The St. Petersburg Forum and Russia’s War with Europe

The civilization-state, multipolarity, and the new global reality

Alexander Dugin shares his sharp analysis of the current global confrontation, the meaning of Russia as a civilization-state, and the deeper shifts taking place in Russian society and elite thinking.

Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.

Host: Finnish President Alexander Stubb hopes to significantly expand the European Union to 40 countries. The figure of 13 new members he would like to see join is rather symbolic. Please tell us, why does Finland — in the person of Stubb — need this right now, and why does the European Union need it? After all, such a massive expansion involves many factors — economic, ideological, and others. What is the calculation behind it at this moment?

Alexander Dugin: I don’t think the European Union needs these additional countries from a purely economic standpoint. What we’re really talking about is that statements like this — and even the concrete political steps that pave the way for countries to join the EU — represent yet another wave in the West’s war against Russia.

You know, there is a discipline called geopolitics. I have been developing, studying, and promoting it for many decades, starting in the late 1980s, when almost no one was working on it and the term itself was barely known. This discipline was originally introduced into scholarly circulation by the British, particularly Halford Mackinder. At its core, it described the strategy of global Anglo-Saxon domination. But naturally, since they described the world as they see it, it was only logical for those positioned as the object — as the enemy of the Anglo-Saxons — to develop an alternative geopolitics. A geopolitics based not on the interests of the “civilization of the Sea,” which the Anglo-Saxons represent — the civilization of capitalism, trade, and haggling — but on the “civilization of the Land,” which they themselves called the civilization of heroism, conservative and traditional values.

Our Eurasianists made the first sketches, and from the 1980s onward I developed this alternative geopolitics. Essentially, it uses the same rules, the same laws, and the same patterns — only viewed from the perspective of the continent, from Eurasia, from Russia, from the “Heartland.”

If we apply this geopolitical lens, we see the following: in the struggle between Sea and Land, the critical issue is control over Europe as the coastal zone — the so-called Rimland. From the perspective of the Anglo-Saxons, the Atlanticists, and NATO supporters (that is, Atlanticism), it is necessary to expand their zone of influence at the expense of the civilization of the Land — that is, at Russia’s expense. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact was a fundamental blow to our first line of defense. Those territories had been under our control as a result of the Great Patriotic War. They were taken from us, even though geopolitically they belonged to us. This happened in 1989, after the prepared collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and we were even persuaded that it was the right thing to do.

The next wave was the separation of the post-Soviet countries, which had historically been part of a single state. This was another major success for the civilization of the Sea — for our adversaries. Now, the conflict in Ukraine has opened the third stage of their expansion. We tried to keep Ukraine within our sphere of influence because it is our people, our values, our civilization, our Russian World. In response, we received a massive blow from the collective West. And now the West is seeking to extend its influence even further over these post-Soviet territories by bringing them into the European Union — and in reality, into NATO. In essence, this is the third wave of the Great War of the Continents.

Host: Let me interrupt you for a moment. There’s another interesting detail: Canada is also on this list. What is the European Union doing on another continent? Moreover, the inclusion of Canada would hardly be welcomed positively by the United States. Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], you’re still with us? Please tell us, why did Canada appear on the list that Stubb proposed for EU expansion?

Alexander Dugin: I think this is a deliberate jab at Trump. Trump somewhat deviates from this Atlanticist, globalist, liberal agenda. He is trying to restore a unipolar world — also Anglo-Saxon, but centered in the United States rather than in a global world government. In other words, Trump sees the global world government as his government — a purely American one. This has put him at odds with the globalist liberal leaders of the European Union and Canada, who have their own vision.

Incidentally, it was precisely representatives of this liberal-globalist camp who unleashed the conflict with us in Ukraine. At the time, a globalist and liberal — Biden — was in the White House, and like-minded leaders were heading European states. They started this war against us. Trump, therefore, sees it differently… No, he is continuing it, but he inherited it from his ideological opponents.

Canada was added to the list specifically to show Trump once again that in the Western world there exists a global oligarchic power structure — the international “deep state” — rather than his own individualistic (and, together with Netanyahu) rather exotic adventurist plan. They are trying to pull Trump’s America back into this framework. Canada is essentially a slap in the face to Trump, a signal that he will have to abandon his peculiar brand of direct and harsh American imperialism and return to the common globalist agenda — to “also be Europe,” to become part of the European Union. In principle, inviting Canada into the EU is an attack on Trump, aimed at forcing him back into the globalist fold.

