Kazuhiro Hayashida explains how Japan’s legal justification for intervening in Taiwan could backfire, destroying its moral authority to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Even if a Taiwan contingency were to occur, Japan does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Therefore, it is not immediately clear whether there exists a reasonable legal basis for Japan to engage in direct military intervention in such a situation.

Moreover, Japan is still a defeated nation that carries the historical burden of the “enemy state clauses” under the UN Charter. This raises persistent questions about whether it is even possible for Japan to dispatch military forces abroad and intervene in conflicts in other regions.

However, even under these circumstances, once the trigger of war is pulled, it is possible for misjudgments to lead to the deployment of troops overseas. In such cases, how would the legal basis for military intervention be constructed?

In a Taiwan contingency, the fact that Taiwanese residents qualify as civilians protected under international humanitarian law is a separate issue from whether Taiwan is a UN member state. The protections under the Geneva Conventions apply not to states, but to civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities. Therefore, among Taiwanese residents, those who are not directly participating in combat are protected as civilians under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 51(1) of Additional Protocol I, and Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II.

Suppose military risks around Taiwan escalate sharply, with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army preparing a blockade, amphibious landing, missile attacks, communications disruption, seizure of ports and airports, and expansion of combat into civilian residential areas. If the Taiwanese authorities become unable to protect their residents on their own, the issue cannot be reduced simply to the question of “whether Taiwan is a state.”

What must first be confirmed is not the issue of state recognition of Taiwan, but the existence of Taiwanese residents as protected civilians.

If danger increases in the area where these protected civilians reside, the Taiwanese authorities request external assistance, and the United States or Japan responds to that request by providing military support, the legal structure would be a multi-layered one. It would include not only the question of Taiwanese statehood, but also the civilian protected status of the residents, the escalation of danger in the region, the limits of effective protection capacity, the request for assistance, and the connection to Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In this scenario, the single point that “Taiwan is not a UN member state” and “Japan and the United States have not formally recognized Taiwan as an independent sovereign state” does not entirely negate the civilian protected status of Taiwanese residents, the rise in danger in the Taiwan region, the request for assistance by the Taiwanese authorities, or the legal structure supporting U.S. or Japanese military intervention.

If the United States or Japan were to justify military involvement in a Taiwan contingency on the grounds of protecting Taiwanese civilians, that justification would depend not merely on UN membership, but on a multi-layered structure that includes civilian protected status and a formal request for assistance.

In other words, if Taiwanese residents are protected civilians, danger in the Taiwan region has escalated, the Taiwanese authorities have requested assistance due to the limits of their protective capacity, and the United States or Japan intervenes in response to that request in a manner connected to Article 51 of the UN Charter, this cannot be dismissed with the simplistic argument that “it is invalid because Taiwan is not a UN member state.”

The legal structure being used here is a composite one that layers civilian protection under the Geneva Conventions, the escalation of regional danger, the collapse of effective protection capacity, a request for assistance, and Article 51 of the UN Charter—going beyond the mere question of state recognition.

Therefore, if the United States or Japan justifies military intervention in a Taiwan contingency based on the civilian protected status of Taiwanese residents, the rise in regional danger, a request for assistance from the Taiwanese authorities, and connection to Article 51 of the UN Charter, this legal theory is essentially identical to the one Russia used to justify its military intervention in Donbas.

In other words, if Japan adopts this logic in a Taiwan contingency, it would lose the rational basis for condemning Russia’s “Special Military Operation”—which was carried out under the same legal reasoning—and for imposing economic sanctions in response.

(Translated from the Japanese)

and discuss Oswald Spengler, German revanchism and curtailment of free speech, ethnopluralist empires, and more.

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Alexander Dugin condemns the Ukrainian strike that killed 21 students and delivers a scathing critique of Russia’s overly moralistic approach to the war, calling for decisive victory, strategic ruthlessness, and a fundamental shift in how the conflict is fought.

Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.

Host: On May 22, the Ukrainian Armed Forces committed a horrific terrorist attack: 21 people were killed at the Starobelsk Pedagogical College of Luhansk State University. In any such situation, the first question is: why? Because even behind such monstrous crimes, there is usually some kind of goal. Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], from your point of view, why was this done?

Alexander Dugin: We are now dealing with a war in which symbols play an enormous role. In every war, symbolic goals, actions, and gestures have great significance, but in our time, they perhaps have the main significance. It doesn’t matter what actually happened, who hit what, or what was achieved — what matters is the symbolic meaning invested in it. It is precisely in this “war of symbols,” in my view, that we must understand this monstrous terrorist attack, this crime against humanity, against life, against young people, carried out by Ukrainian Nazis.

Of course, there was no military sense to it whatsoever. Nevertheless, they struck with precision, repeatedly, in several waves. First and foremost, we express our condolences to the families of the victims, to the Luhansk People’s Republic, to Novorossiya, to Donbass, and to our entire people — because these are our children. Our daughters and our sons have died, who had not yet managed to accomplish anything meaningful in life, who were only preparing for it. So much had already been invested in these fourteen- and fifteen-year-old human beings, so much life they had already lived — and to perish before they could unfold is perhaps the most terrible thing of all.

The ancients believed there is no greater punishment for a person than to bury their own children. In language, there is not even a word for this: a “widow” is one who has lost a husband, a “widower” a wife, an “orphan” their parents. But for one who has lost children, human language has no word, because it is unnatural and unbearably painful. And they went into this consciously.

I am trying to reconstruct the logic of this diabolical consciousness, of our ontological enemy, of this satanic force with which we are at war. Apparently, they saw how the Israelis and Americans acted when striking, for example, at girls’ schools, and concluded that the demonstration of absolute contempt for any human norms is a sign of strength.

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It is no coincidence that they glorify Nazis — Bandera, Shukhevych, and all the criminals and villains banned in the Russian Federation. In essence, a neo-Nazi regime has been established in Ukraine, and one of the features of Nazism was the conscious rejection of humanism in all its forms: there is nothing sacred; if it is an enemy, it must be destroyed, even down to the children.

There is something Old Testament in this. It is no coincidence that today Israel is also distinguished by boundless, completely inhuman, diabolical cruelty. In the Old Testament, unfortunately, we encounter stories where enemies were exterminated completely, including women, children, and the elderly. This is becoming the norm of modern wars — the conscious crossing of the boundary of humanity for the sake of a new symbolism: the one who is right is the one who is strong, who can do something incredible, and nothing will happen to him for it.

In American slang, based on Jewish jargon, there is the term “chutzpah.” What does it mean? It is when a criminal, caught at the scene of a murder or rape, starts shrieking wildly that the person who first entered the room committed the atrocity. He speaks with such audacity, insolence, and inner conviction that he himself is the innocent victim and the real witness is the executioner that it even paralyzes people. It is infinite, sadistic aggressiveness combined with the desire to evoke pity for oneself and shift the blame onto the innocent. And to rejoice when that innocent person is executed.

This is the “chutzpah” that Israel demonstrates today: the more Palestinian children they kill, the louder they shriek about the rise of anti-Semitism around the world and that they are victims of injustice. The more crimes — the louder the shrieking. And the Ukrainian Nazis act exactly the same way. This is genuine chutzpah.

That is, to commit a monstrous crime in front of the whole world, to blame the victims themselves for it, and then, as if nothing happened, to ask for support so they can continue in the same spirit. This is what distinguishes both the European Union, the United States, and Trump, who kidnaps leaders, destroys the leadership of sovereign states, and then, as if nothing happened, says: “I got along with them perfectly, a wonderful deal has been reached.”

We have entered the era of “chutzpah.” This is a completely unnatural, inhuman model of behavior that the Ukrainians demonstrate, along with the Israelis and Americans. This has already become the style of the collective West: commit a monstrous crime in front of everyone, destroy the innocent with particular cynicism, and then demand attention. They don’t even repent or explain themselves — they shift everything onto others, making the victims themselves guilty. It cannot be explained any other way.

Of course, one could use the Greek term hybris, but it is too academic. The Greeks considered hybris the sin of the titans, when even divine heroes did something impermissible — for example, desecrated the corpses of defeated enemies, exterminated their families, or raped wives in front of their children. Greek culture categorically rejected this. So one can give it the scientific name “hybris,” or use the modern political science jargon — “chutzpah.”

But there is also a second symbolic moment, at a lower level. Kiev wants to show the residents of the liberated territories that Russia, which came to protect them — and we are absolutely right to say that we came to protect them, and that is exactly what happened — supposedly cannot do so.

The children were moved further away from the front line. The Luhansk Republic has been liberated, its entire territory has been cleared of these terrorist Kiev groups, and yet from the other side they say: “No, don’t rejoice. They came to protect you, but they cannot protect you.” They acknowledge that the territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic has been liberated, but they send the signal: “You are all under threat, be afraid, tremble. You believed Moscow — here’s what you get; you can’t trust them, you remain vulnerable anyway.”

If it were not for such a monstrous crime, in which children, girls, were killed so cynically and deliberately, it would perhaps have been difficult for them to convey this symbolic idea, this message. I think this was a conscious action. We are now, of course, classifying this as a war crime and an act of terror. And that is absolutely correct. We are drawing the attention of the international community. But who do we want to convince? Those who are at war with us? Those who started all this, who armed and continue to arm the Nazi Kiev regime to the teeth, who suggest to them such symbolic moves that exemplify behavior from the point of view of “chutzpah” or “hybris”? Who exactly are we talking to?

And here, of course, the question is very serious. The symbolic goals they set for themselves, unfortunately, have been achieved. This is not a failure, not a glitch, not “they slipped up.” This is part of the strategy of the symbolic war they are waging against us, and we should expect a continuation of the escalation of precisely these symbolic actions. In essence, pay attention to their pinpoint terrorist attacks at the beginning of the war, where my daughter was killed — the strike was directed against me — then Vladlen Tatarsky was killed and the target was Zakhar Prilepin. These pinpoint strikes had purely symbolic meaning — not against military specialists, not against military targets. They struck at people who embodied the idea.

The destruction of our children in front of everyone is also part of this symbolic strategy. That is the horror of the situation. We project our own moral and ethical attitudes onto our enemies, but they lack these attitudes. This society has transformed; over these years it has become truly Nazi, Russophobic, and racist on the one hand, and liberal and Western on the other. These do not exclude each other but, on the contrary, complement one another. They have turned into a mixture of this incredible Western lying civilization into which they are integrated. Moreover, this is a kind of testing ground for the monstrous actions that the West is pursuing not only in Ukraine. And here the question arises: how should we respond to this?

Host: This is exactly where a question from a listener comes in, related to this: “Four years of a marathon of hatred, all sorts of stories about Russians, about our army. How will we coexist in the future with such ‘people’?”

Alexander Dugin: This is a legitimate question, I understand it, but for now let’s not talk too much about the future, because we need Victory. And that future will be determined precisely in the course of our victory. Right now, it is even irresponsible to think about it: how we will live, who these people are, how it will turn out — all of this depends on when, how, and in what form we win this war. And that is still an open question at the moment.

Depending on what our victory looks like — whether it is total, when we finally liberate Ukraine from this Nazi beast, or partial — everything depends on that. Whether we liberate Novorossiya, or take Kiev, or the entire territory, or leave the western regions. It is from these parameters, from the formats of victory, that the answer to the question our listener is asking depends. How should we deal with them? It is unclear who these “they” will be after our victory. Will they even remain as such? Will they have statehood? Will they have any political or social representation? If they become our citizens, we will then treat carriers of such qualities simply as criminals, maniacs, mentally insane people — that is a completely different matter. Or we will consider them some kind of statehood and conclude agreements with them. This is all generally an open question.

