Everything Is a Color Revolution: The Corrosion of Geopolitical Analysis

On the dangers of seeing foreign plots everywhere

Raphael Machado explains how to separate real regime-change operations from viral unrest.

Few things have been more important for geopolitical analysis and for the maturation of the study of contemporary political history than the construction of the concept of “color revolution” in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, used to study the Bulldozer Revolution (Yugoslavia), the Rose Revolution (Georgia), and the Orange Revolution (Ukraine). Perhaps only the development of the concept of “hybrid war” had a similar impact.

In a summarized and neutral sense, a color revolution is an attempt at regime change through the massification of (initially) peaceful protests orchestrated by mobilizing “civil society organizations.” In a more cynical sense, a color revolution is an attempt at regime change directed against a counter-hegemonic government through the mobilization of NGO-linked assets financed for years by Western public or private apparatuses.

There exists a model or template for the typical “color revolution,” and it can be found in Gene Sharp’s manual on “peaceful resistance” against “authoritarian regimes.”

With few variations, this model was applied—beyond the already mentioned cases—in Armenia, in Ukraine again, in the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East, in the United States, in Brazil, in Bangladesh, and in several other countries, and with less success in Russia, China, Iran, India, Venezuela, Turkey, and Belarus.

In general, there seems to be some correlation between the degree of a state’s capacity to apply exceptional measures to confront protests and its impermeability to color revolutions. Liberal democracies that are “non-aligned” are therefore the typical and most rewarding targets of this kind of tactic.

Because the concept worked so well in interpreting the major regime-change operations of the past 25 years, it soon came to be used as a ready-made explanation for every political crisis and surge of unrest. Everything could now be considered a “color revolution.”

Especially because most people who follow political news do not actually know how color revolutions unfold. They only have vague and abstract notions about “foreign funding” and that the target is a country “adversarial to the United States.” Since many people have a certain fetish for “dissent,” almost everyone exaggerates how much their preferred government is, in reality, an adversary of the United States on the international stage.

Thus, from Gaddafi, Assad, and Lukashenko, they move on to defending nullities like Gustavo Petro and Gabriel Boric against supposed attempts at color revolution.

Most cases of popular agitation, however, lack the essential characteristics of a color revolution.

It seems to me that the central question is that of foreign influence and funding in the organization and execution of mass protests. In this sense, one can reasonably transpose Welzel and Roxin’s “theory of control over the act” (Tatherrschaft) from criminal law into geopolitical analysis, assigning responsibility to the actor who effectively controls the course of events.

Applying this theoretical transplant, we would say that a wave of protests is a “color revolution” if the external forces that may be supporting it hold control over the protests in such a way that:

1. the protests would not occur at all without that support;

2. the support is of such magnitude that it guarantees that the protests will follow the objectives of the financiers beyond any doubt.

Only in this way can we distinguish between “spontaneous protests, or protests driven by local political disputes that merely include participants who have received some international funding,” and “protests organized and directed almost entirely through networks and actors funded from abroad.”

Precisely for this reason, it is also possible for an autonomous protest to be co-opted and to turn into a revolution midway. Everything comes down to determining who holds “control over the act” at any given moment. Because political processes are dynamic, the “controller” of a protest movement can change at any time, depending on the balance of forces and the results of leadership disputes within the unfolding events.

With this in mind, the reality is that many protests labeled as “color revolutions” lack any clear, indisputable cause or target. Maidan happened because of the dispute over Ukraine’s entry into the Eurasian Union. The Arab Spring primarily sought to remove governments hostile to Israel and reluctant towards Atlanticism. The Rose Revolution, the Velvet Revolution, and the Jeans Revolution aimed to tighten the encirclement of Russia through its neighbors. The July Revolution sought to eliminate an important Indian ally from the Asian geopolitical equation. Clear motives, obvious targets. Whether these phenomena truly were color revolutions is something confirmed a posteriori by the laws, policies, and agreements implemented in the first months after regime change. In every color revolution, the new governments step on the accelerator to achieve the objectives of their patrons.

The new governments break with former allies, sign agreements with the West, and pass laws that profoundly alter the previous geopolitical course. This is what happened in all the cases above, at least in those where the revolution succeeded. It is not the case, however, with Nepal. A government open to multipolarity and balancing itself harmoniously between India and China was replaced by a government open to multipolarity that also balances itself harmoniously between India and China.

Color revolutions, moreover, rarely end through small concessions by the targeted governments. Their managers incite the demonstrators to accept nothing short of a complete regime change. The example is Bangladesh, where the concessions offered by Sheikh Hasina only further emboldened the protesters. On the other side, we have Indonesia and the Philippines, where small concessions were enough for everyone to go home. The Philippines, of course, would make a very poor target for a color revolution, considering that—under President Marcos—the country is already an important Western ally in the attempt to encircle China. The same applies to Morocco, where protests were also described as a “color revolution”—which makes no sense, given that Morocco is the principal U.S. and Israeli ally among North African states.

When we speak here of managers, it is important to clarify that—contrary to what has become a commonplace assertion—color revolutions always have leaders and spokespersons, because it is their function to ensure “control over the act” and to guide the demonstrations in the desired direction, preventing protesters from accepting concessions. In Maidan, for example, figures such as Klitschko, Tyahnybok, and Yatsenyuk quickly came to the forefront, among others. The Velvet Revolution was led directly by Nikol Pashinyan, and the Rose Revolution was personally led by Mikheil Saakashvili. There are always leaders, always spokespersons interviewed by mass media and elevated by international authorities and NGOs.

These leaders are supported on the ground by the U.S. Embassy, which is always physically present in color-revolution operations, with no exceptions. Sometimes more openly, as in Maidan—and even more so in Libya—and sometimes in a more discreet manner, as in the attempts to overthrow Viktor Orbán. But the U.S. Embassy always leaves traces. Naturally, official statements by Western authorities supporting the protests and condemning the legitimate authorities are always present in authentic color revolutions.

If we begin paying attention to these basic characteristics of color revolutions and start applying this filter to most of the “Generation Z protests,” we see that—with a few exceptions—these demonstrations lack all or almost all of the features of color revolutions. The cases of Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Madagascar are illustrative. The case of Bangladesh serves as a counterexample that makes clear the possibility that this type of protest can indeed be instrumentalized for the purposes of a color revolution.

Some people are deeply impressed by the fact that “Generation Z protests” involve the use of “common symbols” across different countries, but that is because they are not yet accustomed to the viral capacity of memes, nor to the social mimicry fostered by social media.

It is therefore important to refine our conceptual tools so that we can apply them with precision and responsibility. Otherwise, we will end up overusing important concepts until they sink into irrelevance and disrepute.

(Translated from the Portuguese)