I believe their internal disputes are not that fundamental, although in certain circumstances they could escalate. For now, this is mostly trolling. But the idea of admitting Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, possibly Georgia, Azerbaijan, or even Belarus (obviously impossible under Lukashenko, but the ideas are being floated) — that is something entirely different. That is a consistent, centuries-old Great Game. That is geopolitical code. These are not just momentary extravagant statements by individual politicians. What real influence does Finland have? Yet I would take this seriously. These signals reflect deep geopolitical tendencies that prove stronger than ideologies, economies, business, technology, or changing political structures. Political systems, leaders, and ideologies come and go, but geopolitics remains. Its fundamental laws — the way states are embedded in geographic space — do not change.

Therefore, these signals should be taken very seriously. The West is making it clear that it intends to wage war against us until our strategic defeat, dismemberment, collapse, or internal disintegration through protest movements. In other words, the West is already fighting us with its sleeves rolled up, holding nothing back, swinging with full force. We must acknowledge this reality and, in my view, prepare for a major, large-scale, serious, and difficult war with the entire collective West — without making exceptions even for America, because Trump is only a temporary episode.

Host: At the same time, joining the European Union, besides any economic benefits, carries a very serious civilizational risk for nation-states. It brings with it everything we consider extremist and banned here, along with a completely different migration policy. Do the ruling elites really not take this into account? Why do a number of states — not even all from Stubb’s list, but many of them — know this perfectly well yet still rush to join? Why does this happen?

Alexander Dugin: The truth is that liberals use nationalism as a tool. There is no doubt about who controls whom. Nationalism — and even Nazism — is an artificial instrument in the hands of liberals. They cultivate it and allow some dwarf entity, a failed state, to believe in its own greatness, its sovereignty, and its independence — so that it can break free from the influence of Russia or other emerging poles of the multipolar world.

At first, it is presented like this: “You will all be nationalists, you will be sovereign, you can have everything exactly as you want.” This is necessary for the first radical break from our influence, carried out under the banner of sovereignty and nationalism — away from us, from China, from India. Any civilization-state, any independent pole, is a threat to the globalists. But afterwards, the leaders who posed as nationalists and champions of sovereignty suddenly become ordinary managers of the global West. All their claims to sovereignty immediately evaporate. They sign up to the global agenda, and their dreams of true independence simply dissolve into thin air.

This also applies, incidentally, to many countries that are already inside the EU. Just look at the behavior of Giorgia Meloni. Meloni originally presented herself as a far-right figure. Her party, “Brothers of Italy,” which won the elections, positioned itself in a very radical spirit. And yet suddenly she has become an obedient executor of the policies of Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, and Klaus Schwab. In other words, she fully supports the most anti-nationalist and anti-sovereign steps of the European Union, even though she came to power on slogans about restoring sovereignty. But that didn’t last.

The same thing — and even more so — will happen with the Ukrainian leadership, with Pashinyan, or with Sandu. There’s nothing even to discuss there. They will simply be absorbed. The West’s logic is simple: “Today you were nationalists — well done, excellent if you’re against Russia. And tomorrow you will become part of us, and we will manage you.” What do the nationalist forces in all these countries think? They don’t think anything.

I watch how other post-Soviet peoples react — with the exception of Belarus and its wise population. All the rest are simply swallowing the bait of this fictitious, impossible, and unreal nationalism, which is in reality completely prohibited by the internal rules and standards of the European Union.

There is a glaring contradiction between this nationalist — and even Nazi — bait that gives the population (Ukrainians or others) the hope that “now you can attack everyone, destroy, and proclaim any race you want…” And then, as soon as they complete this operation against us — and this is precisely what big geopolitics is about — they instantly turn into compliant executors of the liberal agenda. They begin marching in the appropriate parades and become absolute plankton, controlled by the globalist elite.