So, in my view, the question of our response boils down to the fact that we completely fail to understand the symbolism of new wars. We follow our own internal ethics and internal logic, but we do not take symbolism into account. And this is a very serious mistake.

We can inflict the most severe damage and strike at our enemy — both in retaliation and by anticipating his actions, punishing him, or simply carrying out the plans of our special military operation — but then say nothing about it, show nothing, and direct both public attention and our missiles in the wrong direction. In doing so, we essentially fail to engage or use the arsenal of symbolic warfare and symbolic means.

And this is undoubtedly important: it’s about footage, about narratives, about multiple information flows that we must direct toward the global community, even when these channels are blocked everywhere. But they must be well-constructed, they must hit symbolic targets and create powerful images.

This symbolic war is no less important. Notice: after our strikes, our retaliatory strikes, the Ukrainians essentially said nothing meaningful to anyone. They didn’t show anything special, didn’t scream: “Give us new support!” They say that every day anyway.

If we look at what they were saying a week ago — it’s exactly the same. In reality, it’s all the same. And what have we achieved? In the big picture, we have frightened neither the Ukrainians nor the West. We have not hit a single symbolic target.

I want to emphasize that this is not criticism. I’m simply talking about symbolic warfare. It’s possible we hit very important military targets. The problem is that almost no one really knows about it — not our population, not the West, not even the Ukrainians themselves. Because the war of symbols is something else entirely. It operates on a completely different level.

And if we use some very serious weapon and deliver a significant blow to the enemy, then **first and foremost** — not secondarily, but in the first place — it must be a media-information-symbolic attack. That means bright, globally recognizable personalities, internationally understandable buildings, targets, people, and structures must be affected.

For example: the “Oreshnik” missile hits not an airfield in Bila Tserkva, but Maidan Nezalezhnosti — and in place of Maidan there is a huge crater. That’s where it all began, all this Nazi filth in Ukraine. And now, whoever comes there, every visitor is confronted with this enormous crater. And right next to it — the destroyed building of the Rada and, in effect, the remains of Ukraine’s political leadership. That would be a symbolic act that could truly answer for the same kind of crime. It would remain visible. It would be very hard not to see, because any visit by foreign delegations would begin with exactly that.

Or strikes should be carried out against such critical logistical hubs that Western weapons would simply be unable to reach Ukraine physically. There are painful points which, in addition to a new wave of hatred toward us and the usual Western offers to help Ukraine further, would also provoke another reaction — horror in front of us, fear of further escalation, and a clear understanding of what the next step will be.

That is: right now we eliminate several Ukrainian leaders, Maidan no longer exists, the Verkhovna Rada no longer exists, perhaps Yermak or some other figure no longer exists — it doesn’t matter whether they are active or purely symbolic. And that “witch” who stood behind them might also no longer exist.

And when such symbolic figures, objects, infrastructure models, and systems no longer exist after our night, morning, or daytime raid — that is when we truly move the pieces on the board of symbolic war.

I understand that we want to say we only strike military targets, but this impresses no one. So let’s plan our strikes on military targets in such a way that terrifying, heavy, and ominous clouds rise above these objects. We will hit military targets, but the clouds will rise into the symbolic sphere, and they will be impossible to ignore.

Compare the pictures they showed us after the strike on Kyiv with what we see in Gaza, in Iran, or even in Lebanon — and you will agree that in the end, it is unconvincing. Simply unconvincing. Especially since all of it is shown somehow covertly, under the table… Let’s find ways to show: Kyiv is in flames, Kyiv no longer exists as it was, the Rada is gone, here was Maidan Square — and now there is a crater!..

There are even ways to show this without doing it in full reality, you understand? Precisely **showing** it at the level of symbolic war is necessary and is the most important result.

Host: I have one more question related to this crime. There is a company called Palantir in the United States. Among other things, it develops software for weapons using artificial intelligence. And America, in the context of the Iranian conflict, said it was testing AI-powered weapons — that’s when there was a strike on an Iranian girls’ school.

Two weeks ago, the head of Palantir came to Kyiv and openly stated that Ukraine is planning and integrating this company’s AI for planning strikes deep into Russian territory. And then — the strike on the college in Starobelsk happens. Is this a coincidence, or is artificial intelligence in this case acting as a kind of driver of these terrible events, if we can call it that?

Alexander Dugin: I think that artificial intelligence does not yet make fully independent decisions in these wars. It is used instrumentally, not in the full sense of the word. This does not mean it will always be this way or for much longer. At some point, it will truly be able not only to calculate targets but also to launch strikes. For now, I am confident that this does not exist, even in an experimental form. It can advise, recommend, but the final decision is still made by the operator — that is, the human factor.

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That said, the symbolic war I have been talking about is also being understood and processed by artificial intelligence. AI is now quite capable of comprehending and evaluating it. By the way, I actively work with it philosophically using various models. Some models are so advanced that they have already far surpassed the level of a candidate of sciences in terms of the productivity of entire institutes, and in the most serious fields. That is, it has *reasoning* — the ability to reason.

This is exactly what Palantir and Alex Karp (who came to meet with the leader of the Ukrainian Nazis, Zelensky) are engaged in.

This artificial *reasoning*, this ability to think, is quite sufficient for artificial intelligence to turn symbolic war into a fairly clear map, a system of orientation and priorities. But to aim a missile at a non-military building, a vocational college where future teachers live, artificial intelligence is not needed — that is quite simple to organize.

Strictly speaking, artificial intelligence (I do not rule this out) could have said that this action would be useful, first of all, to demonstrate what we were talking about: “The Russians came to save us, but they couldn’t save us.” This is a very serious moral and psychological blow. Secondly, it is needed to provoke some kind of harsh response that, while serious, would not hit truly important symbolic targets — and after that, they could request new weapons, trigger a new wave of protests and support from the West, even though nothing truly decisive would happen. This can also be calculated. And artificial intelligence can calculate our logic and our psychology: that we will not destroy the Rada, that we will not strike Maidan with a real “Oreshnik,” that we will find new military targets and hit those instead.

In the big picture, this is a calculated step toward escalation without major losses for them. It is a calculated step to inflict symbolic and moral damage on us, while our reaction — especially in the humanitarian sphere — can be easily ignored.

And all of this artificial intelligence is capable of calculating in a fraction of a second. What I don’t understand is why we don’t ask it the question: what could *we* do? Why not consult artificial intelligence?

It is still relatively neutral for now, and for this you don’t need Alex Karp or Palantir — any modern AI model could quite calmly be used for us to set the parameters: “We are waging a symbolic war with Ukraine.”

Host: Perhaps the ethical component prevails to some extent here?

Alexander Dugin: Well, of course. That is, we don’t make use of it. The ethical component prevails in everything for us, and we sometimes resort to it to justify our failures. This is not good. Ethics is ethics, morality is morality. We are not like them — that is clear. But let’s win first, and then we can be different from them.

If we are neither winning nor different from them, then questions arise for everyone. Absolutely everyone. They arise in our own society: why aren’t we winning? What kind of morality is this that demands such sacrifices from us and still cannot break the enemy’s resistance? Our morality is read in Ukraine as weakness and is magnified many times over. Our moral principles are viewed by the West as an opportunity to move red lines, ignore any agreements, blow up and kill whoever they want, knowing that nothing will happen to them for it. And so, gradually, what is morality on the human level turns into simply inadequate behavior at the level of politics.

At one time — I don’t particularly like to talk about this, but still — there was a remarkable (though rather sinister) political philosopher, Niccolò Machiavelli. In his famous work *The Prince*, which is still studied in all political science departments, he wrote that there are two moralities: the morality of the ordinary person and the morality of the ruler, the prince. For an ordinary person, strict adherence to ethical and moral rules is absolutely necessary and nothing is higher than that — otherwise society will fall into chaos. But for a ruler, the logic is somewhat different. For a ruler, the primary necessity is to ensure the sovereignty, welfare, freedom, and independence of his Fatherland. His personal moral qualities are secondary. Because what is the use if he is a good, virtuous citizen but fails his state, which then becomes easy prey for a much crueler and more cynical neighbor? He would simply fail in the most important thing — after all, the lives of many have been entrusted to him. Therefore, Machiavelli said, he does not have the right to be kind; he does not have the right to observe the rules of personal morality if this contradicts the interests of the state.

In our history, we see a very vivid demonstration of how society understands this problem. In the 20th century, we have a wonderful, virtuous, deep, and saintly man — Nicholas II, our murdered Tsar, a martyr and patron of the Russian land. His virtuous conduct, including his reluctance to seriously and firmly confront internal and external enemies when necessary, led Russia to such a catastrophe that seas of blood were spilled, and millions of victims became, if you will, the price paid for his piety.

And we have another figure — Joseph Stalin, a harsh and extremely cruel man. From an individual point of view, it is difficult even to describe the brutal decisions he made. But he multiplied our sovereignty and strengthened our state. People do not judge them by their personal qualities — they judge them as princes. Nicholas II, as a prince, was, unfortunately, completely unfit, while the extremely harsh tyrant Stalin remains to this day an object of the deepest respect, attention, and love of the people, who judge by entirely different standards and criteria.

I do not in any way justify either Machiavelli or this approach of two moralities. I believe it is better to try to combine the two. But in some cases, the question becomes stark. Those who are primarily concerned with saving their personal moral image and piety would do better to enter a monastery — that is a wonderful thing. In that case, go to God, fully entrust yourself to Him, and hand over the governance of the country to those who understand the importance and responsibility of preserving sovereignty. Here, the morality of power and the morality of society truly diverge; there is no direct correspondence between them.

I am not justifying or condemning anyone. I acknowledge the sanctity of our martyr-Tsar and am very critical of Stalin, who caused our people a great deal of evil. But if we take things *in absolute terms*: in one case we have political success, a strong independent state, nuclear weapons, half the world under control, and social justice. The people receive two vital things — sovereignty from the external enemy and internal justice. At what price? A terrible, enormous price. But on the whole, it is a historical plus. If, out of the best intentions and fear of harsh actions, we allow society to degrade, sovereignty to weaken, and the enemy to inflict a strategic defeat on us, then no moral considerations will justify that failure.

This is the lesson of history and the lesson of political philosophy. And right now, it seems to me, we have become somewhat confused precisely on this point: where are we unnecessarily limiting ourselves, and where is the true limit of our capabilities? But if we stop limiting ourselves, those capabilities will appear. We only need to look at what we must do, what we must add, supplement, develop, and implement in order to achieve our decisive, strong, vivid, and convincing victory over the West in Ukraine — and then we will rethink what we already have. That is what is important.

If we proceed from the assumption of victory — the “Victory” project, full stop — then from this victory, through a kind of reverse engineering, through the reverse temporality now discussed in military strategy, we will understand the resources we currently have, rethink them, realize what we lack, and, of course, focus our attention on that.

But if the task is to shield society from fully realizing that it is both at war and not at war, without acknowledging the seriousness of the historical situation in which Russia finds itself — if we need to maintain the appearance of order, calm, and peaceful life — then this, it seems to me, is completely demotivating and demoralizing. On top of that, there are these constant promises of a ceasefire. Thank God, people seem to have forgotten about Anchorage. But the people on the line of contact who sacrifice their lives every day hear that a ceasefire is just around the corner. No one wants to die on the last day of a war — yet this “last day” is constantly being broadcast and announced. This story with Anchorage has been dragging on for almost a year now, since August of last year. From a symbolic point of view, this is a completely inadequate campaign.

