The Saudi-UAE Split and the Coming Red Sea Struggle
The Middle East power map is breaking apart.
Bob Hickok traces the collapse of a military coalition and the emergence of a new pact as a counterweight to Zionist-backed separatist movements.
After a long but strenuous “alliance” of convenience and necessity between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in their attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government in Yemen, relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have soured severely in recent weeks. Recently, Saudi Arabia demanded the removal of all UAE military forces from Yemen. On 30 December, Saudi airstrikes directly attacked the port city of Mukalla in the state of Hadhramaut, reportedly hitting an Emirati weapons shipment bound for the South Yemeni separatist movement known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC).
Violence between various foreign-backed mercenary factions within Yemen, which until recently were still nominally allied, has spiralled out of control in the occupied southern and eastern regions of Yemen.
Things escalated so much that the STC, which seeks to achieve the secession of an independent South Yemen under UAE protection, has been driven completely out of Aden following major clashes with the armed forces of the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
The PLC, as the Saudi-backed “government” based in Aden has been called since the demotion of President Abdrabbuh Hadi by his own Saudi allies in 2022, has cracked down harshly and suddenly against separatist sentiment. Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the STC leader who had managed to make his way to the position of Vice President of the PLC until January 7, was sacked, branded a traitor to Yemen and marked for arrest all in a single day. The separatist leader, who had been one of the leading military commanders in the war against the revolutionary government in Sana’a ever since 2015, managed to evade arrest and reportedly fled to the UAE via Somaliland.
It seems clear as day that the coalition against the revolutionary Yemeni government in Sana’a, which had always been a tenuous one, has now fully collapsed into bickering and infighting. The actual frontlines of the battle between the forces of Sana’a and Aden have remained mostly stagnant for years, with many of the reports on fighting coming from within the occupied southern and eastern regions.
While the territorial control of the Saudi-backed PLC in Aden remains significant, it is important to bear in mind the demographics of Yemen. The vast majority of Yemen’s population, up to 80% in fact, lives in the northern and western regions of the country under the control of the Government of Change and Construction, which prior to 2025 was known as the National Salvation Government and is led by Ansarullah.
Saudi-led forces mainly control the strategically important coastline along the Gulf of Aden and the petroleum fields of Hadhramaut. And it is here that the recent conflicts have intensified.
The separatists’ hold over southern Yemen has dissipated almost overnight, as Emirati forces have withdrawn from most of the region. Emirati forces even pulled out of the Indian Ocean island archipelago of Socotra, which back in 2018 was the scene of major commotion following a unilateral UAE military deployment without permission from either Aden or Riyadh. On 9 January, the Southern Transitional Council apparently dissolved itself in a statement published by Saudi media, although this was later disputed by other STC sources. On 10 January, the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, could confidently state that all of southern Yemen had been brought under PLC control. This effectively simplifies the situation of the Yemeni conflict down to two sides only: the Government of Change and Construction in Sana’a (which includes the Ansarullah movement) and the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council in Aden.
However, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates has repercussions far beyond Yemen. In the wider scope of the greater area around the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, things are rapidly changing. Perhaps most notably in Somalia, which is now faced with the sudden decision by the Zionist entity to recognise the breakaway region of Somaliland as an independent country. A major provocation that has understandably resulted in widespread anger in Somalia. While “Israel” is so far the only entity worldwide to actually recognise Somaliland’s independence, the United Arab Emirates has long maintained significant commercial and de facto political ties with the separatists there.
The spark that set off lingering Somali dissatisfaction with Abu Dhabi was the alleged evacuation of the aforementioned STC chairman, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, via Somaliland and even through the Somali capital of Mogadishu to the UAE. This accusation was made by Saudi Arabia, and despite Emirati denial it is clear that Somalia believes the claim.
“Using Somalia’s airspace, Somalia’s airfields to smuggle a fugitive is not something that Somalia condones,” Ali Omar, Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, told Al Jazeera in an official statement.
Mogadishu has reacted rapidly, cancelling all port management and security cooperation with Abu Dhabi, which will affect its port operations in Bosaso and Kismayo. The termination of security contracts meant that the UAE was forced to abandon its military base in Bosaso, located at the southern edge of the Gulf of Aden, as well. This, alongside the withdrawal from Socotra, de facto ends the UAE military presence in the southern regions where the Gulf meets the Indian Ocean.
These developments may further impact wider East African affairs as well, since a report by Middle East Eye in October claimed that Bosaso was used to supply the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rebels in Sudan with weapons, supplies and mercenaries. At the moment, the UAE still maintains a military presence in the city of Berbera in the Somaliland region, which, while internationally recognised as part of Somalia, de facto falls outside the practical reach of Mogadishu.
At the moment, only the Berbera base is still confirmed to be operational. The nature of the base on the Yemeni island of Perim has never been fully clarified to the public, with Saudi Arabia claiming there never was any Emirati ownership.
Perhaps it comes as no surprise then that Somalia has been engaging in high-level negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt to form a tripartite military coalition. Saudi Arabia has eagerly joined many other Muslim-majority states in heavily condemning the Zionist recognition of Somaliland and affirming support for Somalia’s unity. The inclusion of Egypt would add further strength to the pact, encircling the Red Sea from three sides. Cairo was directly involved in the Saudi crackdown on separatist forces in southern Yemen, with Egypt having passed intelligence on UAE activities to Riyadh.
A coalition between Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Egypt could be a game-changer for the Red Sea region, especially if it were to be deployed as a counterweight against Zionist-backed separatist movements across the area. The fact that a notably secular government such as Egypt’s could now align itself with Saudi Arabia, superseding political differences, is a notable development. With this tripartite pact controlling key access points to the Red Sea from the Suez Canal down to south of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the potential should not be underestimated. What this potential will be used for remains to be seen.
The rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two main states to participate in the 2015 military intervention against the revolutionary government of Yemen, will likely have far-reaching consequences. This will particularly be felt in Yemen itself: for the first time since the beginning of the war, one single Saudi-backed government is (nominally) in charge of the entirety of the territories held by coalition forces. On the other hand, the Sana’a government, and the leadership within Ansarullah in particular, has undoubtedly been using the opportunity presented by the relative calm at the frontlines and the instability amongst the foreign armies to significantly boost its military capacity. After years of relative stagnation, the conflict in Yemen is likely to either flare up in full intensity or wind down into a negotiated settlement that would see Saudi forces leave the country without loss of face.
Beyond Yemen as well, these developments influence international politics and diplomacy, possibly resulting in a whole new network of political connections that may reshape the region.