Welcome to a world where people think they are making a career, while in reality they are simply items on the menu of these global elites. The West’s logic is: if you hate Russians, you can be whoever you want. Hatred is precisely what these destructive forces find extremely convenient. This is exactly what we are seeing in full measure in Ukraine right now. And what kind of nationalism is this in Ukraine? This country had a large amount of territory and, generally speaking, controlled it peacefully — no one made any claims against them. But as soon as the liberals began pushing Ukraine into NATO and the European Union, that’s when the colossal losses for Ukrainians began: loss of their own territories, sovereignty, independence, economy, and population. Everything went completely off the rails. What kind of nationalism is that?

They continue to attack and carry out terrorist acts while failing to notice this obvious contradiction. I think this is a profound threshold of consciousness. The same pattern, by the way, is followed by other Eastern European, post-Soviet, and even Western European radicals. They shout slogans like “Now we will rule here, we won’t let in any migrants,” but in reality, the switch is flipped and they become obedient executors of globalist will.

Globalists control nationalists, not the other way around. Any attempt to enter into an alliance with globalist forces is doomed from the very beginning — it is a completely dead-end path. Why don’t those who are being bribed and seduced see this? Why do they lose the capacity for normal political thinking that could weigh real sovereignty and interests? It’s hard for me to say, but the degree of cognitive blindness in modern societies is simply astonishing.

Host: Since you mentioned Ukraine, let’s touch on this. First there was Zelensky’s loud open letter, written in language that is completely unacceptable for public politics. Then came the meeting between Zelensky, Macron, Starmer, and Merz, after which yet another ultimatum-proposal was voiced to our country. Why do they keep repeating the same pattern of actions over and over? Do they have any hope of achieving some result from these actions? Or what is the purpose of all this?

Alexander Dugin: Of course, they are waging war against us. They hope to inflict a strategic defeat on us. We usually respond that they won’t succeed. I am confident that we are right — they won’t succeed — but this “won’t succeed” will not happen by itself.

If we wake up, if we pull ourselves together into a fist, gather our will, our minds, and our resolve, and look honestly at what we really lack for a genuine and convincing victory… What is victory? It would mean, for example, that we are prepared to inflict a strategic defeat on Ukraine. Not on the West, but on Ukraine. Yes, and that means demilitarization and denazification. It means establishing control over this territory so that it cannot pose a threat to us either ideologically or militarily. That is what inflicting a strategic defeat on the current Ukrainian regime would look like. Europe, which stands behind it, is the next stage.

They have a different perception. They feel that by fighting us, they are capable of inflicting a strategic defeat on us. They apparently see our weakness — perhaps we ourselves don’t fully realize it, or perhaps they are imagining it, which is also possible. In any case, they feel that, for example, as they see it, we are in the fourth or already fifth year of the war with only very relative results. In that sense, they are right from their point of view. So they think: we need to keep pressing Russia with sanctions, insults, threats, provocation, and irritation so that it loses self-confidence, feels weak, and its society begins to split apart.

And do you think none of this works? It does work. Of course, it is mostly enemy propaganda, but people inside the country are also starting to ask questions: how is this possible? Where is the image of victory? Where is the clear, understandable logic? Many in our country are becoming dissatisfied, and this is exactly what they are counting on. Our enemy is counting on the fact that if they press Russia with all their might, escalate the degree of confrontation, they will achieve their goal. After all, our responses have been rather modest so far. “Oreshnik” without special warheads, strikes on targets that are not particularly symbolic…

This is not funny. Their intention, their desire to inflict a strategic defeat on us is not funny at all. It was not funny when Hitler sought to inflict a strategic defeat on the Soviet Union. That was extremely serious, and we won that war — the Great Patriotic War — only with enormous difficulty. It was incredibly serious. And now something no less serious — if not more so — is brewing. Europe has 400 million people. That is a lot. And America has a colossal population and enormous economic and technological capabilities.

I am not trying to scare anyone. I am simply saying that we need to understand: the situation is taking a very dangerous turn. If we expect them to meet us halfway, to start negotiating with us, or to change their tone — why on earth would they do that? Are there any indisputable arguments on our side? Do we have such tremendous successes that could force them to do so — for example, to stop our powerful offensive? If Kharkov and Odessa were ours, if we were standing at the gates of Kiev — then they would change their tone. But while the line of contact remains roughly what it is now, with only minor changes, the situation is very dangerous. They sincerely believe they are winning. We understand that this is not the case, but since they believe it, we cannot afford to ignore it.