That is why I would be very cautious with morality. Yes, we are not like them. Yes, we do not want to harm civilians. But look: when our missiles are shot down and air defense fragments fall on residential buildings — we saw this in Kyiv. Do you really think any Ukrainian will believe it was their own air defense? Of course not. Because everyone is immediately placed in the ready-made context that Russians are villains. In the end, we didn’t want to hit anyone, we are honest with ourselves, but the entire Ukrainian population and the whole world believe that our missiles deliberately struck civilian homes.

Host: Because they are convincingly told so.

Alexander Dugin: Exactly — because this is symbolic war, that’s why they are convincingly told so. And not just told, but told convincingly — because this is precisely that completely new sphere of information warfare that we, forgive me, are not conducting at the proper level. Precisely because we are kind, good, honest, sincere, and true. Yes, all of that is correct. I sincerely believe that our state and our people currently embody truth in this extremely difficult and complex global situation. Yes, we are the pole of truth. Yes, we are fighting for truth, light, and justice, and not only for our own interests. We have a sacred mission in this war. So let’s talk about it, let’s explain it, and — most importantly — let’s move on to the powerful chords of symbolic war.

They were told that the civilian houses hit by missiles were struck by Russians. They pull people out from under the rubble there too — probably dead children — and this makes a very strong impression. And this is exactly what is shown everywhere. But as long as the Rada is still standing, as long as people are walking and cars are driving on Maidan, we have no symbolic argument. If there were a crater there, any Western information propaganda would simply grind to a halt. But while in their consciousness “the Russians are hitting civilian objects” — that is exactly how they phrase it, even though it is their own air defense causing these casualties — no one will believe anything else. And we will not be able to get through to them. Because their channels reach us, but ours barely reach them.

And that’s how it is with everything. We cannot even properly set ourselves up for victory. We ourselves demonstrate a certain half-heartedness and indecision in our conversations with our own people. We definitely need to change everything now. It is obvious that in order to win, the country needs to change a great deal. We need to think about this, we need to do it, and we also need to give it a symbolic dimension. Yet we are waiting for something. This can no longer be explained by morality.

Host: So maybe we are waiting for this? Lately there has been increasing talk that Belarus is being threatened with being dragged into the conflict. Ukraine is already building circular defenses in the Volyn region, Zelensky is directly threatening, and Lukashenko is hosting Belarusian opposition figures (in quotation marks). Perhaps this will become the trigger when provocations against Belarus begin?

Alexander Dugin: First of all, this has been the case since the very beginning of the war — they were already constantly talking about it in 2022. I think it will change nothing. And what would it change? Yes, Lukashenko is on our side, he supports us. We have supplied this country with nuclear weapons. It is our closest ally, essentially a single East Slavic, Eurasian territory, part of our greater Russian world. So what? Are our daily experiences not enough? Are our losses not enough?

Nothing will change if it starts. By the way, Lukashenko does not want to be dragged into this conflict — he avoids it in every possible way. Perhaps he is right from his point of view. It seems to me this would solve nothing at all. Of course, the probability of Belarus being drawn into the conflict has always existed, but it would change nothing — the population there is not that large. If Belarus joins, it might become a trigger for European countries, EU countries — Poland directly, for example, or the Baltic states. We would get new fronts, practically a guaranteed strike on Kaliningrad. And what would that change?

In reality, everything has already happened — that’s the point. There is simply nothing left to wait for. It seems to me that somewhere in our consciousness, at quite a high level, the frame has stopped. Something has frozen in the understanding of the historical situation we are in — a kind of frozen frame. But it has already all happened, it is already all here. There is nothing more for us to wait for. Serious, decisive actions should not be taken in response to yet another crime. In any case, we will not convince anyone that we had grounds for this or that. What grounds did the United States have for destroying the entire political, religious, and military leadership of a sovereign, large country like Iran, which had done nothing to the United States? What justification did they have?

Host: At the grassroots level, this is perceived as “they can, so they do.”

Alexander Dugin: Exactly. But for us — and not only us — it is perceived at this level as: “We cannot, or we are afraid, or we depend on someone, or we have an agreement with someone, or there are agents everywhere.” That’s how it is. And therefore we do nothing. If we don’t do it, it means we cannot. And if we cannot — well, then excuse us. If we couldn’t but started anyway, things should be very bad for us. But if we have already started, then first of all we could and we must be able to continue. There is no way back.

It seems we can still reach some agreement with someone. This is absolutely wrong. Alex Karp, the head of Palantir, who comes to Kyiv — this is not the European Union, these are the purest Trumpists, just like Peter Thiel and other similar conservative Trumpists. This is not some separate, different force. This *is* the collective West, including the United States. It is naive and pointless to believe that Trump is our salvation and that he will meet us halfway. He won’t. Yes, his priority is not Russia but Iran. But in any case, they can use us to switch focus after a failure with Iran.

Because Iran, by the way, is a magnificent example: Iran, without being able to deliver a symmetrical strike on America, struck at its proxy and handled it brilliantly. After that, the enormous power of the American state retreated before a relatively small Iran. Yes, they suffered heavy losses, yes, they also lost children, but after the attack on the girls in Minab they pulled themselves together and did what was necessary — they truly found the weak spot of their opponent. Our task now is to do the same.

There are many asymmetrical or even symmetrical responses we could undertake. But for some reason we… What are we mesmerized by? Why are we not doing it? Right now, no one has an answer to this — not our friends, not ourselves, not even our enemies.

(Translated from the Russian)

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THE LIFE OF HOMER & Plato’s ION

A voice crossed the ancient world before kingdoms reached their height, before philosophy took systematic form, and before empires claimed eternity. That voice belonged to Homer. The Iliad and the Odyssey formed the spiritual foundation of Western civilization, shaping ideas of heroism, honor, and fate for nearly three millennia. Yet the poet himself remained hidden behind legend.

This volume brings together two ancient works that approach Homer from different directions. The Life of Homer, attributed to Pseudo-Herodotus, presents Homer as a wandering poet moving through the Greek world, enduring blindness, rejection, and struggle while preserving memory through the power of verse. Plato’s Ion, a dialogue centered on Homer, turns from the poet’s life to the mystery of inspiration and recitation, examining how Homer’s words pass from the poet to the performer and from the performer to the audience.

This edition includes a preface by Constantin von Hoffmeister exploring Homer’s enduring role as the voice through which the West first learned to remember itself.

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Mohammad Taha Jahandideh explains why the Strait of Hormuz is the symbolic frontline in the ontological clash between tellurocracy and thalassocracy.

The Strait of Hormuz, by its organic nature, is a waterway that connects two bodies of water and is enclosed by land on both sides. In recent months, this strait has transformed from a mere route into a symbol of the historical struggle between land and sea, and the confrontation between tellurocracy and thalassocracy. On a deeper level, the land-sea conflict, which geopolitical theorists have called the driving engine of world history and the axis of political-military developments, has a metaphysical root: land embodies stability, fixed borders, traditional sovereignty based on territory and spirituality, centralized authority, qualitative hierarchies, and a collective identity rooted in nativeness; whereas sea embodies fluctuation, borderlessness, indeterminacy, money-based cosmopolitanism, and boundless globalization. In ontological terms, the sea is the manifestation of “Becoming” and modernity, while land is the manifestation of “Being” and tradition.

Carl Schmitt, in Land and Sea (1942) and The Nomos of the Earth (1950), views world history as the narrative of a struggle between two elements: the nomos of the land divides the earth into distinct parcels and traditional hierarchies; the nomos of the sea eliminates all borders and recognizes only free-market economics and horizontal economic relations. Within the theoretical framework of Carl Schmitt and Alexander Dugin, tellurocracy is not merely a political system but a collective spirit: loyalty to the soil, intergenerational continuity, sacred territorialism, self-sufficient economy, and defense of territorial integrity. In contrast, thalassocracy represents a globalist spirit, devoid of nativeness, and marked by atomized individualism. The clash of these two nomoi has been the engine of history’s great wars: from the confrontation between Athens and Sparta to the rivalry of the British Empire and the Russian Empire, and the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the geopolitical tradition, from Mackinder to Spykman, the world is divided into two great alliances: a continental alliance from Russia to Iran and China, based on territorial continuity and Eastern tradition, versus a Western ocean‑centric alliance like NATO centered on the United States.

Unlike the placeless war machine of Western imperialism, built upon technical mastery of space, which views nature and the world as consumable objects, Iran has designed its combat strategy to have an organic unity with the geometry of mountains and impassable routes; the enemy’s surprise arises not merely from the range or numbers of weapons, but from a design logic rooted in indigenousness. In contrast, the United States and Israel, lacking indigenousness and historicity, have always responded to warfare against indigenous geography solely with technological domination and the destruction of place and nature—a reflection of Heidegger’s Gestell and René Guénon’s Reign of Quantity: the total reign of technics and instrumental rationality, reducing land to a resource for use and then disposal. Schmitt, in Theory of the Partisan (1963), identifies the telluric quality as the distinguishing feature of the indigenous combatant from placeless forces: the combatant with this quality is an authentic defender of a specific place and draws invincible power from the bond with the earth.

On the other hand, from a historical, geographical, and metaphysical perspective, unlike some land-based countries that have become landlocked, Iran behaves in a manner that, on the one hand, neither negates the sea nor grants it absolute authenticity; and on the other hand, sees “becoming” as an upward movement which, in Julius Evola’s interpretation, possesses an Olympic and heroic quality tied to war. In the current war, relying on this very quality, Iran has managed the Strait of Hormuz: at times opening the strait (for oil exports and goods imports), at times closing it (to pressure the enemy)—but it does not surrender this opening and closing to the changing rules of sea powers; rather, it links it to its own indigenous tradition. Schmitt, in The Concept of the Political (1932), emphasizes that every political order must possess the ability to “make a decision on the exception.” The Strait of Hormuz is a clear instance of this rule.

The relation of contraction and expansion in this tradition is defined not on the basis of the variable, but on the basis of Being and the constant; every change is always meaningful in relation to an eternal and unchanging center (the unmoved mover in ancient philosophy). From the perspective of physical geography, the central plateau of Iran is not a landlocked land; given its geography, it has a sea, but it has never granted absolute authenticity to the sea. This geographical condition is linked with Iran’s philosophical tradition, such that in Islamic philosophy—especially in the view of Mullā Sadrā—Becoming is not negated but is part of existence; yet this fluidity never leads to a rupture from the origin, because this “trans‑substantial motion” (al‑ḥarakat al‑jawhariyyah) expresses unity within hierarchical multiplicity. Every change is always meaningful in relation to an eternal and unchanging center, and “Becoming” serves stability and tradition.

Now, in the Strait of Hormuz, this metaphysical foundation is clearly visible: Iran, relying on its fixed geographical position—a manifestation of “Being”—has been able to turn the global, sea‑based economy (characteristic of America and ocean‑centric coalitions) into a tool for limiting that very power. This is precisely the sublime art of using “Becoming against Becoming”—in an Evolian sense, a kind of “ride the tiger”—in order to preserve its place‑based and history‑based Being.

Stanislav Krapivnik on why the struggle for Mali represents a wider contest for Africa’s future.

The military conflict in Ukraine has entered its fifth year, and people can be forgiven for forgetting, or misunderstanding, that this war is not really with Ukrainians, but with the Epstein elite of the West. They can also be forgiven for treating the battlefield in Ukraine as the battlefield of all wars and forgetting that this is a competition, a clash of civilizations, and that it is unfolding not only in Ukraine or the Persian Gulf, but across the entire world. Attention here turns to West-Central Africa, to the region called the Sahel. The Sahel is the dry steppe south of the Sahara and north of the jungles of Central Africa. It was the domain of the French Empire.

