israel.

The principal reason is that the Central Asian states do not regard these relationships as mutually exclusive alternatives but as complementary channels. Purchasing agricultural or cybersecurity technology from Israel does not require reducing cooperation with Turkey in education, culture, trade, or defense.

Turkey possesses a far broader sphere of historical, linguistic, and cultural influence in the region than Israel. Israel, by contrast, concentrates on a narrower range of sectors that carry considerable technical and strategic importance.

Another important factor should not be overlooked. Although Turkey had sought to strengthen its ties with the Central Asian republics since the 1990s, it was only from the mid-2010s onward that it achieved the level of closeness it had long pursued. This same period also coincided with the beginning of renewed Central Asian engagement by Israel, the United States, and the European Union.

Not an Ideological Alliance, but a Pragmatic Convergence

In the end, there is no single explanation for the growing rapprochement between the Turkic states and Israel.

The legacy of historic Jewish communities provides a cultural foundation for these relationships. Energy trade creates mutual dependence. The Central Asian republics look to Israel’s technological expertise and security capabilities to meet practical needs. Shared concerns arising from Iran and Afghanistan bring the parties closer together in certain areas. At the same time, the pursuit of multidirectional diplomacy places these ties within a broader strategic balance that also includes Russia, China, Turkey, and the West.

(Translated from the Turkish)