Host: The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum [SPIEF] recently concluded. In addition to economic issues, it was also devoted to the future world order. President Vladimir Putin spoke there and discussed the coming world order in detail. Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], how significant are such forums in the modern world for determining how we will live going forward? What role do they play today?

Alexander Dugin: I think all forums are different. There is the Davos Forum, where globalists gather to develop their projects. There are forums where China dominates and mainly talks about itself. There are Islamic forums where Islamic issues are addressed.

The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum was conceived — and by the way, I was there at its origins, when Yegor Stroyev and Yevgeny Primakov first outlined it in the late 1990s (around 1997–1998). At the early SPIEFs I gave presentations on my books and projects: Foundations of Geopolitics, Absolute Motherland, Our Path. I now recall how untimely those ideas seemed back then — they caused bewilderment. We discussed them with various figures from the Yeltsin system, with its advisors, ministers, and deputy ministers. From my point of view, everything I said was correct, but from their point of view it sounded like a terrible dissonance. Although Primakov and his inner circle, as well as some military figures, liked it very much.

But over these almost 30 years since the forum began, enormous changes have taken place. First of all, Vladimir Putin gave it tremendous scale in the 2000s. It became a showcase and exhibition of Russia — its achievements and successes. Leaders of many European states came to us when tensions between Russia and Europe had not yet reached the current stage of direct war. At that time, it was a window onto a new, rising Russia that sought to integrate with the West while preserving its sovereignty.

This project gradually collapsed. First came COVID, when the forum was either cancelled or barely attended. Then came the start of the Special Military Operation. At first, people recoiled from the forum — there was an attempt to isolate and demonize Russia. All those high-ranking guests and representatives of major companies who had formed the core of the SPIEF in the 2000s disappeared. That earlier forum had many dark sides and excessive entertainment programs. St. Petersburg turned into a kind of “window to Europe” exhibition where, from both sides, some of the least admirable characters flocked. But that Western-oriented SPIEF is over.

For the next few years, the forum was somewhat disoriented as we gathered our strength and showed that we were nevertheless building our own path. The guests were mostly from non-Western civilizations. That was also good: Russia was not forgotten, we remained open — but no longer to the Western world.

And now, at this forum, I sensed a very interesting shift: it is once again becoming powerful, gaining strength, and we are returning to ourselves. We are restoring our somewhat shaken confidence in our own capabilities, and a profound turn is taking place among our political elites toward our deep civilizational identity and toward the multipolarity that the President spoke about. And this self-confidence of ours is inspiring everyone else.

This year, the guests looked at us in a completely different way — including many representatives of the West. Prominent figures came, such as Candace Owens, an independent American journalist whose influence extends to tens of millions of people in America and around the world. There was a sense that these people had come to us, to the Russians, consciously, and the Russians gathered there also clearly understood who they were. When a drone attack occurred in the morning, it didn’t frighten anyone — on the contrary, it united people. They felt like one whole.

There was no longer any dominance of systemic liberals in the foreground. In the past, patriotic bearers of sovereign ideas — Glazyev, Galushka, Konstantin Malofeev, Alexander Isaev — had looked like white crows among them. People with a patriotic worldview used to be exotic exhibits at such forums. This time, there was no trace of that. Very focused, purposeful, energetic, and strong representatives of our elite, the regions, and foreign guests — all understood what Russia is as a civilization-state.

Yes, of course, there were some flaws, such as the display of strange cars — echoes of the old “archaeomodernity” from the 2000s or 2010s. We still can’t do without these waves of absurdity. But remember: once upon a time, Konstantin Malofeev’s Tsargrad pavilion was decorated in Khokhloma style, and everyone walked past in amazement. Then electronic kokoshniks gradually appeared. And now, practically every second stand featured Russian elements. The pavilions of our regions showcased their ethnic and cultural traditions — both Russian regions and national republics. Every city demonstrated its uniqueness, and yet we are one people.

We no longer divide the country into “those who are at war” and “those who are not at war.” Governors, officials, ministers, and entrepreneurs — everyone is now involved in this historic process. Everyone understands how serious everything is. It seemed to me that this was a unique forum that demonstrated Russia’s gradual return as a fully sovereign civilization-state — one that feels its own dignity, strength, and freedom. And this Russia is ready for dialogue with everyone who is open to it: in the East, in the West, in Africa, and in Latin America. China was represented very systematically and substantially. A wonderful journalist from India came, who was absolutely delighted with what she saw. In essence, the real contours of the new world are emerging before our eyes.