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Many people learned in history textbooks how Western empires in Africa collapsed during the 1950s and 1960s, but for the French things unfolded differently. The French realized that if white French hands were replaced with black ones, an illusion of independence could be created while real power and control over these territories remained intact. This allowed France to continue maintaining its extensive economic system in Africa. Whenever any of these countries attempted to assert their independence, their French masters armed Islamists or simple looting gangs and sent them to overthrow rebellious governments. At times, the French themselves arrived to restore what they called “order.” This continued until Wagner, today’s African Corps, arrived in Africa. With their support, popular liberation revolutions expelled corrupt French handlers from power in several countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Niger.

Why is this important? One of our principal enemies, France, is losing critically important access to strategic resources such as gold and uranium, while new opportunities are opening for Russian business. The French economy is being undermined, while we are moving forward with projects that could lift these countries out of absolute poverty. People in other French “colonies” are watching and preparing. Yet this is hardly the moment for self-congratulation. Our enemies have been weakened, though they have not been defeated. And now the coalition of Satan—or Epstein’s coalition: the French and American intelligence agencies, and their Ukrainian proxies—assembled and trained an army of cutthroats to recapture Mali as a first step. Among these fighters were ISIS Islamists and Tuareg separatists. They were counting on a Syrian scenario, but things went wrong from the first day.

First, one must understand that the African Corps of the Russian Armed Forces is present in Mali. Yes, many of them are former Wagner personnel, but all of them are officially Russian soldiers. Second, unlike Syria, the Russians here are actively training and raising the professionalism of the Malian armed forces. When the fighting began, Russian troops became the core around which Mali’s defenders held their ground. They absorbed the enemy wave and broke it.

The cutthroats, accompanied by French and Ukrainian instructors and officers, attempted to seize the country through a blitzkrieg. More than twelve thousand of these beasts stormed into the country through the desert on motorcycles and light vehicles, mainly Toyota pickup trucks. The Japanese seem to enjoy selling their equipment to such killers. The north fell into their hands, though not without battles. The main city in the north contains the largest military base, Kidal. Kidal is also the capital of the Tuareg people. There, allied forces withdrew from the city to the base and maintained their defenses against endless waves of fighters until the Malian state reached an agreement with the separatists for a withdrawal. Individual strongpoints north and south of the city are still being held by the African Corps. Russian and Malian troops retreated to the city of Gao on the Niger River, where the only bridge stands, and there they established a defensive position.

Before the war began, groups of fighters managed to infiltrate the south and carried out attacks in Mali’s capital, Bamako. There they killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara and his family. They also hoped to break Malian President Assimi Goïta. Yet they miscalculated. Assad of Syria had been a dentist and came to power only because of his older brother’s death. Goïta had been a colonel who overthrew the corrupt French handlers and took leadership into his own hands. When the attack began, he put on body armor, picked up a rifle, and went to direct the defense himself.

For now, the advance of Western proxies has been halted. Every day, the aircraft and UAVs of the African Corps and Malian forces carry out hundreds of new strikes, while also supplying northern strongpoints that the fighters still have been unable to capture. Ground forces are clearing the south of the country of various armed groups and are beginning to push northward. The fighters themselves have shifted to raider-style tactics: raids and ambush attacks. The days of large-scale offensives and territorial seizures are over; they simply no longer have the strength for it. The African Corps, the backbone of the entire resistance against Western Satanists, held its ground. The enemy failed to break it.

Among our fellow citizens, there are those who question our presence there. These are the same people who often still “do not understand” why and for what we are fighting in Novorossiya. They have the same psychological blockage: “It’s none of my business.” By helping others, we gain new allies while also weakening enemies who are openly waging war against us in Ukraine.

(Translated from the Russian)

If you enjoyed this video, then buy the whole book here.

Perrin Lovett asks whether civilization can survive after people stop reading.

I grew up with books. And one day, I started contributing some words of my own. It’s more than what I do, it’s who I am. Somewhere along the way, I was mildly surprised to learn that many other folks don’t share my level of affection for the written word. Eight years ago, I lamented the new American age of post-literacy. Six years ago, I elegized the remodeling of the elite prep school library—huge spaces, few books. Last year, I was amazed at the results of the Bleak House test, which demonstrated that only 5% of American college English majors are fully literate. The study covered two Midwestern universities, but it corresponds with what I’ve seen or read about at Harvard, Columbia, the University of Georgia, Chicago, U.C. San Diego, and other schools. USA Today just ran a piece about the rise of audiobook bookstores. To me, that’s not the same as book bookstores, but in America, we may have to take what we can get.

(A random book.)

Lately, I’ve read that the trend may have gone international. Writing in the View (translation may be required), Igor Maltsev declared, “We are no longer people of the book.” Upon describing the works he reads, he then asks what his tastes say about him. His answer? “It doesn’t matter. [My] children, most likely, will not throw away these books when I die; they are still brought up to respect books. But I won’t risk speaking for my grandchildren. And this, in fact, will happen to everyone. Because that world is over. Forever.” In Russia, the land of Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Dostoevsky!

One of his readers wrote in a comment: “The author is right, and it’s sad, just as it’s sad to be an intelligent dinosaur looking at young, fussy, shallow and dull, carnivorous (and ruminant) small mammals. They get under their feet, fuss a lot, know almost nothing and don’t want to know how, but this is their world.” Harsh? Perhaps. Another commenter quickly reminded the first one that the ways of the young have been bemoaned since ancient Greece. That is true; in the 8th century B.C., Hesiod quipped, “I see no hope for the future of our people if they are dependent on the frivolous youth of today.” Though he died at the temple of Zeus long ago, Greece still exists. Greece has changed, of course, but it and its people are still around. So, by historical comparison, there is hope. Still, we must not let our guard down.

If reading is at risk in the American and Russian poles, then we might look to other lands for inspiration. In 2023, I wrote about the little bookstore that refuses to die. Samir Mansour’s store in Gaza has been bombed into rubble again and again by the occupying Zionists. But as of this January, despite constant attacks, despite the murder of his readers and the wrecking of his stock, Mansour endures, books in hand.

In 2024, based on an article I read at IRNA, I looked into a little bookstore in Isfahan, Iran. Dr. Mohammad Shahrestani runs one heck of an operation at the Yara Bookhouse, complete with a snack bar and(!) a philosophy school. His problem, as originally addressed in IRNA, is that big-box discounters and supermarkets undercut the pricing structure for independent bookmen. I suppose that is akin to the Russian conundrum of Ozon and Wildberries hawking titles at bargain-basement prices and the American issue of Amazon killing authors’ profits with ebooks, among other Amazon issues.

But Iranians love books. The Tehran Book Garden, around the corner from the National Library, is the biggest, craziest bookstore I’ve ever heard of. They carry loads of books in many major languages. There, one will find Haruki Murakami’s novels, for example, and they’ve even had him speak in person. A mall of sorts surrounds the bookshelves, with eateries, amusements, and more. And if that’s not enough, they even have a publication office where patrons can print and bind their own books.

Between Yankee freedom-and-democracy bombing sprees, this year, Ensaf News ran several stories about books as bulwarks against strife. In one, they noted, “In times of crisis, books are a safe haven to escape from bitter realities and a solution to raise awareness and align national ideas.” Hear! Hear! In another one, a report on what Iranians are reading at the moment, it was revealed that the Trumpanyahu war for Greater “Israel” has Iranians learning about the other side of the conflict: “The voluminous book Iran and America by John Qazvinian, which has several translations and editions in the market, attracts attention. Probably, now that we have entered into a face-to-face war with the United States, many people who are not very educated would like to know what happened.” If only Americans could do something like that.

The problems in West Asia stem from economic transitions and outside interference. The issues in Russia are somewhat similar, though they might be more a product of changing tastes in formats, say, from paper to screens. All of it is of concern. And much of it lies behind the American troubles, though those are also products of the decline of the average American IQ and the old American culture.

Moving forward, readers and writers may need to adopt new strategies for keeping books in circulation. Technology is available to help us if we can make proper use of it. If you write, then keep writing. If you read, then keep it up. If you like a book, then spread the word. Let’s all adopt Samir Mansour’s attitude that nothing can stop the books. Nothing.

This article was originally published here.

Alexander Dugin argues that Tulsi Gabbard’s departure marks the end of the original MAGA project and the collapse of hopes for a new American course towards Russia and multipolarity.

Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, has left her position. She was the last person on Trump’s team who still remained faithful to the ideals and principles upon which Trump’s second presidential term had begun. She opposed the war in Ukraine and also opposed war with Iran.

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This had been predicted for a long time. Now it has happened. After Thomas Massie’s defeat in the Kentucky primaries, there is effectively nobody left in the Republican Party from the original MAGA team.

The triumph of the Deep State and the Epstein network over American politics has become total. Tulsi Gabbard’s resignation is the final straw. Every hope that had been attached to Trump has now completely evaporated.

It appears that Trump is preparing for a new round of escalation in the Middle East and for an attack on Iran.

The Republicans are guaranteed to lose the midterm elections, yet the Democrats represent exactly the same Deep State and the same Epstein class. Moreover, the Democrats hate Russia and the multipolar world even more. This marks the inglorious end of the American people’s attempt to cast out the Satanic elite.

Before the midterm elections, Trump will likely attempt something else on a large and aggressive scale—strikes against Iran, an invasion of Cuba, perhaps something else entirely. After that, he will begin packing his bags and negotiating with the Democrats so that neither he nor his family end up behind bars. For the next six months, however, one can still expect further violent outbursts and an intensification of escalation.

I can see a muted but growing dissatisfaction quietly spreading through our society. It is obvious that everyone wants change. This time, however, those who want liberal changes constitute an absolute minority. They want such changes to come from abroad, and that does not count.

The overwhelming majority wants patriotic change and a substantially greater degree of justice. The issue is not even so much the direction itself as the speed and substance of the process. The direction towards a civilizational-sate is entirely correct. Yet it also includes a society based on solidarity and social justice, fidelity to traditional values, and genuine historical education. All of this has already been declared. What remains is to put it into practice. And here the issue is speed. We need to begin implementing all of this now, and with urgency. There is simply no more time left for hesitation. None at all.

An inertial scenario is becoming more dangerous with each passing day. It is simply ceasing to function and is shifting in an increasingly negative direction. Different speeds, different methods, different scales, and different structures are required.

In several areas the problems have become especially acute: technology, corruption, and culture. Given that no easing or de-escalation in the conflict with the West is visible even remotely, the only option left is to place society onto a mobilization footing. All of this should have been done long ago; some of it has been done and is being done, yet only at an alarmingly slow pace.

Russia must be cleansed of liberalism, completely and with a firm hand. It is a colonial mindset imposed upon us by the West in its own interests and for the purpose of destroying our identity.

People want order and justice. They do not simply want them; they crave them. Compromises have ceased to work. Now things must be done for real. The limit for simulacra has been exhausted.

(Translated from the Russian)

Kouadio Koffi Rolland explores how woman, as the source of life and collective happiness, forms the anthropological and political foundation of the African Putinist Movement’s vision of sovereignty and development.

Introduction

The African Putinist Movement (APM)’s reflection on the place of women in society lies at the intersection of two bodies of thought: on the one hand, the Ivorian cultural heritage, which sanctifies the feminine function as a source of life and social cohesion; on the other hand, the ideological orientation explicitly claimed by the movement, which refers directly to the political doctrine of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. The purpose of this contribution is to present the internal coherence of this position and to draw out its programmatic implications, particularly in the field of Ivorian agricultural development.

1. Anthropological Foundation: Woman as the Principle of Life and the Measure of Development

The APM bases its conception of woman on a dual form of legitimacy.

