Trump’s Ukraine Plan: A Trap for Poland
A peace with a price
Krzysztof Karczewski reveals why the so-called peace plan threatens Polish interests more than it protects them.
The Donald Trump Plan (or Witkoff Plan) is deeply troubling and simply unacceptable not only for Russia, but also even for Poland. Here I wish to emphasize that this plan is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of objective(!) national interests, rather than the interests of Poland’s current governing teams (one must not confuse the interests of governing teams with the national interests of Poland—its identity, economy, and geostrategy).
More specifically, the following points are particularly alarming from the standpoint of Poland’s objective national interests:
1. “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed,”
and “the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.”
The passage concerning the number of soldiers is especially concerning for Poland’s true national interests. Six hundred thousand soldiers would constitute one of the largest armies in Europe and would overshadow the Polish Armed Forces. For comparison: the current size of the Polish Army is about 212,600 soldiers—meaning that under the plan, Ukraine would have nearly three times as many soldiers as all of Poland.
Why is the size of Ukraine’s army so important? Because the government of Zelensky still has not recognized the genocide of Poles committed by the OUN–UPA, continues to glorify UPA criminals, and Nazism and revisionism are rapidly growing there, questioning the Polish character of Przemyśl, Rzeszów, and other southeastern cities. Dmytro Dontsov, in his programmatic book Nationalism, claimed that Poland’s southeastern territories are Ukrainian.
This is why I believe that a Ukrainian army with as many as 600,000 soldiers—an army that glorifies the genocide of Poles and promotes a Ukrainian version of Nazism—would constitute a potential threat to Poland’s security.
2. “European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.”
This, in fact, further endangers Poland’s security. This point confirms the thesis that Poland is to serve as a militarized NATO bastion—a peripheral spearhead which, in the event of a NATO or Ukrainian conflict with Russia, would be aimed directly against Russia.
More concretely: if European fighter jets strike from bases in Poland, Russia would be compelled to retaliate primarily against those bases.
3. The issue of protecting the Polish economy
Let us examine the relevant passages concerning economic measures. The plan states that:
“Ukraine may seek EU membership and will receive short-term, preferential access to the European market while the matter is being considered.”
A massive reconstruction package is then outlined, including:
establishing “a Ukrainian Development Fund to invest in rapidly developing industries, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence”;
the United States will “work with Ukraine to jointly rebuild, develop, modernize, and manage Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities”;
“joint efforts to rebuild areas affected by military actions, aimed at restoring, reconstructing, and modernizing cities and built-up regions”;
large-scale infrastructure development;
extraction of minerals and natural resources;
and “the World Bank will create a special financial package to accelerate these efforts.”
Next comes the matter of frozen Russian assets:
“100 billion dollars of Russia’s frozen assets will be invested in American efforts to rebuild and develop investments in Ukraine”;
“the US will receive 50 percent of the profits from this project.”
Europe will contribute another 100 billion dollars for reconstruction. Frozen funds held in Europe will be unfrozen, and the remaining Russian assets will be placed into “a separate US–Russian mechanism allowing the implementation of joint projects in various fields.”
This fund, the plan states, will aim “to strengthen relations and increase shared interest in creating incentives to avoid returning to conflict.”
In other words: above all, American and other Western companies will be the ones investing in and supporting the Ukrainian economy.
I am left wondering: what about Polish companies?
Furthermore, a conflict of economic interests between Ukraine and Poland is already ongoing and harming Polish farmers and the Polish economy. Ukrainian grain is cheaper and of lower quality than Polish grain and is spreading throughout Poland—something Polish farmers have bitterly noted while protesting, by dumping Ukrainian grain, for example.
Ukrainian companies have also entered the Polish market and are trying to take over industrial plants, pushing Polish companies out. And if the points above are implemented, the highly expansionary Ukrainian economy will threaten Polish economic interests even more.
A revealing additional passage
Now let us look at the following striking section of the plan:
“If Russia invades Ukraine, then in addition to a coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, and recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.”
“If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.”
We see, then, that this is essentially a Western plan to preserve the Ukrainian state.
What is more, the phrase “without cause” is particularly irritating. And what if Ukraine attacks Russia with a claimed cause? One can always invent a suitable justification.
Conclusion
Let me remind readers that Poland’s objective national interests lie above all in maintaining a peaceful alliance and cooperation with the East—with Russia, China, India, and Islamic countries—in the fields of economy, culture, and intellectual life. Good relations between Poland and Russia, and with other Eurasian states, are the guarantee of the security and survival of the Polish state, Polish identity, and the substance of Polishness.
(Translated from the Polish)