Our forum, the St. Petersburg one — where at the beginning I somewhat solitarily handed out the brochure Our Path, which described roughly what we have finally arrived at with great difficulty — was my first experience, the first feeling of a certain loneliness and clear prematurity of it all. And now at this forum, in which I participated, I had the feeling: yes, of course it is slow — “the mills of the gods grind slowly” — all our processes happen gradually. But if you are confident, work hard, wait, love your country, and labor for it tirelessly, then in 30 years or so, you may see some results. Especially if the top leadership of our country continues moving in the same patriotic direction.

But this was confirmation of long, enormous efforts and meticulous work by many — I think millions — of Russian people. In other words, we have shifted the ship of Russian statehood away from the difficult course of integrating into the Western world and onto the true course of affirming our own identity, sovereignty, freedom, and our civilizational and traditional values. And we have crossed a certain threshold. The previous two years also saw very good St. Petersburg forums, but it was hard to clearly articulate exactly what we were presenting. We showed that we were beginning to reassemble ourselves, to rethink our position in the world, and to pursue import substitution in the economy. But now the question is no longer simply about import substitution. Now the question is how Russia can unlock its infinite potential — in politics, resources, economics, and technology.

I was also pleasantly surprised by the sessions this year. Every second one was devoted to demography, increasing the birth rate, regional development, and the settlement of large cities. One part of the agenda focused on patriotic themes — support for mothers, women, and families; the other half on a breakthrough in technology, artificial intelligence, and other innovations. This is simply an optimal agenda.

At the session we organized together with Konstantin Malofeev, we discussed threats for the year 2050 and ways to overcome them. It was perhaps one of the most lively and well-attended sessions after the President’s speech. People couldn’t fit in the hall — the audience could have filled it three times over. This means people are taking the future very seriously. They understand what threats hang over our country and what difficulties we still have to overcome. There was no trace of overconfidence or bravado. We are united, we are recovering, we are strong, and we cannot be intimidated. We have finally consolidated ourselves in our patriotic dimension. There is no other option — everything else has either left or fallen silent; at least, it was not visible at the forum. The people who gathered at the forum understood their task: to save Russia under rather difficult conditions. Difficult, but by no means hopeless.

Host: Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], both at this forum and in many public speeches, we talk about Russia as a civilization-state and about the creation of a multipolar world, which is actively continuing. In the context of a multipolar world, what does Russia as a civilization-state represent? What kind of civilization is it?

Alexander Dugin: I have just published a book called The Civilization-State, which we prepared on a state commission.

What does it mean to “be a civilization”? It means possessing absolute monopoly over meaning. That is, Russia itself defines what is good and what is bad, what is humane and what is not, what goals we pursue, what kind of society we are building, what system we choose — and no one from outside can impose any values on us. If we want to, we accept them of our own free will; if we want to, we reject them. This is the degree of civilizational sovereignty that is inaccessible to an ordinary state.

Italy, Spain, Holland, or Belgium are also considered sovereign political states. So are Morocco and Egypt. But they belong to one civilization or another and are forced to share its values, even when this runs counter to their national interests. A civilization itself determines the most important things. It determines not only what is good and what is bad, but even what exists and what does not. A civilization has its own cosmos; it describes the very structure of being based on its own ideas.

Our civilization is, without doubt, Orthodox Christian at its roots and East Slavic in its essence. This is the Russian World — our core. This calm and dignified affirmation of the Russian principle as the axis of our civilization, Orthodoxy as its spiritual content, and strong statehood and great-power status as the political expression of our historical messianism — along with the values of mercy, openness, universality, the traditional family, and a traditional attitude toward generations — all of this constitutes the inner life of our people. Together, they shape who we are.

This is far more important than technology. Far more important than resources, the economy, nuances of trade, finance, or business. All of that is important, no one disputes it, but it is secondary and has an instrumental character within a civilization. Russians should have a Russian economy and a Russian financial system. If we like something from abroad — for example, Islamic banking or other forms of managing financial assets — we can adopt it, but it must be our choice. If we want to, we take it; if we want to, we reject it. And no one from outside can ever impose on us which reserve currency to use, with whom to engage economically, with whom to be friends, or with whom to cooperate. All of this flows from one place — from the center of our soul, from the Russian heart.