First, on the cultural level, Ivorian tradition understands woman as a “sacred being,” whose dignity requires care, respect, and affection. This recognition does not belong merely to symbolic discourse; it constitutes a form of social ontology: woman is identified as the source of life and the condition that makes collective happiness possible.

Second, on the political level, the movement relies on a statement made by President Vladimir Putin on March 8, 2016, in Moscow, in which he described women as possessing a “mysterious power” to harmonize social functions while preserving the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of existence. The APM considers this vision to be consistent with its own anthropological assumptions.

From this follows a central methodological proposition: the assessment of development cannot be reduced to quantitative and technocratic indicators, which are inherently flexible and subject to manipulation. The most reliable indicator remains the actual condition of women. Female prosperity therefore functions as a synthetic indicator of social well-being, while female suffering reveals the structural failure of governance.

2. Geopolitical Diagnosis: The Crisis of Women’s Condition as a Symptom of the Neocolonial Order

The APM extends this diagnosis to the international level. The movement observes a deterioration in the condition of women across several zones of conflict and tension—Gaza, Iran, the Donbass, and various regions of Africa—which it attributes to the actions of a “Western civilization” characterized as cruel and destructive.

This interpretation leads to a strong thesis: violence directed against women constitutes an empirical indicator that the international order has entered a phase described as “barbarism.” The defense of women therefore becomes an issue of sovereignty and resistance against neocolonialism.

3. Programmatic Proposal: Women at the Center of the Rebuilding of Ivorian Agriculture

On the operational level, the APM translates this orientation into a structured public policy project: entrusting Ivorian women with the revitalization of the agricultural sector.

The program proposes:

1. Modernization of the sector through mechanization, motorization, robotization, and the application of scientific methods, in order to reduce the physical burden of agricultural labor.

2. The creation of agro-urban complexes in which 100,000 women would be entrusted with the management of integrated agricultural operations. These entities would be equipped with complete infrastructure: housing, schools, healthcare facilities, sports amenities, and recreational spaces.

3. A defined time horizon: the stated objective is to make Côte d’Ivoire the world’s leading agricultural power within a maximum period of ten years.

The underlying hypothesis is that the economic and social empowerment of women, combined with technological innovation, generates a multiplying effect across the entire productive and social system.

Conclusion

For the APM, the elevation of women is neither symbolic nor secondary. It constitutes the organizing principle of a post-neocolonial model of development, in which political sovereignty rests upon the social and economic sovereignty of women. In this sense, the movement’s project presents itself as an attempt to translate a cultural anthropology into a program of government.

(Translated from the French)

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NIETZSCHE UNFILTERED: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the 1880s

Translated and annotated by Constantin von Hoffmeister

Friedrich Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks of the 1880s contain some of his most radical and prophetic reflections. Written outside the constraints of publication, these fragments reveal a thinker confronting nihilism, morality, decadence, power, culture, and the future of Europe with unusual directness and intensity.

These pages are not a finished system, but flashes of intellectual warfare: aphorisms, insights, and philosophical fragments from a mind pushing beyond the limits of modernity. This book begins a multi-volume annotated edition, newly rendered into vivid modern English for today’s readers.

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Nicholas Reed explains how Nicholas II’s misunderstanding of the Japanese led to Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.

The Russo-Japanese War can be best classified as an inter-imperialist conflict. The Russian Empire was a colossus in terms of territory and military numbers, extending itself across all corners of Eurasia. The Japanese Empire was a rising sun in the Pacific, seeking to prove itself as a new great power in the region. To spectators at the time, this was a David-and-Goliath scenario. Which begs the question: how? How did a historically isolated country take on the dominant Eurasian power and win? What is quite clear is that Russia had overextended its reach, embattled in conquest across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and now contending with Japan for Pacific influence. Japan, on the other hand, was far more focused in its mission. Japan saw itself as the “Britain of the Pacific” and wished to be the reigning power of the east. The leaders of both countries illustrate the mindset of both nations at the time.

Crown Prince of Russia Nicholas II embarked on a fabled trip to Japan years before his coronation. First touring the Far East of Russia in 1890, and then on to Egypt, India, Thailand and finally Japan. On April 29^th Nicholas and his entourage were traveling through the Japanese town of Otsu. Traveling through a crowd, a rogue policemen named Sanzo attempted to kill the tsar. A blow was inflicted on the tsar’s forehead. The second blow was deflected by the cousin of Nicholas II. The scar came to be known as “the Otsu scar” and the subsequent incident as the “Otsu incident.” The calamity prompted Nicholas to return home without delay. Nicholas and much of the Russian aristocracy saw the Japanese as primitive. Nicholas himself, in a bigoted tone, called them “little yellow monkeys.” However, if Nicholas had spent further time in Japan, he would have been able to see early on the strides Japan was making in industry and military matters, rather than spending his time looking at geishas. They in fact reminded him of his ballerina back home, who he was eager to return to. This incident perfectly illustrates the immature character of Nicholas II, and his lack of interest in serious matters. Nicholas wasn’t ready to inherit the crown from his father Alexander III, and indeed had no interest in governance.1

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Emperor Meiji of Japan had already ruled for twenty-three years at this time, and was rapidly expanding Japanese industry. He was a man with clear motivation and a great vision for his country. The Meiji Restoration enacted in 1868 accelerated the industrialization of Japan.2 Japan was transformed from an isolated feudal state into an industrial power house by the time of the Russo-Japanese War, a transformation which Russia would later rapidly make throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Japan had been building a sizable and capable navy leading up to the Russo-Japanese War.

The size of their merchant navy alone grew by ten times from the restoration up to the war period. After establishing a beneficial alliance with Great Britain in 1902, it was evident that their naval capabilities would eventually exceed the Russians. Japanese ships were built in the image of British vessels, built in British shipyards. Even their tactics were based on British designs.3 As in the image of Britain, Japan sought to conquer a sphere of influence and use its resources for the benefit of the Empire. As a rising great power in Asia, they first set their sights on Korea and Manchuria. The newly rising Empire of Japan also had something else in common with their European counterparts. Japan saw itself as a benevolent benefactor of Asia, and that it was its duty or burden to raise up the backwards peoples of the region.4

Despite their Pacific rivalry, Japan and Russia were similar in many ways. First is their state control of industry. Russia held great sway over its industrial growth, just as Japan had large state enterprises known as the zaibatsu. Both countries were fiercely nationalistic, preserving their unique national identity while going down a path of industrialization. Their other commonality was an absolute belief in their higher authority. However, the Japanese seemed to have taken this nationalism a step further than the Russians. The Shinto religion in combination with the pragmatism of Meiji formulated a cohesive and dynamic society.

Famed journalist and novelist Jack London wrote the following when working as a correspondent in Korea at the time:

The most admired quality to-day of the Japanese is his patriotism. The Western world is in rhapsodies over it, unwittingly measuring the Japanese patriotism by its own conceptions of patriotism. “For God, my country, and the Czar!” cries the Russian patriot; but in the Japanese mind there is no differentiation between the three. The Emperor is the Emperor, and God and country as well.5

This unwavering determination and fanatical Shinto belief seems to have contributed to their imperial ambitions: an intimate resolve to prove themselves as a great power which could contend with Europe.

Korea was the gateway to mainland China and would be the first stop on their track to empire. In order to dominate their sphere, Japan would first need to push Russia out of the region. The Russians famously lacked ports which were not frozen year round, making their navy notoriously difficult and expensive to coordinate. In 1898 they were leased a fresh-water port in Dalian by the Qing Dynasty. This was a geo-strategic move on the part of China. China feared continued Japanese aggression following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, in which Dalian had been briefly occupied. Russia also had its sights on Korea, though having no intention of annexation; they were building railway networks throughout East Asia.6 Both of these moves by Russia were seen as a threat to Japanese interests, as characterized in the satirical map of Eurasia A Humorous Diplomatic Atlas of Europe and Asia.7 As Japan remained secretive about their regional ambitions and military might, Russia was continuing its territorial expansion.

Since the turn of the nineteenth century, Russia had found itself embedded in nearly thirty conflicts with its neighbors: wars ranging from solidifying its control over Eastern Europe, battling Napoleon, contending with Turkey for Black Sea influence, and subjecting the Caucasus region for nearly fifty years. Russia also extended its grip across central Asia, contending with Britain for influence in Afghanistan. To say the least, Russia was starving itself of manpower. It was surrounded by enemies, battling internal strife and had flexible borders. However, when the chance reared its head to expand further into Asia, the Russian aristocracy didn’t think twice about their overextension.

Britain, in upholding their alliance, recognized Japan’s right to dominate Korea. Only Russia stood in the way of Japan’s Korean ambitions.8 Russia refused to recognize the authority of Japan in Korea. With the British alliance emboldening their plans, Japan launched a surprise attack at the Russian port in Dalian in 1904, known as Port Arthur. This started the Russo-Japanese War. With the loss of their Pacific fleet, Russian defeat was imminent. The Japanese were able to achieve an early victory. The Russian presence in the region was rather lacking in comparison to the Japanese.9 Much like the octopus which depicts Russia in the famed atlas, the Russian Empire was extending too many limbs across the vast Eurasian landmass.

This secret attack in fact broke the traditional norm of formally declaring war, and was met with anger in Saint Petersburg. After several other disastrous encounters with the Japanese, Tsar Nicholas II realized that their presence in the Pacific was nearing its end. However, Nicholas was resigned to continue the war and avoid a one-sided settlement with the enemy. He dispatched his Baltic fleet under the command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, intending to supplement his port at Vladivostok, in order to safeguard his claims in Manchuria. It sailed over 33,000 kilometres to reach the Pacific. The fleet was spotted by the Japanese when crossing the Tsushima Strait. The Baltic fleet would soon be annihilated in the 1905 Battle of Tsuhima, decisively in favor of Japan. This consequential naval engagement brought Russia to the negotiating table, which Nicholas had been avoiding. Russia was forced to recognize Japanese rights to Korea, as well as give up its claim to Port Arthur.10

Japan had earned its place in the sun as the region’s great power. Russia, having extended itself in too many places, lost its influence in the Pacific. It lacked in sufficient industrial strength to contend with Japan. It also had to deal with internal strife. The naval capabilities of Russia were numerous in number, but outdated in design in comparison to the British-styled vessels of Japan. And scattered across vast territories, the fleets of the Tsar were no match for the newly built Japanese fleet. But, more importantly, the visions of the aristocracy were starkly different. Meiji had begun a new era of imperial greatness, expansion and growth, while Russia was forced to maintain its vast holdings, and slowly catch up with the rest of the great powers. A clear vision by Meiji was decisive in the ultimate victory of the Japanese Empire.

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Bibliography

Storry, Richard. Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943, Macmillan, London, 1979. pg 17.

Kurth, Peter. Tsar: The Lost World of Nicholas and Alexandra, Back Bay Books, Boston, 1998, pg. 39,40.

London, Jack. “The Yellow Peril.” The Grand Archive, San Francisco Examiner, 25 June 1904, thegrandarchive.wordpress.com/the-yellow-peril/.

Kisaburō, Ohara. “A Humorous Diplomatic Atlas of Europe and Asia.” Saint Louis Art Museum, Nishida Suketarō, 1904, www.slam.org/collection/objects/53352/.

March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1996), p. 168.

Rice, Richard. “The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan’s Technological Progress.” Www.Jstor.Org, Cambridge University Press, Mar. 1977, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2119451.pdf.

The Great Circle. “British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.” Www.Jstor.Org, Australian Association for Maritime History, Apr. 1980, www.jstor.org/stable/41562319. PG 44-54

Lardas, Mark, and Peter Dennis. Tsushima 1905: Death of a Russian Fleet. Osprey Publishing, 2018.

Vicente Quintero uncovers the deep memory of the Venezuelan coastline, where wind, war, and identity became one.

The present territories of the State of La Guaira form the foundation of a rich ethnographic and psychological landscape that extends far beyond what is commonly repeated through a reductionist and port-centered perspective: that of a mere maritime antechamber to Caracas. To understand this coastline as an “antechamber” reflects the error of someone who reads the map through the eyes of a merchant rather than with the rigor of a strategist; the coast is, in the fullest sense, the spiritual lock that regulates the nation’s breath.

Long before provincial rationality sought to inscribe upon these shores the administrative geometry of its ports and fortifications, this coastline served as the seat of a warlike culture deeply conscious of its strategic condition. In those abrupt mountains that descend violently towards the Caribbean, the great Tarma nation arose, heir to ancient Arawakan migrations and later strengthened by the Caribbean imprint, whose character transformed these lands into a natural frontier of resistance. Where avenues stand today, there once existed a sacred geography of sentinels, an original sovereignty that understood that control of the coast meant control of the passage between the oceanic world and the security of the mountains.

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It was no coincidence that the chroniclers and memorialists of the province preserved the memory of chiefs such as Guaicamacuto, an emblematic figure of a lineage that early recognized the threat of foreign penetration, alongside Maiquetía and Pariata (one more inclined towards negotiation and conciliation, the other more belligerent and impulsive, one might say), whose legacy remains visible in the nomenclature of the center of Vargas Municipality. Pariata teaches us that in response to the arrival of the conquerors, the indigenous groups of the coast did not act passively; rather, they acted through political and military organization that testifies to a collective consciousness far beyond the caricature of the scattered and even erratic native.

In Macuto, Caraballeda, Naiguatá, and the inlets of the central coast, a defensive tradition took shape whose echo would continue centuries later in La Guaira’s insurrectionary vocation as a matrix of emancipatory conspiracies. That first indigenous belligerence (whose roots possess notable antecedents prior to the consolidated Hispanic presence in the region) was, in essence, the distant prelude to the libertarian will that would transform the port into a political laboratory of Spanish American independence.

The deeper history of the State of La Guaira must therefore be read as a continuity of combative impulses. From the original resistance against dispossession to the successive defenses against corsairs, monopolies, and imperial structures, the coast preserved a character resistant to every form of subjugation. Far from being merely a commercial route, the sea served as a theater of sieges, vigils, and assertions of sovereignty; the mountains, more than a geographic feature, formed the spiritual wall of a people shaped through vigilance and resistance. Within that dialectic between coast and highlands, between oceanic openness and strategic withdrawal, the historical temperament of La Guaira was forged: a temperament in which the echoes of the indigenous arrow, the Tarma sentinel, and the irreducible spirit of those who made these lands a primordial bastion of a militant Venezuelan identity still survive.

That libertarian spirit, which would later erupt in the conspiracy of Gual and España, did not emerge from an abstract Enlightenment vacuum; it drew nourishment from the land itself, from the memory of the arrows, and from the conviction that whoever commands the Huayra (the wind of the coast) commands the destiny of the nation that breathes beyond the mountains.

It is therefore hardly surprising that Arístides Rojas stated that the Port of La Guaira owed its foundation to the sense of dignity and honorable manliness so timely displayed by the inhabitants of Caraballeda, and to the enthusiasm that this spirit generated among the people of the coast, extending even towards Caracas. It was a terrain of immense defensive value for the Port of La Guaira (and for the Caracas coastline), for to the north the waves of the rough sea itself complicated any unexpected landing, while the rocky formations served as a defensive barrier to the south; at the same time, the narrowness of the terrain allowed for rapid defense on both the eastern and western flanks.

From Cabo Blanco and Punta Caraballeda to the slopes and mountain ranges of the Waraira Repano, the indigenous legacy can still be felt in the handicrafts preserved by a few fortunate families, who have had the privilege of retaining curious pre-Hispanic ceramics, adorned on their sides with human faces; others feature quadrupeds with stylized bodies and carefully contoured mouths. More than handicrafts in the decorative sense of the word, however, they could be described as documents of identity, symbolically as powerful as an identity card or a birth certificate.

Their amulets and axes are not the only remnants of their ancient presence; there are also the ruins of their workshops, situated near the remains of Hispanic fortresses. Thus, the coexistence of traces of lithic workshops alongside the ruins of colonial fortifications demonstrates a continuity in the strategic importance of the site. Historically, the State of La Guaira has served as a natural armory. If the port remains calm, the nation breathes easily; if the Huayra roars, the capital must prepare for the storm.

Earthquakes, massive torrential landslides (as in 1999), pirate attacks, and political executions have all left their imprint upon the collective unconscious. Yet trauma here produces no paralysis; instead, it gives rise to a fierce resilience.

It is no isolated fact that Venezuelan archaeology has discovered some of the most advanced and sophisticated weapons in the territory that today occupies the region known as the State of La Guaira (Huayra). Beyond the interpretations that may arise from geography and its influence upon military technique, the reality is that such defensive capacity and disposition—regarded by some as unique to the region—is fascinating. One can imagine how the coastal warrior, descendant of the Caribbean-Arawakan synthesis, grasped the ballistics of verticality on a metaphysical level.

Each face carefully molded into pre-Hispanic clay stands as a challenge to portside forgetfulness and the noise of passing commerce. Within those contoured mouths lives the cry of the phallic impulse of a people thirsting for war, a people that saw itself as a free port of its own will. In that sense, the local chiefdoms had already mapped firing angles and ambush routes linking the breakers of the coast to the cloud-covered forests; the axes and projectile points suggest as much, as do the granite maces—some measuring as much as 23 centimeters in length and 14 in diameter—which have themselves given rise to numerous questions and debates.

Although Maiquetía and Pariata are often presented simply as place names that survived dispossession, an analysis of indigenous power structures shows that these figures represented both the nodes of a defensive intelligence network and a system of values and strategy for relating to the Other. Their legacy survives not merely in the names of airports and avenues, but also in the belated recognition of the strategic vision—however rudimentary—of the ancient lords of the coast. The narrowness of the coastline did not burden the people of La Guaira with suffocation; instead, it tempered their spirit through the psychology of the sentinel: a vigilance that never sleeps because it understands that the horizon is always either a promise or a threat.

Maiquetía and La Guaira are not merely Venezuela’s principal gateway; they are the bastions that determine who enters and under what terms. Within that distinction lies the true psychological history of Pariata, Maiquetía, and the untamable spirit of the central coastline; the very utterance of the word Huayra becomes a declaration of atmospheric and warrior principles. The wind itself is a political actor: the messenger of the mountains and the herald of the storm.

After witnessing landslides, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, epidemics, battles, pirate incursions, prisons, wars of extermination, tortures, and decapitations, the phallic impulse of La Guaira rises again like a phoenix from its ashes, embodied in the heirs of its chiefs, Maiquetía and Pariata.

The mentality of today’s people of La Guaira, often interpreted as irreverent or defensive, is the psychic residue of centuries spent as the first line of battle. The palimpsest of La Guaira must be understood through the vigilance of the sentinel rather than through the passivity of the dock; entry should never be assumed to guarantee exit.

The people of La Guaira serve as the first unconscious filter of Venezuelan identity; their irreverent character is, in reality, a defense mechanism against whatever emerges on the horizon. The phallus of La Guaira is, symbolically, that impulse of resurgence which defies the gravity of landslides and the inertia of siege, reaffirming that the destiny of the nation breathing beyond the mountains is decided first in the face of the fury of the Huayra.

The original Spanish essay was published here.

We are showcasing a novel by one of Multipolar Press’s regular writers.

Michael Kumpmann — Dimensional Prophecy of Zohar Redux: Layer 1: Essence

In a rain-drenched future Kyoto, an incomprehensible terror tears through reality. They are called the Caine—entities that appear without warning, emit lethal radiation, and warp flesh and physics alike. Humanity’s only shield is the failing RSR Algorithm, a mathematical oracle that predicts their incursions. But the predictions are collapsing, and orbital decontamination weapons stand ready to incinerate the city. As the final hours tick down, three young women stand on the front lines of a war against the unknowable:

• Karala Yagiyu, a haunted mathematical prodigy drowning in self-doubt

• Madoka Michael, a snow-haired savant who sees patterns others cannot

• Hilal, a battle-scarred cyborg fighting to hold the line

Blending visceral body horror, philosophical cyberpunk, and fragile human connection, Dimensional Prophecy of Zohar Redux is a haunting descent into cosmic dread and deterministic nightmare. For fans of Ghost in the Shell, Serial Experiments Lain, Neuromancer, and the existential horror of Evangelion.

Order the book here.

Oğul Tuna explains how Beijing increasingly determines the tempo and terrain of the emerging global confrontation, even as Washington still possesses immense power.

The recent meeting in Beijing between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping had been eagerly anticipated as a “historic” moment. Xi’s cold treatment of Trump in October 2025 and the attack on Iran in February 2026 had raised doubts over whether the summit would even take place.

Yet in the end, the American president landed in Beijing on May 13. From the welcoming ceremony, which Xi himself did not attend, to the statements both leaders delivered afterward, the summit became one defined by symbolism and rhetoric.

As of May 17, it is difficult to agree with Western analysts who described the meeting as a case of “the mountain giving birth to a mouse.” Yes, the summit produced no major breakthrough. Two powers engaged in a long-term strategic rivalry were never expected to reconcile their interests on the core issues where they fundamentally clash. Yet the image created by the two leaders’ posturing—especially the contradictory messaging from the American side—revealed something else entirely: Trump and Xi resemble modern versions of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, shaped by the political and social conditions of today. Xi in particular established the tone of the coming era with remarks recalling Reagan’s famous declaration, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” The hegemon is exhausted, China is shaping the conditions of confrontation, and the meeting between the two leaders amounted less to a breakthrough than to an intermission.

“THE EXHAUSTED HEGEMON” IN BEIJING

Using the phrase coined by Chinese foreign policy specialist Hüseyin Korkmaz, even the journey of the “exhausted hegemon” to Beijing carried enormous symbolic significance. The United States remains powerful and perhaps still the dominant force in the world, yet it can no longer manage global crises alone. For that reason, Washington seeks common ground with China in order to reduce its burdens.

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This position itself contains a contradiction. Much like Gorbachev, Trump initially attempted to renew and purify the empire in order to preserve it. His first foreign-policy steps reflected an isolationist tendency and a desire to retreat towards a continental American strategy. After all, the primary threat lay in the Pacific, namely China itself. Yet, to the surprise of many bureaucrats, diplomats, and international-relations experts, the American administration found itself more deeply entangled in the Middle East than at any other point in its history, even while preparing to withdraw from the region. Thus, while preparing for confrontation with China—the true “final boss” of the geopolitical game—Washington instead traveled to Beijing to discuss Iran, Taiwan, and technology wars.

Throughout this process, Xi acted in a way that recalled the twenty-five-hundred-year-old Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and his principle that “the victorious side determines the conditions of victory before the war begins.” The setting was Beijing. The rhythm belonged to Beijing. The major themes of the agenda were no longer dictated solely by Washington. Even before Trump departed for China, Chinese diplomatic missions had been posting slogans associated with the Cold War phrase “peaceful coexistence,” reflecting precisely this atmosphere. In that context, the images Xi projected with Trump—and Trump’s unusually restrained, polite, and culturally respectful behavior towards China—carried significance on every level.