This idea of the civilization-state is itself a philosophy, a teaching, a worldview, an ideology — whatever you wish to call it. From this single term unfolds a vast field of meanings. If we are an independent civilization, then we are not part of the West. And in that case, the West is peeled away. Another practical significance of the civilization-state is that the West loses its claim to universalism, to exclusivity, to monopoly, and to hegemony in every sense.

That is, we can take something from the West and discard something else. And no one can say: “Why didn’t you adopt, for example, human rights?” Because we understand both rights and the human being differently. That is why we do not follow what you put into that concept. Moreover, your “human rights” are a liberal individualistic ideology that you use in your own interests. We simply do not play those games. We have our own understanding of man and his rights, based more on the Orthodox and humanistic worldview of our classical tradition than on your latest ideas.

In other words, we set our own standards, criteria, goals, and measures. That is what it means to be a civilization. This applies to everything: education, politics, and more. For example, if we are a civilization-state, we can abolish democracy. People will say, “Oh, why are you abolishing democracy?” But we might not abolish it… Look: everyone panics and is horrified because they think there is no alternative to democracy. Of course there is. It is a Western European invention of the Modern era, one that functions rather poorly, is visibly degenerating, and is turning into a dictatorship masked by the omnipotence of deep states or liberal elites. Why should we cling to it? It is not a divine law. It is merely a human construct.

It may not be bad in itself. We had a good zemstvo system and zemshchina — assemblies of the land. That kind of democracy appeals to us. As for liberal democracy, we have already rejected it along with liberalism, but we can retain certain elements if we wish. That is the main point: if we have elements of democracy, it will be because we chose them, not because they were imposed on us. It will be because we thought it through and weighed everything: “Well, perhaps democracy after all.” But for that, we must first understand whether we really need it. Maybe we are better off without it. And if we immediately become frightened — “No, no, how can we do without democracy?” — then we fall into the trap.

Here, thinking men and women who occupy a prominent place in the realm of thought and wisdom must sit down and discuss this at a nationwide council. Russian people, do you need democracy? The Russian people might say: “To hell with it. Give us prosperity, justice, honesty, and a strong state instead — why do we need this democracy?” Or they might say: “No, as the Russian people, I very much want this democracy. I like elections — going and choosing people.” If the Russian people say that, then we will adopt democracy.

The main thing is to understand that we can choose it, or we can choose not to. We owe nothing to anyone. The same applies to human rights and civil society: if we want, we build a strong great power and choose what we want. That is what it means to be a civilization-state. It is complete autonomy. No one can impose on us any religion, ideology, politics, culture, science, or educational standards — as long as we, the Russian people, honestly, deeply, and thoroughly think everything through and weigh it carefully. This is what civilization gives us. In essence, it grants us the fullest possible freedom attainable in human history.

Host: In that case, doesn’t this require some kind of legislative consolidation? Or should it remain at the level of worldview? Because everything you listed — and perhaps I’m wrong — reminds me of an ideology that is prohibited by our Constitution. Don’t we need some changes in this direction?

Alexander Dugin: There are different points of view. First of all, if we recall the conditions under which the Constitution was adopted, it was a specific historical moment. But the Constitution is not divine law. Constitutions are adopted, changed, abolished, readopted, or countries can live without one altogether. It is a historical phenomenon, so we should not absolutize it.

Yes, state ideology is currently prohibited in our country. Nevertheless, right up until the beginning of the Special Military Operation, we effectively had one. It was Western-style liberalism, embodied in our economy and culture: “You are an individualist, make your personal career, orient yourself toward the West — that is the goal.” That was our real ideology. Although formally prohibited, it dominated.

Now we are freeing ourselves from it — from this liberalism — and opening up a genuinely new ideological horizon. Within the framework of the civilization-state, every narrow ideology has the right to find its place, and every political form can be meaningfully considered. The civilization-state is by no means a dogmatic model. It is openness to everything except the dictates of the West and the liberalism that was imposed on us.

(Translated from the Russian)