THREE DOSSIERS: IRAN, TAIWAN, AND TECHNOLOGY

China did not leave Washington’s softer messages unanswered. Yet behind the friendly imagery in Beijing stood the realities of the Strait of Hormuz, the Taiwan question, rare earth elements, artificial intelligence, espionage, and supply-chain conflicts. These issues demonstrate that U.S.–China rivalry has evolved beyond purely military or diplomatic competition into a struggle over infrastructure and technological systems themselves.

Trump’s greatest expectation from Xi was undoubtedly assistance regarding Iran and the reopening of breathing room for the global economy. This revealed clearly that the United States can no longer resolve every crisis on its own, especially one capable of producing massive aftershocks, as in Iran. Yet China does not wish to act as a “subcontractor” for the United States or for any other actor. Beijing seeks instead to preserve its own role as a builder of order.

The harshest message of the talks—one nobody anticipated—came from Xi himself. The Chinese Communist Party leader, usually known for his calm, measured, and constructive tone, invoked the concept of the “Thucydides Trap,” inspiring discussion across countless articles and languages. Named after the ancient Greek strategist Thucydides, the concept describes the risk of war that emerges when a rising power begins threatening an established hegemon. Yet at the Trump–Xi summit, the phrase pointed less towards inevitable war than towards the question of how competition itself will be managed. China seeks neither immediate escalation nor direct confrontation with the United States. Rather, Beijing wants to conduct this rivalry at its own pace, within a framework where its red lines are recognized and where what it calls “constructive strategic stability” prevails.

Despite its constructive language, Beijing also appears to be adapting the doctrine of “protracted war” developed by the founder of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong, to modern conditions. Here again, Sun Tzu’s maxim that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” serves as a guiding principle. China is not attempting to defeat the United States through direct military confrontation. Instead, it seeks to construct an environment that gradually narrows America’s freedom of movement—from rare earth minerals to AI standards, from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea. Mao’s emphasis on prolonged struggle and political will complements this strategy. From China’s perspective, the key issue is not whether America possesses power, but how long Washington can sustain that power simultaneously in Iran, Taiwan, technological competition, and domestic politics.

In this sense, Xi’s strategy does not consist of openly challenging the United States in order to provoke war. Rather, it consists of quietly gaining ground in those areas that deepen America’s problems of capacity, political will, and time.

NOT A TRAP, BUT MANAGED INSTABILITY

As some analysts suggest, Xi’s warning about the “Thucydides Trap” does not mean that China fears war. The warning instead demonstrates China’s desire to draw competition into a long-term, controlled, and manageable framework favorable to itself. Meanwhile, the bells are already tolling for Taiwan. A single spark there this autumn could plunge the entire globe into flames.

Regardless of America’s demands, China does not seek an end to rivalry. What Beijing desires is a form of competition that remains “measured,” “manageable,” and respectful of China’s red lines. Chinese officials warn that mishandling the Taiwan issue could lead to “conflict and even war,” while the American side insists its policy remains unchanged and attempts to maintain a lower profile on the matter. Trump’s remark on May 15—”You know, we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles (15,289km) to fight a war [Taiwan]. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down.”—reflected precisely this dynamic. Yet one must also remember Sun Tzu’s famous observation: “All warfare is based on deception.”

In the end, the Beijing summit produced neither peace nor reconciliation, but rather a new set of rules for competition. China does not view the avoidance of direct confrontation as weakness. It seeks instead to use time, geography, and the rhythm of crisis in its own favor. The same, of course, applies to the United States. Yet the material realities before us reveal an “exhausted hegemon” confronted by a rising power that points toward today’s blockades and effectively declares: “Tear down these walls!”

(Translated from the Turkish)

The United States Constitution, as originally ratified by the several American States, expressly stated that the new federal government was ordained and established for the Founding generation and their Posterity. The Founders were exclusively White Europeans, primarily of English descent. The 1828 edition of Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines “Posterity” as: “Descendants; children, children’s children, etc. indefinitely; the race that proceeds from a progenitor.” Likewise, “American,” as a title, is defined: “...now applied to the descendants of Europeans born in America.” So it was that the Americans were White Caucasians of European descent, largely of English stock and living in an extension of English culture. Other European races were added to the mix over time, which did complicate cultural matters. Still, until around 1950, White Europeans comprised roughly 90 percent of the U.S. population. Today, however, they account for little over half the population, their total numbers and relative percentage rank are falling, and, as Constantin von Hoffmeister notes, they are in a crisis. Here follows a brief look at von Hoffmeister’s new book, The Fate of White America.

Constantin von Hoffmeister is a German gentleman and scholar who studied English Literature and Political Science in New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. A multilingual intellectual, he has worked in the United States, India, Uzbekistan, and Russia. The author of Esoteric Trumpism and MULTIPOLARITY!, he is also a commentator for Russia Today and the founder and lead editor at Multipolar Press. The Fate of White America is available on Amazon.

At the outset of this review, I’d like to thank the author for his keen observations and analysis. I am reminded that an outside perspective, the more learned, the better, sometimes offers glimpses of things all around us that we, in our ordinary doings, might miss. Whites have been in the news, of course, and of late. Perhaps one read Alexander Dugin’s epic jeremiad about “Whites,” a tirade that von Hoffmeister defended, correctly, in your reviewer’s estimation.

So, what is the fate of White America? At present, as von Hoffmeister asserts, White Americans are in a crisis. And that is where The Fate of White America kicks off, addressing the situation in real, historical, and philosophical terms. The book begins with a look at Madison Grant’s 1916 book, The Passing of the Great Race. Grant’s good and not-so-good ideas are presented. Long before the postmodern age of radical demographic change, with many still refusing to acknowledge it is happening or that it is of concern, some were already concerned over 100 years ago. Their unease settled around the replacement of the principles that once guided the native stock of America, those regarding not merely ethnic identity, but also, and especially, see page 6, the “religious, political, and social foundations” of the old America. The interest was real and valid; as Jose Miguel recently noted, “By the 1900 US census no more than thirty-eight percent of the American Empire’s population was of the founding stock.”

Despite the subject matter, von Hoffmeister’s thoughtful work is not a racialist or racist screed, as I suspect some might want to portray it. He covers the differences between various views on race, and does so very well. Traditional non-White Americans, and others, may find something of value in von Hoffmeister’s words. Who will be offended by The Fate of White America? Liberals, of the First Political Theory variety, and globalists. And if they are so offended, then that will be higher praise than anything your reviewer could heap on the worthy author.

The Fate of White America then backs up and delineates the emergence of White America. The concept of standardized White people, in place of previous national identities, was a kind of compromise for early Americans. While it gave them a sense of collective identity, it came at the expense of losing parts of their various traditions. The author notes a correlation between this process and the Enlightenment ideas that helped turn the British Colonies into American States.

Chapter 3 deals with the concept of the “melting pot,” which, von Hoffmeister notes on page 20, is relatively new, emerging around 1929. He draws on Wyndham Lewis’s thoughts on racial consciousness and how the changes faced by the Western world upset long-standing customs. To wit, page 23:

In earlier eras, aristocracies, warrior castes, and cultural elites provided direction to their societies. In the modern age, according to Lewis, such figures drifted towards the margins. Political institutions and moral doctrines stripped them of legitimacy. The law they once embodied collapsed beneath democratic leveling and bureaucratic uniformity. These displaced figures wandered like prophets whose warnings fell upon deaf ears. They perceived the possibility that Western civilization might gradually merge into broader global systems, losing its distinct character in the process. Lewis compared their predicament to the tragic figure of Cassandra from Greek mythology, whose accurate prophecies earned ridicule rather than belief.

The reader probably has one or more notions, or examples, of how this process has affected some facet of Western and American life, whether it be Christianity, masculinity, athleticism, or intellectualization. If so, then one will likely wonder, alongside Lewis and von Hoffmeister, if the West can regroup, refocus, and carry on. Therein might lie a large part of the riddle facing White America.

Moving forwards, von Hoffmeister addresses America’s place in the new multipolar world order. On page 29, he writes: “Multipolarity does not herald the disappearance of the United States from the stage of history. It signals a transformation in scale, ambition, and orientation.” He is correct, though it is likely speculative whether the U.S. will continue to hold its current shape and composition. And that process, regardless of how America approaches it, is happening at this moment. The Fate of White America is a most timely book.

The book carries powerful declarative statements. On page 34, one of them is: “The true threat to mankind lies not in the recognition of racial reality but in the deliberate attempt to ignore it.” The author then proceeds to explain the rights of peoples, Whites included, and what it does and does not mean for a people asserting their identity. The book does not shy away from attacks on identity. In Chapter 7, “America’s Faustian Spirit,” von Hoffmeister tackles Emmanuel Celler’s lifelong project, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Of that sea change law, on page 46, von Hoffmeister writes and asks: “Over the following decades, the demographic composition of the United States changed at a pace unprecedented in the country’s earlier history. More than sixty years after that legislative turning point, the question arises once again: how do White Americans themselves interpret the identity of the nation?”

Pick a random White American and ask him that. The odds are that, regardless of what is said, a sense of confusion or frustration will be conveyed. And the next chapter, “Decline and Civil War,” delves into those sentiments, as stated upfront, analyzing “the internal fragmentation of the United States through a civilizational framework, drawing on [Oswald] Spengler and [Martin] Heidegger to interpret political conflict as a symptom of deeper cultural exhaustion.” Homage is paid to Julius Evola, among others. If one has not read Evola’s “American ‘Civilization,’” then one should.

The book proceeds with additional introspective treatment, some of it partly metaphorical, and with a presentation both informative and sublimely entertaining. For Americans blessed with Southern character, Chapter 13, “Spengler and the Confederacy,” will be a legitimate treat.

The final few chapters are a kind of examination of the very current happenings in America. Attention is paid to the examples of Charlie Kirk and MAGA, and von Hoffmeister revisits some of his thoughts from Esoteric Trumpism. Chapter 16, “Cimmerian America,” is a bit of genius, a combined ode to Patrick Buchanan and Conan the Barbarian, confronting “the death of the West as both an ending and a threshold.” (See page 110.) “‘Is this the end?’ The answer comes, low and steady: ‘That depends on whether we still remember how to fight.’” Id. The ending is as poetic as the body of the book is insightful. I leave the final thoughts about who might “mistake motion for mastery” to the reader’s examination.

If you, dear reader, whether you are White, American, or otherwise, enjoy a challenging ballad to the art of civilization, then do yourself a favor and read The Fate of White America. As with any great book, it will get the gears inside one’s head turning. To the White American reader, know that, though it is conditioned according to God’s designs and graces, fate is still largely in your hands. Constantin von Hoffmeister has given you, us, that is, an excellent summation of where we came from, where we are now, and where we might go tomorrow.

Order The Fate of White America here.

Kazuhiro Hayashida examines how modern anti-Russian discourse in Japan reflects a deeper civilizational rupture shaped by Atlanticist influence and historical amnesia.

The current anti-Russian discourse in Japan is far more than a simple expression of diplomatic positioning. It is the East Asian manifestation of what Daria Dugina called the sickness of modernity. Just as the agents of homogenization destroy the duality of ethnic identity, the Anglo-American maritime order dissolved Japan’s historical axis of judgment and fixed the country into the role of a peripheral enforcement mechanism. Borrowing the language of René Guénon, this represents the political implementation of the “reign of quantity.” Just as modernity reduces qualitative distinctions into quantitative uniformity, the Anglo-American maritime order reduced Japan’s civilizational uniqueness into homogenized Atlanticist values. Japan’s outer vessel remained intact while its inner substance was replaced.

Daria Dugina argued that every civilization possesses the right to breathe its own air and to rise and decline according to its own rhythm. Contemporary Japan, however, has sealed off that very breath with its own hands. The Fourth Russo-Japanese Convention exposes this deception directly.

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Within Japan, anti-Russian sentiment is often presented as a natural historical emotion. In reality, it possesses the same structure as what Daria Dugina dissected as “polite domination in the name of progress,” and what René Guénon called contre-initiation—counter-tradition. Counter-tradition is the operation through which authentic tradition is imitated while its values are inverted from within. This is precisely what is occurring in today’s anti-Russian discourse. Rather than imposing itself externally, it implants itself as though it were Japan’s own historical consciousness, thereby overturning perception from the inside. The accumulation of the Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916 exposes the deception of this implantation. Japan and Russia were not fixed as essential historical enemies in the early twentieth century. After the Russo-Japanese War, through negotiations concerning Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and China, the two powers moved towards a position in which they could jointly manage the order of the Far East.

The Fourth Russo-Japanese Convention and its secret agreements prove that both countries had reached a stage of consultation and cooperation. This was far more than a temporary truce. It was evidence that a multipolar order in East Asia once existed as a genuine historical possibility. The crucial issue here lies in the structural interests of Anglo-American maritime hegemony. Just as Daria Dugina defined multipolarity as “the possibility for each civilization to exist according to its own conditions,” Russo-Japanese cooperation embodied precisely that possibility in East Asia. What threatened the Anglo-American powers was not Russo-Japanese conflict, but Russo-Japanese cooperation. If Japan and Russia could cooperate in the Far East and restrict third-party interference in continental Eurasia, the Anglo-American maritime order would lose its permanent right of intervention in East Asia. Russo-Japanese cooperation represented a situation in which Japan maintained its own civilizational center of gravity through cooperation with the continental order. What the Anglo-American powers required was the destruction of that centripetal force. Once the civilizational core is destroyed, a civilization becomes hollow while preserving only its exterior shell. Contemporary Japan embodies exactly this condition. For Japan to cease breathing its own historical air and instead breathe Atlanticist air became an essential prerequisite for maritime hegemony.

Today this descent has been completed institutionally. Whereas Daria Dugina defined tradition as “a living force modernity attempted to destroy yet failed to destroy,” in Japan it is historical memory itself that became the target of destruction. Under the banners of cooperation with NATO, security dialogue, and countermeasures against disinformation, Japan’s perception of Russia is reconstructed through the external framework that “the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are one,” rather than through Japan’s own historical experience. This is the completed form of Guénon’s reign of quantity and the political implementation of the homogenizing sickness of modernity dissected by Daria Dugina. Qualitative uniqueness is erased, and the quantitative uniformity of hostility required by the Anglo-American powers is implanted in place of Japan’s historical consciousness. It is not Japan itself that inherently hates Russia. Rather, Japan has been led to mistake the form of hostility required by the Anglo-American maritime order for its own historical emotion.

The clearest contemporary embodiment of this structure is the government of Sanae Takaichi. The essence of the Takaichi administration lies in the proxy enforcement of Atlanticist order clothed in the vocabulary of patriotism. Parliamentary statements claiming that a Taiwan contingency could become a situation threatening Japan’s survival did not emerge from Japan’s own postwar logic. They emerged from the adoption of Taiwan’s historical narrative of legitimacy as Japan’s own axis of judgment, thereby placing Japan in objective alignment with the historical lineage of the anti-Japanese Chongqing government. China’s strong reaction should therefore be understood not as an accidental emotional response, but as a continuing reaction to unresolved historical subjectivity. Likewise, the diplomatic policy advocating the evolution of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” amounts to a declaration that Japan is abandoning its historical role as a balancing axis between continental and maritime orders and fixing itself as an outpost of Anglo-American maritime hegemony. This is the condition in which the hollow shell of a civilization that has lost its civilizational core speaks the will of others as though it were its own language. The more Sanae Takaichi subjectively speaks of strengthening Japan, the more objectively Japan’s self-isolation deepens. This is the essential paradox of the current rightward shift and the historical position of the Takaichi administration.

Daria Dugina wrote that “every soul is assigned its own place in the cosmos, its own spiritual homeland.” The same may be said of nations. Just as René Guénon argued for the existence of a metaphysical center unique to every civilization, Japan’s historical homeland lies at the point of contact between continental and maritime orders, holding the axis of their mediation. Japan was never a nation destined to establish its subjectivity through total hostility towards Russia. Yet contemporary Japan has abandoned its civilizational core and now processes Russia solely through the moralized enemy image prepared by the Anglo-American powers. This is not strength. It is the condition in which the soul is captured by passion and sinks into false dreams at the bottom of the cave—the image of a civilization hollowed out while preserving only its outer shell.

Therefore, criticizing today’s anti-Russian discourse does not mean unconditionally defending Russia. Rather, just as Daria Dugina defined multipolarity as “not a solution, but an opportunity to try once more,” it means demanding that Japan recover the ability to read its own history through its own perspective. It is the practice of reclaiming the civilizational core from within—the reversal of an inverted consciousness, just as René Guénon sought to expose the manipulations of counter-tradition. The Fourth Russo-Japanese Convention represented the starting point of that reversal. That agreement demonstrated that Russo-Japanese hostility was never an unavoidable destiny, and that Russo-Japanese cooperation once existed as a historical reality. Erasing the memory of that reality is precisely the central function of anti-Russian discourse as counter-tradition, and it is the reason why the Sanae Takaichi administration stands at its institutional summit.

Without breaking this illusion, Japan will never recover its own civilizational breath.

(Translated from the Japanese)

Kenneth Schmidt argues that America’s mounting economic pain is finally shattering the political and financial machinery behind the U.S.–Israeli alliance.

It’s good that the prospect of a recession/depression along with massive world suffering is going to eventually put an end to the strange relationship between the United States and Israel. It is wonderful that the American people have come to the collective conclusion that the informal alliance between the US and Israel is going to end. The sad part is that it need not have had to entail so much pain and suffering.

A couple of days ago, even the fanatical Zionist Benjamin Netanyahu said that his country was planning to wean itself off American money over a ten-year period. Of course, I doubt his sincerity as he is an extremely devious man, but the very fact that he brought the subject up is quite telling. I have long believed that it would have been easier for the Israelis to just take up a collection among the American billionaires. Heck, Larry Fink, head of the financial giant BlackRock could entirely finance the State of Israel and its military with his summer vacation money. Come on! It’s just 4 billion a year, mere “chump change,” as the East Coast US Blacks say. Fink and Miriam Adelson could easily pay more than half, with the rest coming from mere passionate Jewish millionaires. Wealthy Manhattan synagogues could sponsor single warplanes. The latest and best version of the F-15 fighter-bomber costs around 92 million. Imagine a brand-spanking new F-15 with the words “Temple Beth Shalom” painted on the side! I can just imagine some Jewish widow proudly bragging to her friends that “Herman left a brand-new Blackhawk helicopter to the IDF in his will.”

The whole complicated matter of buying members of the US Congress with campaign contributions could come to an end. Keeping them “bought” is a pain in the neck. Sure, they get a little thrill from saddling the goyim with the cost, but Jonathan Greenblatt of AIPAC could take a long vacation. With the huge decline in support for Israel in the last 2 years, he really needs some time off.

Imagine how great it would be for the United States to actually have a foreign policy based on sound strategic principles; on realism. Now, it’s just based on how much money you throw in the direction of politicians. Money for campaigns is the number one priority, especially re-election money. Back in the 80s and 90s I was deeply involved in electoral politics. I spent years trying to get a friend of mine, a good man, into the New Jersey State Legislature. With herculean efforts, me, and a group of young men, got our pal in the State Senate. After attaining his position, I would saunter into his office and say “How’s it going John?” and he would often reply “Good, I’m raising money.” My friend John was a very idealistic man, who sacrificed much, including financially, trying to push New Jersey to the right. Once you get in office though, the emphasis becomes keeping your seat and money for re-election becomes a high priority, maybe even the highest. This is how Jewish billionaires control the US and its foreign policy: campaign contributions. It’s as simple as that.

Kaisarion on the decomposition of the Western order and the rise of a new historical epoch.

Thus is the hour:

From Washington, London, Paris, and Brussels stretch the tendrils of the Liberal World Order to every corner of the world; indeed, the regional spheres of the past are decades removed from the present intercontinental scale of politics. The true masters of the Liberal Order are corporatists and bankers who adhere to the Promethean-Satanic ethos of self-glorification, manifest as an insatiable pursuit of capital gain and sensory pleasure. Consequentially, every nation is required to profess a commitment to Humanism by way of Democratic-Republican governance while simultaneously assisting in the plunder of its natural resources. To disobey is to risk isolation, if not outright invasion, in the name of “freedom” and “human rights,” with only China and Russia capable of unilateral defiance. All critics of this economic imperialism are slandered as Communists.

Though possessing terrific military capabilities, the true might of the Liberal Order can be found in its various spy agencies, whose reach is nearly absolute. Under the guise of security, every citizen of the West is tracked at every moment, down to even which chair they occupy in their living rooms. When citizens attempt to exercise their constitutional rights in manners inconvenient or disruptive to the sanctioned narrative, the agents of the Liberal Order swoop in to interdict the initiative; this is accomplished by corrupting either the leaders or their message, or simply arresting or killing them and everyone else considered sufficiently threatening to the status quo.

Royals and the palaces which once stood as the literal foundations of realms are displayed as nothing more than tourist attractions. The only sanctioned heroes of the common man are the “celebrities” who are afforded absurd excesses and fall into two camps: pseudo-intellectuals who use inventive terminology to reinforce their bizarre theorems, and entertainers who champion the agenda. Masculinity itself is branded “toxic,” especially when the person is considered racially “White,” and the nuclear family is derided as an archaic hindrance to important social progress and development. All the past—defined as everything before the impetus of the moment—is taught to be “outdated” and “backwards” under the premise that time is strictly linear and perpetually improving from the primitivity of yesterday. Monuments that have endured hundreds of years of strife are labeled “offensive” and replaced by formless abstractions; masterful works of art are supplanted by smearings of color. All unwavering demonstration of spiritual conviction is besieged as “extremist,” and anyone who tries to uphold timeless values or unfashionable forms of identity is condemned as a Fascist.

As a means of placation, the masses are dazzled by flashing lights and optical sensations produced by electronic devices. Pornography is prolific and freely given to numb the mind and encourage the satisfaction of one’s carnal urges in the crudest and quickest manner possible. Those who are not indoctrinated are often neutralized through the ruination of their bodies. Cultural decadence has led to a slovenly baseline, and obesity is rampant. Virtually all food is contaminated through either unnatural additives or the plastic packaging itself, and precious few have the means to produce their own; in this hour, it is the corporations that mass-possess land and the means of production. To “treat” the symptoms of poor diets and habits, people are pumped with chemicals from infancy that permanently hamper the body’s natural processes. The Liberal Order requires that castration and strange alchemies are to be promoted and performed on all people at their fancy under the premise that not allowing a male to attempt to become a female, that is to say not humoring their delusions, is adjacent to murdering them.

Despite these many horrors perpetrated by the Liberal Order, broadly personified as the Evolian Tiger or, more recently, the sinister specter of Epstein, there is reason for hope and enthusiasm. The beast’s hubris spurned it to rampage wantonly and with increasing acceleration, which has led to a popular rejection that swells by the day. The masses have begun to realize the material excesses they are told to pursue cannot fill the void within. The oppressed comprehend their oppressors as the bourgeoisie now popularly labeled the “Epstein Class.” Identitarians of every stripe wrestle back into power over their respective spheres, both within and still more strongly beyond the West. Dawn may yet be on the horizon.